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NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY HUMANITIES SERIES
volume 8

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN THE HUMANITIES
NUMBER EIGHT

THE AESTHETIC PROCESS

BY

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AMS PRESS
NEW YORK

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First AMS EDITION published 1970
Manufactured in the United States of America**

**International Standard Book Number
Complete Set 0 404 50700 X
Number 8 0 404 50708 5**

Library of Congress Card Catalog Number 75 129000

**AMS PRESS, INC.
NEW YORK, N Y 10003**

TO FAY

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Preface

In this volume I have tried to make some ideas clear to myself. For some years now I have hoped to understand art and beauty not merely in a way which would be consonant with my own appreciations, but also in a way which seemed to me philosophically satisfactory. My Odyssey in aesthetic theory began with the inviting call to accept a theory that art can be looked upon as a kind of pleasure. Later, it led me through the mazes of metaphysical theories of "meaning," in an attempt to see art as some kind of peculiar relation between a mind and its object. Because these earlier positions eventually turned out for me to be neither philosophically attractive nor aesthetically worthy, I was led to re-state my ideas in the form in which they are here offered, and in a form which I believe to be more defensible. In this form, I hope that others may also find some clarity in the ideas.

In presenting these ideas I have, of course, borrowed heavily from the philosophical tradition, both near and remote. In recent times I have been impressed by the work of Samuel Alexander, of Bergson, of Dewey, and of Alfred North Whitehead, as well as by the work of others too numerous to mention, as they have contributed to my own thought on aesthetic matters. Especially have I been impressed with the need of "taking time seriously," and of seeing the implications of time for understanding art. Thus, I have tried to understand art as the process through which one comes to be aware of beauty and its nature. This way of looking at the matter is certainly not new, but it is a way which has many unobserved things, and which deserves further exploration. I should be happy if this volume contributed to that end.

Formal acknowledgments are inadequate signs of appreciation of those who have given unsparingly of their time and interest and attention. My colleagues in the Department of Philosophy have always been gratifyingly responsive to the many demands I have made on them, and I take this opportunity of thanking them one

and all. Dr. Fritz Kaufmann has been especially gracious in going over an early draft of the manuscript, and in making innumerable helpful suggestions for its improvement. Also, Professor D. T. Howard has kindly given me criticism on several sections of this work. Professor Moody Prior of the Department of English has read the manuscript, and has assisted me greatly in his criticism of it for style; and Professor John W. Spargo, Editor of the Northwestern University Studies, has generously contributed his time and attention to the editing of this work. To Dean Thomas Moody Campbell of the Graduate School, I owe a great debt for his encouragement and help in the publishing of this manuscript. I wish to thank these men, as well as innumerable others who have aided in this work. I do not, of course, relinquish the responsibilities for the shortcomings of the work.

My thanks are due also to the editors of *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* for permission to use, in Chapters II and III, material from my article, "Intention and Fulfillment in Art," which they published in the December, 1940 issue; and in addition my thanks to the editors of the *Journal of Philosophy* for permission to use, in Chapter V, material from two of my articles, "Metaphysics of Beauty," Oct. 24, 1935, and "Beauty in Nature," Nov. 25, 1937.

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April 28, 1943

B. M.

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Introduction

One cannot define a field until it has been explored, together with its surrounding fields. Definitions are not truly meaningful at the beginning of an inquiry, but only at the end. To be sure, they may be suggestive, but what is suggestive only hints at an orientation; it does not constitute the orientation itself.

A definition of beauty suffers the same fate as other definitions. To define beauty in advance of sustained inquiry into it appears to be nothing short of monstrous pretense. Yet the fact of beauty is so thoroughly engraved in human experience that it becomes an ever-new object of research and study. Many people seem to have an idea of what it is, and would like to talk about it more or less intelligently. The point of view taken in this work is that in order to talk about beauty intelligently, one must understand the process by which it comes into being, and its place in human experience.

The purpose of aesthetic theory is unquestionably to help us understand the beautiful and the ugly. No one seriously challenges the statement that this is its purpose, but students of the subject are continually at loggerheads as to what constitutes the beautiful and the ugly, and as to what understanding them means. No doubt, many of the issues in aesthetics will never be resolved to the satisfaction of all students. Nevertheless, the continual re-assessment of these issues is not profitless; for the aesthetic field must be continually re-surveyed in the light of new cultural developments. Though philosophical inquiry inevitably seeks the timeless element that transcends any particular culture, even the philosophical cannot quite free itself from the influence of the particular culture in which the inquiry flourishes; it cannot quite free itself from the temporal element. The temporal element is perhaps what makes the philosophical quest ever-attractive and fruitful.

The impact of the changing social and political order, of modern science and of machine industry, of newly emerging economic institutions and of present-day technology, cannot but be felt on

aesthetic theory. When we are confronted with new art-forms, for example, the cinema, we must inevitably reconsider our leading aesthetic principles. In the modern age, our thinking and acting have beyond question made the idea of time assume proportions incomparable to those which it could have had in any preceding age. Of even greater moment than any philosophical or abstract idea of time is the actual functioning of time in our cultural activities; that is, time embodied in human affairs. Embodied time is process. Though the idea of process is not new to thought, it has assumed a prominence in philosophy, in science, in government, in industry—in our whole culture generally—which it has never enjoyed previously. The titles of an ever-increasing number of writings testify to the hold which the idea of process has on our present-day thinking: *The Judicial Process*, *The Social Process*, *Process and Reality*, *The Process of Revolution*, and many more. It is for the historian to trace the development of this idea, and the historian no doubt will devote a large chapter to the part which the biological sciences have played in the genesis of the idea.

Although the arts are not indifferent to the cultural climate of the idea of process, aesthetic theory has tended to be more sheltered from its influence than have the arts. The dialectical materialists have with spotty success approached the theme of process in aesthetics; perhaps in the future they may more boldly come to terms with it. In this country John Dewey has pioneered the exploration of it in his *Art as Experience*, and Stephen Pepper has further cleared the ground in his *Aesthetic Quality*.

The present work makes no claim to being a thoroughgoing analysis of the aesthetic process, yet in this approach to aesthetic problems the idea of process has, with some exceptions, been decisive. In aesthetics, perhaps more so than in other disciplines, the limitations of the idea are, however, strikingly evident. Although both creation and appreciation are taken to be thoroughly processual, in their consummatory phase, both end by resolving the art-process in a structural form. Thus, we seem compelled to distinguish between the art-process, through which creation and appreciation are sustained, and the apprehended form, which is the resolution of the process; that is, beauty. The critic may rejoin, of

course, that the end attained in this process is not a complete finality, and we may eventually have to agree. Nevertheless, since we cannot yet dispense with the notion of aesthetic resolution or end, we had better hold fast to it until further analysis provides us with something more adequate to put in its place.

Linguistic difficulties constitute one of the greatest stumbling-blocks to the analysis of process. Modern developments in semantics attempt to overcome these difficulties, but for reasons which appear later, the point of view of present-day semantics seems to give little aid and comfort to understanding the nature of the aesthetic process. Vocabularies enable us to talk about things and their attributes more easily than about processes and their characterization. Because there is no adequate language of process, we have had to do the best we could with the vocabulary at our command. To overcome the difficulty, we have been forced at times to make over-sharp distinctions, and then afterwards to qualify them. At other times we have had to fall back upon metaphorical language, especially for illustrative purposes. The matter is somewhat simplified by the fact that a language which refers to things is somewhat more appropriate to a description of beauty. For the art-process is consummated in beauty; and aesthetic form comes into being. The process terminates in form, and, given form, definition becomes feasible.

The starting-point of an analysis is always arbitrary. We have chosen in Chapter I to begin with an analysis of the aesthetic attitude. In the course of this analysis, problems emerge which lead us on, in Chapter II, to a consideration of the aesthetic object. In Chapter III we start from a relatively fresh point of view and attempt to sketch the outline of a constructive aesthetic theory, which we have called the theory of the satisfied imagination. In order to base the theory on solid ground, we have found it necessary, in Chapter IV, to distinguish at some length the aesthetic from other forms of activity. Chapter V, on kinds of beauty, deals with some miscellaneous matters which would seem to challenge the theory of the satisfied imagination. In the last two Chapters, VI and VII, we consider the foundations of the aesthetic judgment and of art-criticism. In the former, especially, we try to show the implications

of process for aesthetic judgment. In the latter we try more explicitly to relate aesthetic theory to the arts and to culture. The treatment does not pretend to be exhaustive, but at best is suggestive of the kind of practical criticism in which we may profitably indulge, on the basis of the theory of the satisfied imagination. The importance of practical criticism cannot be overestimated. No doubt this is the idea in which we can most truly judge both the virtues and the limitations of the notion of aesthetic process.

The study of aesthetics helps us to orient ourselves in the field of values. Certainly, no treatment of the general problem of values can afford to ignore the fresh insights which may come from an understanding of the aesthetic experience. Since our problem, however, is not that of value-theory but of aesthetic theory, we must try to define the field of aesthetics as a specific area of philosophical inquiry.

CHAPTER I

The Aesthetic Attitude

The way in which man culturally responds to a thing reflects an attitude. An attitude is an orientation to something. When an individual approaches something with a sense of reverence and awe, or with a sense of contempt and arrogance, or with a sense of amiability and kindness, or in the myriad other ways possible to him, he appraises it as an item in a world with which he is coming to terms. He is a being who has partly organized his world, for better or for worse, and is trying to further this organization in new situations. In short, he has developed attitudes towards his world.

Typical attitudes are the attitudes which are common to typical ways of responding. Consequently when we have discovered the principles of a typical attitude, we may reasonably speak of "the attitude," to which the principles refer. Thus, if we can discover the principles which apply to the typical attitude of the scientist or of the artist, we may reasonably speak of "the scientific attitude" or of "the aesthetic attitude." At the outset, we are inclined to believe that such expressions as the scientific attitude or the aesthetic attitude are not meaningless; and we hope in subsequent pages to set forth what we may mean by the aesthetic attitude.

Since attitudes foreshadow future responses, they are not to be thought of as merely mechanical. When one responds or fails to respond (a negative response) to something, one manifests an attitude towards it, unless the action is purely mechanical, involving no anticipation of things on the basis of past experience. For ordinary purposes, the knee-jerk or the responses of the automatic nervous system would not in this view be considered attitudinal responses. The aesthetic response, obviously, is one which involves consciousness and emotion, or perhaps better, an emotional consciousness. What is less obvious but no less important is that the emotional

response, if aesthetic, must eventuate as a responsible emotion. This statement is no mere play on words. It points to the noteworthy fact that the aesthetic attitude anticipates the creation of a worthy object, of an object which makes sense; and it warns us that we must not confuse an emotional jag with aesthetic activity. However much of "madness" there may be in aesthetic activity, the artist is one who in the art-process turns madness into insight.

Through the aesthetic attitude, which yields insight, we can come to appreciate better not only a past culture but also our own, for through the attitude we can appreciate in its arts the character of a culture. To a superlative degree the arts express the qualities which an age prizes, the human actions which it cherishes, and the ideals which it ennobles. Expression purifies and makes determinate these qualities or actions or ideals in art, through which they may be preserved as a monumental heritage for future generations. In the aesthetic attitude a culture can be captured and held, not as a set of bare facts to be statistically tabulated, but as the fruition of the travail of human minds. And we may add, the more completely a culture is integrated, the more significant does its art become, and the more humane do human beings become, in a world which is consonant with their being.

Aesthetic data appear not as unprovoked genii; they appear in the course of the process by which man expresses his attitudes. When adequate expression is achieved, beauty is created, life is enhanced, and art flourishes. When life is cheap, ideals become correspondingly degraded and art increasingly thin. The furthering or hampering of man's attitudes is reflected in the quality of his art, and when the art-activity is denied to man or when it is aborted, he suffers under a culture destined to decadence. Man then exists in a world which is alien to his deep-seated interests, and sickly ornamentation may come to be substituted for virile art.

Our present purpose is to justify a use of the term, aesthetic attitude; that is, to try to discover the principles of the attitude in which the aesthetic experience comes to fruition. We find in the literature of aesthetics at least three principles, which, though not universally accepted, provide a point of departure for analysis: immanence, disinterestedness, and unity. We may explore these

principles for the light which they shed on defining the aesthetic attitude. A word of warning may help to allay a possible misapprehension. We shall not find that the aesthetic attitude is thoroughly and adequately definable, precisely because it is not in and of itself a complete thing, but is inseparable from the total, aesthetic complex in which it appears. Yet, we may hope to see its relatively distinct characteristics, and what is perhaps more important, to see how in understanding the attitude we are moved to consider other phases of the aesthetic complex. In this way we hope to construct a positive aesthetic theory, which we may call the theory of the satisfied imagination. We shall begin by paying due regard to the attitudinal response in terms of the principles of immanence, disinterestedness, and unity, respectively.

Immanence

Aesthetic value is usually thought to be immanent or intrinsic, in contrast with those values which are transcendent or extrinsic. Accordingly, the aesthetic attitude is one which looks to the immediate enjoyment of things. A thing immediately enjoyed or suffered, as being good or bad in and of itself, differs from that which is good or bad only as it facilitates or debilitates another thing, which is good or bad. There is little disagreement with the belief that aesthetic value furthers man's life-functions, that it invigorates, refreshes, and makes for better vision. The problem is rather whether there is anything which is not instrumental, whether there is any aesthetic value which can be considered to be immanent or wholly self-contained. Since the time of Plato, the disconcerting notion has prevailed that art may be pure illusion, that it may be only a copy, and that its value resides only in its furthering ultimate values of holiness. In the *Republic*, Plato applies criteria of reality which by means of transcendent principles prejudice things in the light of an absolute good, but when Plato identifies the absolute good with absolute beauty, the principle of immediacy becomes greatly attenuated. In the *Philebus*, he puts some perceptions in

the class of things which are good in themselves, even though he does not put them in the class of the highest goods.

In modern times, Santayana, who has insisted upon the need for emotional consciousness in which alone the immediacy of aesthetic value can be guaranteed, denies that there can be any beauty in a purely mechanical or in a purely intellectual world. He affirms that mechanism excludes consciousness, and that intellectualism excludes emotion. On the one hand, a mechanical world is one in which a thing is never independent of the forces which act upon it, and upon which it acts. The mechanical thus involves the principle of never-ending action and reaction. On the other hand, a purely intellectual world is one of implicative relationships, which is neither to be admired nor despised. Such a world is meaningful only in the sense that a proposition or set of propositions implies others. The meaning of a proposition is other propositions, the totality of which constitutes the intellectual world. Immediacy as an aesthetic principle, however, refers not to propositions, which may be true or false, but to experience which is fulfilment.

Two remarks are relevant here; first, concerning the distinction made between datum and experience, and secondly, concerning the allegation of the sensuous character of aesthetic value. The datum considered as the traditional primary or secondary sense-quality is not a unity, as William James argues in his criticism of sensations. Lemonade is not a sum-total of sense-qualities. A datum *means*, and thus is not immanent, but is a sign which has transcendent reference. One alternative is that data are merely subjective feelings, but then, of course, there can be no intersubjective testing of feelings, and objective knowledge is impossible. In this case, meanings can never be validated or invalidated. Another possibility which we shall explore later, is that the datum is not experience, but that it falls *within* experience.

The sensuous character of aesthetic value is suggested by the root meaning of the word aesthetic; namely, *aesthesis*. Aesthetic immediacy would also seem to be sensuous. Seeing and hearing are relevant to art in a way in which they are irrelevant to intellectual disciplines. Science is translatable in abstract terms; poetry is not. The meaning of the one is sundered from arbitrary symbols; the

meaning of the other is carried in the symbol. The prosaic may point to the poetic; it cannot express it. This distinction, of course, prejudices the issue concerning the alleged beauty of abstract systems, for it arbitrarily repudiates the aesthetic character of mathematics and logic. The procedure may appear questionable, but we can better recur to the problem in a later context.

When the sensuous character of beauty is analyzed into component parts, usually called sense-data, aesthetic theory becomes plagued with what is its most perplexing problem. For when we analyze the whole into parts, we must then reconstitute them into the whole. Unfortunately, however, once we separate the whole into parts, we cannot make them coalesce again into the whole. Croce, for example, frankly repudiates this method of analysis, and insists that we must take our choice between sense-data or unity, since the two are incompatible. Both Croce's theory and the theory of sense-data hold fast to the principle of immanence. But in the latter theory, immanence characterizes not the aesthetic experience, but only the separate data as they are successively felt. The theory cannot, however, re-integrate the data within the larger, aesthetic whole. Croce's theory surmounts this difficulty by asserting that the whole is immanent—his theory rebaptizes the immanent as "a spiritual aesthetic synthesis"—yet his theory provides no technique for analyzing art, and consequently provides no mechanism by which art can be communicated. Apparently, we are confronted with the dilemma of insisting either upon analyzing art into sense-data, and then we are unable to understand art; or of insisting upon the impossibility of analyzing art, and then we are unable to understand how art is communicable.

Dilemmas of this sort usually indicate the setting of a false problem. If so, we may better proceed by re-examining the underlying assumptions. We may begin by questioning the assumption of the existence of atomic data which are immediately given and which are open to inspection only by the recipient. More specifically, we may examine more closely, in order that we may come to a better understanding of the aesthetic attitude, that datum in aesthetic experience which is called pleasure.

When the newly sophisticated mind seeks for that which is good in its own right, and which is at the same time enjoyable by human beings, it invariably resolves upon a state of consciousness, whose privacy guarantees its unassailability. No success in such an enterprise is possible without making a sharp separation between states of consciousness and the external, physical world. A new area of inquiry thus becomes delimited, and attention may be focused upon man and human problems, instead of upon the world and problems of nature. At least, we can trace this course of events in Greek times. In their affirmation that man is the measure of all things, the Sophists directed thought away from nature to human nature. Cyrenaic insistence upon pleasure as the only good and pain as the only evil is a logical outgrowth of Gorgias's denial of the possibility of knowledge. Pleasure is ostensibly the most indisputable sort of positive good, intrinsic and unquestionable. When I say that I experience pleasure and that I consider it a good, on what grounds can one controvert me? For he who does so, impugns my integrity; he pries into the innermost recesses of my being, which only I can know.

According to the position assumed above, fact and value are regarded as one and the same; but only those things are facts which are constituted as direct, immediate appearances, and not those things which in themselves constitute the physical world. In this cultural climate, man becomes value-conscious, and of those values which are immediately enjoyed in experience. But the subtlety of hedonism is not sufficiently far-reaching. On the one hand, Hegelias shows that this ivory-tower attitude can lead only to pessimism. On the other hand, both the atomists and the later Epicureans declare that one must distinguish between kinds of pleasures.

Hedonistic aesthetics is a recurrent pattern of thought, the plausibility of which resides primarily in the search for the indubitably immanent. Its appeal consists in part in that which man takes as a final authority and in part in the utter simplicity of the doctrine. Concerning tastes there is no dispute. Let man argue about what he does not know; not about what he does know. Here is resolved immanence; here the ineffable is its own guarantee. The Siren of pleasure knows only itself.

A *laissez-faire* policy of refusing to argue about philosophies is coming more and more to be the philosophical fashion of the day. Some logicians warn us that philosophical systems are only verbal, and entirely nonsensical. When utterances are merely verbal or entirely nonsensical, we had better ignore them. If, however, not all philosophers have been charlatans and if their philosophies do have content, then we may reasonably criticize their assertions with respect to the content, and we may hope to validate or invalidate such assertions for ourselves. If, moreover, the material is experience which cannot be measured by rods and clocks, so much the worse for methods which demand these techniques. No *a priori* or empirical arguments make rods and clocks sacred. Even science must fall back upon verification, which always contains an element of the ineffable. And even if meanings in science were always transcendent, this fact would constitute no argument that all meanings are of this sort and that there are no immanent meanings. Another and more subtle reason for refusing to argue is that alternative philosophies have their own peculiar content and that they are all equally valid. To test whether this is the case, we must analyze the various philosophies, and check assertions with experience, by which alone verbal arguments can be dissipated and inconsistencies ferreted out. With the intent then not of polemicizing but rather of clarifying a point of view, we may assess some of the basic claims of hedonistic aesthetics.

The most telling consideration with respect to hedonistic aesthetics is the factual question of whether or not one ever experiences pleasure simply; that is, a pleasure sundered from any other sense-presentation, visual, auditory, kinaesthetic, etc. If one answers here in the affirmative, the issue is resolved, and there is no further dispute, except that beauty for most people is considered something different. If, however, the answer is negative, one may raise the further question that if pleasure is never sundered from experience, is it sunderable? Such an issue is factitious, in the sense that the alleged empirical aesthetics is now built not upon experience but upon conceptions. The coercive force of the pleasure-theory is then dissipated, since its original claims to immanence are supposed to be grounded in experience, but actually are not.

Philosophers, however, often have a way of saying what they do not mean, and by pleasure they may mean not pleasure, but, as in Santayana's version, pleasure taken as the quality of a thing. We need not argue about labels, but we should observe that in Santayana's version simple hedonism is now forsaken, and subtle empirical analysis of integrated appearances put in its stead. Pleasures are distinguished into kinds, and we must differentiate between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic.¹ Objectified pleasures are no longer pleasures; we speak of things as *pleasurable*. And in all fairness it should be observed that aesthetic value cannot be equated with pleasure simply, but only with a total experience which has a pleasurable aspect.

Again it may be that to take issue with such a view ends only in polemic and that the alleged issue can be nothing more than two assertions of different things; but again questions may be asked in order to clarify the matter. First, the question: Is pleasure actually experienced as the quality of an appearance? This is a matter of fact, and only experience can give the answer. If it is affirmative, the issue is resolved; and at best we can assert that this again is not what many people mean by beauty. But a key word, which is not to be slurred over, is "objectified." Its meaning lies in contrast with its complement "subjectified," and one may justly raise the question whether or not understanding of the one entails that of the other; that is, whether or not they are complements, referring to polar aspects of beauty. Because the pleasure-theory is not wholly articulate and suppresses much that it actually contains, it gains in attractiveness. In the name of intellectual honesty, however, the theory must be expanded to include all that is relevant to it. Then we may question whether pleasure is the essence of the aesthetic experience. In truth, the essence of the aesthetic experience is the aesthetic experience, and nothing short of it. Through better sustained analysis, we shall presently try to show that what is here called the immanent, actually engenders some kind of process, the successful culmination of which issues into the aesthetic experience.

The chief virtue of hedonism lies in its stricture that we look

¹ Cf. *Sense of Beauty*, New York, Scribner's, 1896, pp. 35 ff.

to experience. "Reality" is that which can be verified in the present, in the immediately given. Upon making the empirical test, however, we find that the hedonistic theory is disproportionately narrow to fact. The imperative for unity leads to hasty acceptance of the atomic. Unquestionably, the persistent criticisms of contextualism at this point, must be taken seriously, for hedonism is atomic in a sense which makes aesthetics unenlightened; and since the aesthetic must be distinguished from mere pleasure, the underlying principle is not that of pleasure alone. The admirable attempt of the hedonist to conceive of beauty as a datum equated with pleasure is thwarted. The datum is out of the context of experience. When theory isolates things in this way, it gives evidence of the disintegration of society. Aesthetically, it suggests a kind of plaintive suffering of the individual at odds with his civilization. Broadly speaking, we may say that although pleasure-theories insist upon the immanent character of value, they fail to realize the complexity of the experience, and are further misled into the view that pleasure is suffering rather than enjoyment. This error makes for the substitution of passive happening for active enterprise.

The principle of immanence demands a radical interpretation. It must denote not merely the felt immediacy of sensuous impression, but also the referential processes involved in actually living through an experience. Experience is carried to fulfillment by means of these processes. In the temporal arts, this is obvious. Music thrives on felt rhythmical cadences. As felt, music is immanent; as rhythmical cadence, it is both retrospective and anticipatory. Without both backward and forward reference, it could be at best only a series of inchoate sounds. Even the most elementary acquaintance with music discloses the fact that tones are grouped in phrases. Though discriminable, a phrase is essentially incomplete. When I say, "Robinson Crusoe," one is certain to respond, "Well, what about Robinson Crusoe?" So in music the

incomplete phrase sets up forces which need to be resolved. One can discover for oneself the principles involved by analysis of the most simple three-part song form. The theme announced, which for the classically-trained ear needs repetition, the composer then rounds out a progression which is brought to a partial conclusion. Then by means of a contrasting section, the ear carries through till it is brought back to the original theme, which is finally resolved in the coda. In sonata form, the commonplace of music-criticism is that the composer is most truly judged by the developmental section; the introduction is more or less arbitrary, and the recapitulation brings together the loose ends of what has preceded.

The illustration suggests that the work of art must carry us along, or to put the same thing differently, we must carry along the work of art. A telling aspect of the aesthetic situation is the so-called "natural resolution." Here the shortcoming of atomism appears in bold relief, for in alleging that we can know only events, *since the relational features of events are infinite and therefore unknowable*, a strict atomism cuts itself loose from the possibility of recognizing the dynamic or growing character of experience. Our contention is that the facts of such experience demand description in terms of a purpose. The purpose is not an end imputed to a thing *ab extra*, but is rather the resolution intrinsic to a good work of art. Since appreciation involves both the retrospective and anticipatory, I assume that we have to account for these characteristics in some such terms as John Dewey uses when he refers to the "funding" of meanings and "consummatory" experience. Conceived atomistically, a series of events could never constitute a work of art. A mere sequence of tones, for example, could never make a musical progression; it could provide no principle whereby the subsequent phrase in a sonata could be anticipated. So far as we can observe, such analysis could not distinguish music from noise. In terms of modern physical analysis, the one is aesthetically as value-free as the other. But experientially, there is all the difference between day and night.

As above interpreted, the principle of immanence leads us on to the immediately felt processes involved in experience. These processes are not sign-references, as when we say clouds are the

sign of rain; they are rather a continuum of culminating activities, which import the earlier into the later. The difference is between data which mean, and processes meaningfully lived through. Because pleasure-theories cannot account for process, we find ourselves taking issue with them and the atomistic philosophies on which they are built. (But in observing that aesthetic processes are consummatory, that meanings are "funded,") we are confronted with the further problem of understanding how these processes can be disinterested. For if, as we have said, they are constituted not as passive happening but as active enterprise, then we must assess the almost universal claim that art is disinterested and that the attitude toward it is one of detachment.

Disinterestedness

The aesthetic attitude is often characterized as the disinterested absorption in an object. It is said to be a contemplative attitude; yet for the most part the fact that (activity is involved in contemplation does not go without comment.) Contemplation, however, is selective; and when an object is attended to, whatever is not relevant to it must be suppressed and excluded from it. Far from being incompatible with emotional satisfaction, disinterested contemplation can flourish only in the medium which leads to emotional satisfaction. This asserts the commonplace that the disinterested is not the uninterested, and that it is not without interest. More noteworthy, however, is the fact that the interest must be grounded in a satisfactory object, which provides the necessary structure for calling forth the attitude. Activity and disinterested contemplation are not two but one.

(Thus, the aesthetic situation depends upon an interest which is an active striving.) Art exploits pervasive impulses—sex, pity, fear, ambition, conceit, and the like. It awakens these impulses not as our desires, but as constitutive of the dynamics of the object. Otherwise, art would be a reduplication of life, a non-aesthetic copy or imitation. The aesthetic experience is a conquest of the

emotions; not a suffering. Almost in a Spinozistic sense is contemplation an activity. It gives man a sense of power, but a power which is resolved in the object of experience. Art produces its catharsis only as it arouses interest in the object, and an interest which is satisfactorily resolved through an inexorable necessity. In this way art makes possible the realization of unique value, and also makes possible a distinction between the practical and the aesthetic. We may proceed to advantage by turning to this latter distinction and contrasting the disinterested aesthetic attitude with practical interests.)

If we mean by the disinterested that which appears, we may ask whether there is any experience which is not disinterested. Are visceral feelings any the less disinterested for experience than the casual notice I take of things about me? The problem is, of course, that of consciousness, and if the term is used to designate that which immediately appears, then there is in the absorption in the object as appearing, no distinguishing consciousness between the disinterested and the interested, though to be sure the so-called determinate qualities together with the intensity of feeling may differ. Apparently, the opposite of the disinterested as qualities can be only the interested as extra-relational, or that which for consciousness is foreign to a given quality. Thus when the visceral leads to frenzied search for external remedies, its intrinsic quality is drained in practical interest and it becomes a sign, say, for paregoric.

A practical interest is always one which looks to an end beyond, whereas a disinterested interest is one in which there is appreciation of the evolving order on its own account. Disinterested experience involves something focally present which nevertheless dynamically leads on to a conclusion (save in cases of insanity or senility, where it leads to disintegration). Dewey has made here the helpful distinction between consciousness as "the totality of actualized immediate qualitative differences, or 'feelings'," and mind as the "actualized apprehensions of meanings."² The difference between the interested (the practical) and the disinterested (the aesthetic), I should like to suggest, is rooted in different

² *Experience and Nature*, New York, W. W. Norton, 1929, p. 303.

kinds of meanings. The one we may call "adjustmental," and the other "contemplative;" although these designations are not self-explanatory, they may serve as starting-points for further elucidation.

Aesthetically, the problem with which we are confronted is this: at one and the same time the object must command interest, and yet an interest which is not "ours." Thus, although the attitude must be contemplative, the object must be vital. If vitality is emphasized to the exclusion of all else, the object is earthy, trashy, or mere propaganda. But in the absence of vitality the contemplative is anaemic, lifeless, "spiritual." Bullough refers to this dilemma as the "antinomy of psychical distance," where "psychical distance" is a descriptive phrase for an object interesting, but put "out of gear with our practical, actual self."³ Such a statement, however; is of little help until we know what is meant by the "practical, actual self."

In so-called practical activity we tend to make the distinction between self and not-self, or preferably between two aspects of experience foreign to each other. Feeling discomfort from the oppressive air, I open the window. Direct experience reveals no necessary continuity between the self which feels the oppressive heat and the self which is conscious of the closed window. The act I engage in may resolve a problem for me, but in practical situations the act is a means to an end, and has value (in this case, utility) only because the end comes about; namely, the feeling of relief. The means is external to the end, first in the sense that my feeling of relief is only incidental to the act of opening the window, and not inherently contained in it; and secondly in the sense that there are innumerable acts (and my choice among the alternatives may be on thoroughly arbitrary grounds) by which the end may be attained. Since the aesthetic object is one in which means and end are inherently related to and inseparable from each other, the merely practical act is antipodal to the aesthetic act, which creates an object. One who acts in a merely practical way is not an artist creating objects, but an engineer who is mechanically manipulating things external to himself. The engineer is a divided

³ *British Journal of Psychology*, Vol. 5, p. 89.

personality, who thinks of external things *and* how they affect him. He can predicate the rightness or wrongness of a thing only in terms of the effect which it has upon his feelings. Although the distinction between the practical and the aesthetic is probably never an absolute disjunction, yet discursive thought may advantageously point to such absolute distinctions as limiting concepts.

Adjustment is an act of manipulating for ulterior purposes. Such manipulation is at times thought by the instrumentalist as the pattern of all experience, and he tends to confuse opportunism with intrinsic resolution, which is the ideal in art. Professor Langfeld makes the distinction as follows:

"The aesthetic attitude as thus described is diametrically opposed to one's usual attitude toward one's environment, the one which one learns to assume by reason of the struggle for existence. In this latter attitude, we are continually opposing forces . . . while . . . the aesthetic set is directed toward experiencing in ourselves various relations which the elements of the object have to one another and not our own independent action in regard to them."⁴

He illustrates the difference as between two attitudes towards a statue with outstretched hands: in the one, we perceptibly feel the impulse to shake the hand of the statue, thereby reacting to it as an alien force; in the other, we feel the lines of force harmoniously related within the thing. The aesthetic response refers to the feeling of forces in the object, which seem to possess it; this is the empathic response.

Much of the controversy concerning empathy—whether and how projection is effected, and the attendant problems of trying to reestablish unity—may, for aesthetic purposes, be dismissed as irrelevant. What needs concern us is only the descriptive account of the experience and the way in which it contrasts with other kinds of experience. Empathy is not aesthetic value,⁵ but it is one of the most significant psychological concepts contributed to the subject. For our purposes it may be well to reconsider briefly three types of empathic response which June Downey, following Mueller-

⁴ Herbert S. Langfeld, *The Aesthetic Attitude*, New York (quoted by permission of) Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1920, pp. 64-65.

⁵ I am assuming that aesthetic value is the aesthetic experience, a thesis to be upheld as the study progresses.

Freienfels, has distinguished: "that of the ecstatic, the participator [Mitspieler], and the spectator [Zuschauer],"⁷ any one of which may, of course, shade into the others.

In the ecstatic type, "all self-consciousness is merged in the perfect unity of the subject and object that occurs under conditions of intense enjoyment."⁷ Subject and object thus lose all meaning. As Lipps put it: "Empathy is the fact here established, that the object is myself and by the very same token this self of mine is the object. Empathy is the fact that the antithesis between myself and the object disappears, or rather does not yet exist."⁸ Accordingly, subject may be said to become objectified, or the object subjectified. Such consciousness, though having aspects of the aesthetic, is not genuinely so, and may be better related to mysticism.⁹

The participator identifies himself with one object or personality following another. This is perhaps best illustrated in the drama, where one successively becomes the different characters, though with varying degrees of completeness. Such identification is perhaps the most usual and not unlike the self of everyday life, save for the strong or brutal personality which cuts all others asunder. The limitations of this type of consciousness for aesthetic purposes consist in its waywardness, in the discrete selves or split personalities which remain unresolved. Instead of becoming successively hero, villain, and clown, one must identify oneself with the greater forces by which all the characters are part and parcel of the plot. One of the most common mistakes in literature results from the irresistible temptation of the author to identify himself with the hero, whom he then makes the mouth-piece for his own sentiments and moralizing. When this occurs, the integrity of the whole is destroyed. Aristotle's criticism of this indefensible practice is contained in his statement that the plot is the end of

⁷ *Creative Imagination*, New York (quoted by permission of) Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1929, p. 180. Cf. Richard Mueller-Freienfels, *Psychologie der Kunst*, Leipzig and Berlin, B. S. Treubner, 1923, dritte Auflage, pp. 66 ff.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 180.

⁹ Rader, *A Modern Book of Esthetics*, New York (quoted by permission of) Henry Holt and Company, 1935, p. 294.

⁹ Compare, for example, the similarity of ecstatic consciousness with William James' treatment of "The Divided Self and the Process of Unification," lecture 8, and "Mysticism," lectures 16, 17, in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*.

tragedy. The positive suggestion that art must be grasped in its wholeness leads us on to an analysis of what is meant by the spectator's point of view.

The spectator's point of view as opposed to the participator's should not be characterized in terms of passivity as opposed to activity. Rather, such characterization insists upon action which has its local habitat in the work of art. The play of forces is not that between the self and the work of art, which is adjustmental to an alien thing; the play of forces is objectivated *within* the thing, where, as such, it commands respect. The attitude is detached only in the sense that the locus of the experience is the object and not the body. Even Mr. Sigmund Spaeth's "foot-listener," provided he remains unaware of the foot's thumping, may enjoy the music. The dancer, of course, must localize the object in her own body and the surrounding space. The violinist's problem is to sensitize the bow in such a way that it becomes part of the work, and not a bodily impediment to it. Whether we call the result a "spiritual aesthetic synthesis," or what we will, our chief task is to describe the experience.

The suggestion we may put forward without argument at the present time is this. Whether we call it empathic or not, the aesthetic attitude is one in which the qualitative differentiations appear as funded drives which are resolved in the material constituting the work of art. We are led to believe, then, that the relevant background of experience is not an unessential motivating stimulus for such drives. Otherwise it is difficult to explain, for example, the consistency or inconsistency of the characters in a drama, the resolution of a chord in music, the rhythm of a poem, the balance or structure in a painting or in a statue, the relations of masses and volumes in a building. The qualitative aspect is *aesthesia* in its etymological sense, but the qualitative must be charged with the force which finds its own inner resolution, lest the practical destroy the aesthetic. James T. Farrell gives us a plausible statement of the process, when he writes in the introduction to *Studs Lonigan*:

"I saw in the character of Studs Lonigan a number of tendencies at work in a section of American life which I happened to know because it happened to be part of my own education in

living. I began to see Studs, not only as a character for imaginative fiction, but also as a social manifestation. In the early stages of writing this work, I analyzed my character as I considered him in his relations to his own world, his own background. I set as my aim that of unfolding the destiny of Studs Lonigan in his own words, his own theories, his own patterns of thought and feeling. I decided that my task was not to state formally what life meant to me, but to try and recreate a sense of what life meant to Studs Lonigan. I worked on with this project, setting up as an ideal the strictest possible objectivity."¹⁰

But to attain aesthetic objectivity, the vehicle of art must be arresting, for only in this way is detachment possible. Otherwise attention flags and the experience is disrupted; or else attention persists only because of an ulterior interest, and then experience is not resolvable in the thing. When anxiety, conflict, satisfaction are aesthetic, they are in the thing, and our active participation testifies to our disinterested, creative ability.

Disinterestedness, we conclude, goes to the very heart of aesthetic activity. Art is contemplative, but the contemplative involves that immanent activity which resolves a thing in its own terms. This activity constitutes the fabric of the art-process, and only through its office can we win that fulfillment which puts the process to rest. This supreme achievement is the ground of aesthetic unity. Contemplation is often confused with passivity because of the failure to discern that unity is an achievement, that it is dictated by an antecedent struggle, without which no worthy object can be attained. The aesthetic object is no cheap unity, and the contemplative is thought to be passive only because we begin with the achievement rather than with the way of achieving. To gain a better understanding of the aesthetic attitude we are forced on to see how the principle of unity relates to it. In this further discussion we hope to remove some of the ambiguities which shroud aesthetic analysis, especially those pertaining to aesthetic unity.

¹⁰ James T. Farrell, introduction to *Studs Lonigan*, Modern Library Ed., New York (quoted by permission of) Random House, p. xi.

Unity

The unity which is achieved through the aesthetic attitude is a unity of experience forged through the art-process. It is the insight which comes into existence through the life of the mind. Art gestates in the crude matter of human functioning; it is born of labor pains, more or less severe; and it flowers in the resultant unity, which is insight. Forgetting that the resultant unity is insight, some theorists lead us to the mistaken view that art can be understood as a purely mental or biological phenomenon, and that we can understand aesthetic unity also in these terms. This is the bogey of subjectivism, widely prevalent in our own culture. In this view, the unique and intrinsic value of art is dissipated. The subjective point of view imposes limitations upon art which make it unintelligible as a social enterprise. Because of the prevalence of subjectivism, we may be pardoned an excursion in which we shall try to see its nature and its limitations. Through such a procedure, we can gain a vantage-point for constructive analysis.

A convenient point of departure for analyzing the principle of unity is found in Aristotle's theory of catharsis. His theory of catharsis, the purging effect of tragedy through pity and fear, has given rise to volumes of conflicting interpretations, into which we need not go. Of cardinal significance, however, is his apparent insistence upon restoring unity or balance of personality. Pity and fear are aroused through dramatic representation; tragedy that is worthy of the name then allays the emotions, after which follows the pleasurable calm. Whatever else tragedy is, according to Aristotle—and presumably it is a good deal more—it is that which effects, at least for the time being, an expression of emotion in which conflicts of experience are resolved.

Pity and fear are driving, irritating forces. The tragic poet must make the spectators feel these forces; he must precipitate the conflict which is latent in the forces; and finally he must satisfactorily resolve the conflict. Because the emotions of pity and fear are felt as forces which come to be resolved, catharsis can be effected. The biological or medical metaphor, as Butcher puts it, is a "homeopathic treatment curing emotion with like emotion";

but such a metaphor does little justice to the intrinsic value of art.¹¹ Although the metaphor, like the Freudian theory in modern times, fails to provide for the unique value of a work of art, it is suggestive of the principle of unity supposed to characterize the aesthetic attitude. For both Aristotle and Freud unity is effected through activity.

Tragedy is an imitation of an action. The calm results as action successfully flows to a conclusion, and the success of the action is measured in part at least by its ability to tap dormant interests. In Greek tragedy, the appeal is enhanced by the subject-matter. Aside from their well-nigh universal interest, the myths are familiar to the Greek audience, for whom the argument of the tragedy is superfluous. The greatness of the Greek poet resides not in his invention of a new plot, but in his treatment of an old one. The latent culture of Greek society is thus brought from the implicit to the explicit, and troubling problems are temporarily resolved. As Caudwell puts it, "If tragedy did not make the Athenians feel better, in spite of its tragedy, it was bad. The tragic poet who made them weep bitterly at the fate of their fellow Hellenes in Persia was fined."¹² Despite the arousal of unpleasant emotions, the "spectators went away feeling the better for it, so much so that they returned for more. The emotions, though unpleasant, had done them good."¹³ The result is a vicarious experience which resolves a felt action. It achieves an end, however temporary the end might be. The purgation is effected through the expression of the emotions of pity and fear, and in purging these emotions the spectator feels better.

The modern counterpart of Aristotle's theory interpreted as a biological metaphor is found in Freud. Despite great differences reflected in the outlook of the two, Freud's theory nevertheless bears an intellectual kinship to the theory of catharsis, and at least a general emphasis upon the principle of unity and integrity of mind, which comes from the resolution of conflicting desires.

¹¹ See S. H. Butcher, *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1902, ch. 6.

¹² Christopher Caudwell, *Illusion and Reality*, London (quoted by permission of) The Macmillan Company, 1937, p. 49.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

Freud looked deeply into the nature of mind and observed what we may call the stratification of interests, which makes for splits in personality. Reconstruction of personality requires the breakdown of strata and the re-formation of organic or integrated interests, which find expression in the space-time world. In art this reconstruction takes the form of the expression of a wish. Many activities are frustrated in ordinary life. Both through our inherent bodily and mental limitations and through those limitations imposed upon us by others, according to which alone we can enjoy the advantages of social life, we are continually repressed. Whether or not we have the claim to express ourselves in "free and natural activity," social forces restrain us from infringing upon the "rights" of others. Public opinion, fear of breaking the law, moral obligations, customs and conventions—these and countless other forces inhibit our natural impulses. Conflicts arise, which we are unable to resolve in ordinary motor activity. Feelings which seek expression are pent up. Since ordinary activity is blocked, the censor compels us to sublimate these desires in some other form of expression.

Freud describes this sublimation:

"The artist is originally a man who turns from reality because he cannot come to terms with the demand for renunciation of instinctual satisfaction as it is first made, and who then in fantasy-life allows full play to his erotic and ambitious wishes. But he finds a way of return from this world of fantasy back to reality; with his special gifts he molds his fantasies into a new kind of reality, and men concede them a justification as valuable reflections of actual life."¹⁴

Again he writes, ". . . happy people never make fantasies, only unsatisfied ones."¹⁵ He seems to have hit upon an indisputable fact: since the artist cannot satisfy his cravings in "real life," he turns to imaginative or "fantasy-life." But the interpretation of the fact is open to question. Many have taken objection to the prominence given to "erotic and ambitious wishes," and would assert that the dependence of all art upon the eros is unwarranted

¹⁴ *Collected Papers*, London (by permission of) Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-analysis, 1925, iv, 19, quoted from H. S. Langfeld in *Feelings and Emotions: The Wittenberg Symposium*, p. 348.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 348-9.

and contradictory to fact. Yet an important movement in art—surrealism—has gone to Freudian psychology for the theoretical grounding of its practice.

Although surrealists are loath to define the principles of their art, for it then becomes "rational, dogmatic, and consequently static theory of art,"¹⁶ André Breton's manifesto in 1924 leaves no doubt that they recline upon psycho-analytic theory. "I believe in the future resolution of two states (in appearance so contradictory), dream and reality, into a sort of absolute reality, 'Sur-réalité';" and thus his text becomes "pure psychic automatism."¹⁷ Herbert Read convincingly shows in *Surrealism*, as well as in *Art and Society*, that the surrealists in both theory and practice aim to express hidden personality, and thus to mitigate the evils of warped and thwarted personality, which have come about chiefly through bourgeois morality. One need look only to such examples as René Magritte's "la femme introuvable" or Salvador Dali's "Accommodations of Desire" to verify the practice.

In its deeper foundations, surrealism alleges that it is not simply a wanton expression of the libidinous, but a total outlook on life. It ruthlessly attacks not merely art, but also action and morality, play and politics, behavior and the cinema. Because surrealism will brook no allegiance with academic formalism and because it insists upon the breadth of experience, it excludes no area of life in its fiery attacks. Surrealism is morally oriented and tends towards a socially grounded point of view,¹⁸ but in its impurity it contains germs of a subjective basis, which lead to the merely eccentric or the shocking. The shocking, so characteristic of dadaism, is not unknown to surrealism. Whenever form is abandoned, disastrous consequences may be expected. In his opposition to the tradition, the surrealist is likely to forego his constructive aims, and thus to be contrary, merely for the sake of contrariety. Too often he confuses the shocking with expression, and consequently tends to make us psychoanalyze him rather than to analyze his work. However vulnerable for artistic purposes is

¹⁶ Julien Levy, *Surrealism*, New York, 1936, p. 3.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 11, 12.

¹⁸ Cf. Herbert Read's admirable statement of the surrealist's credo in his *Surrealism*, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1937, especially pp. 86-87.

the naïve layman's conception of spatial form, the same is not true of artistic form, as Picasso and Chirico evidently recognize. Although the surrealist's criticism of bourgeois art and morality is not without ground, its theoretical abandonment to the formless, tends to ally it with dadaism. In this event the principle of unity is homeless, and "art" becomes licentious display. Freudian gossip, together with the antics which have brought to the movement its newspaper notoriety, is then substituted for art.

Objections similar to the above may be taken to Aristotle's theory of catharsis interpreted according to the biological metaphor. No doubt this is an inadequate interpretation of Aristotle, however important it has been historically. Yet in modern times Freud has given new impetus to the general point of view contained in the older biological metaphor-theory. Psychologizing and biologizing cannot today be dismissed by a wave of the hand. But if we are to understand them we must see them in perspective. Basically, they refer to some of the genetic aspects of value; they do not resolve many of the issues concerning the nature of aesthetic value. Carritt, for example, asks the leading question as to what makes the sublimated form sublime. What catharsis or sublimation fails to account for is that a work of art is unique, that it has its own individuality, not accountable for in terms of mere relief from feeling. Neither sublimation nor catharsis helps us to appreciate the worth of the immediate contents of experience.

The issue is between two fundamental points of view. The psychoanalyst is not expected to be a very good art-critic, nor the critic, a good psychoanalyst. The one point of view is, to use Professor Fite's distinction, the observer's, looking to a type of behavior; the other the agent's, looking to immediate experience.¹⁹ The observer shuts himself out from aesthetic insight by reason of his arbitrary procedure; similarly, the agent is not in a favorable position for psychologizing. In either case, one rôle repudiates the other. Since the aims and purposes differ, the results naturally differ. Little wonder is it then that many refuse to accept the so-called medical interpretation of Aristotle's theory, and insist upon the inherent value of art.

¹⁹ Cf. Warner Fite, *The Living Mind*, New York, Dial Press, 1930, ch. 2.

(Aesthetic unity is characteristic not of the point of view of the observer but of the point of view of the agent, who experiences the fantasies as unique and "concedes them a justification as valuable reflections of actual life." From the psychoanalyst's point of view there is no reason why the frustrated maternal instinct might not be relieved equally well by pampering pets as by achieving poetic insights. Indeed, because of the dubious character of the alleged insights, we might sincerely prefer that poetasters turn their energies to dumb animals. We distinguish here between mental adjustment and art. The assumption is not *prima facie* unwarranted or merely presumptuous that aesthetic values are unique and can be differentiated from practical or mere adjustmental values. (In fact, the obvious suggestion is that art is not a reduplication of life, but as Freud has put it, a "reflection of actual life." Art is reflective in that it is contemplative. In its successful resolution it brings about a unity the justification of which is self-evident, and the insight of which is its own guarantee of worth.

We may now summarize our discussion of the principles of immanence, disinterestedness, and unity. We conclude that we must distinguish two species of the immanent: that which is self-contained, as in the specious present; and that which is unfolding. This latter contains within itself germinal drives that are in the process of being realized. The relation of this latter kind of immanence to the former is that of process to product, where the product is nothing more nor less than the completed process. Empathic consciousness is this immanent process, through which the object comes to be realized. In conceiving of the aesthetic situation in these terms, we avoid making any spurious separatism between the expressive and the thing expressed; for the expressive is the process by which the thing is expressed, and the expressed is only the product which issues from the expressive process. Thus, in these terms, there is no sundering of content and form, an act which inevitably dissolves aesthetic value, and, for example, leads to that often-indulged-in, tortuous enterprise of separating plot from drama.

The art-process is the conscious process which takes place in the aesthetic experience.

The purpose of our discussion has been to observe the function of the aesthetic attitude. We can see now that it operates within the aesthetic situation, with which it tends to be identified in the final realization of value. The two aspects of the situation—the process of realizing and the realization—should, nevertheless, be distinguished. The former is critical and sustained in the inherent forces normatively controlled by virtue of the intended expression, and consequently is capable of being reflected upon. The latter is momentary and fleeting, as something enjoyed, but not to be recaptured, except as the process is repeated. In assuming the aesthetic attitude, we implicitly assume a critical attitude toward the work of art; a false note obstructs the music; a bad gesture impairs the play; a bad line mars the poem. The shock in these instances is evidence of the disinterested movement of perception, which has been implicitly in operation throughout the process; but following the shock we shift from criticism *in* art to criticism *of* it.

Detachment or disinterestedness connotes the funded present which anticipates the future. The movement from present to future is carried by the interplay of drives felt in the object. The interplay is not between self and object, even though, indeed, the relevant background of experience is engendered in the object. The appreciative attitude is furthered by an elegant present having a future. In the temporal arts, the fact is obvious; but in appreciation, all arts are temporal. A painting is not taken in at a glance; its rhythm, balance, its dynamics are not understood momentarily. We must study the painting in order to understand it. The appreciative attitude comes to fulfilment when participation in the object comes unhesitatingly and with ease. Appreciation is defeated precisely at those points where the work is responded to passively and haltingly. A listener can easily participate in the early Beethoven string quartets; but when he tries the later, such as Opus 131, he is likely to find that the music does not move, that it leaves him unresponsive. He is no longer the appreciator as *in*, say, the quartet in G, Opus 18. As appreciation becomes more intelligent, it becomes more objective, and we may therefore assume that it

more closely approximates the artist's own creative process.

This process marks the disinterested mastery over the art-object, and a mastery which naturally has its strictures. Wanton ecstasy is outlawed by reason of the controlling medium, in which alone art comes to fulfilment. Mere sentimentality is no substitute for aesthetic virility, nor aesthetes for artists. Participation may, of course, be only partial; probably this is usually the case. As June Downey writes, "A thorough-going facile identification may coexist with a low type of art-consciousness. . . . Short stories, novels, and dramas would seem to encourage the attitude of personal assumption of emotions, often to the exclusion of all possibility of artistic evaluation of content."²⁰ The prominence of "Collected Short Stories" today suggests an interest in characters, whose actions are resolved not so much by any inherent forces as by some clever ending. The effect is to shock us back to the world in which we begin to ask questions about the author rather than about the story.

Unity is effected through the art-process which comes to its successful resolution. Putting the matter in this way, we avoid the irresolvable paradoxes which arise in making unity pertain to the mind alone. Unity is not to be sought in the relational aspects of art, but in the thing as a realization. This unity may be attenuated in actual experience—as in the almost beautiful—but the break between it and the regaining of a practical attitude is sufficiently well punctuated to set it apart as a thing by itself. Accordingly, the opening lines of Keats's *Endymion* should not be taken unquestionably. Much closer to the truth is Carl Sandburg, when he laments:

"I cried over beautiful things knowing no beautiful thing lasts."²¹

The art-process, which is purposive, is unifying; it is not a unity. Suspense is maintained in the aesthetic object until the last reverberating chord of the symphony, or the fall of the curtain of the drama, or the closing of the covers of the novel. Because the

²⁰ *Creative Imagination*, p. 181. Quoted by permission of Harcourt, Brace and Company.

²¹ Carl Sandburg, *Cornhuskers*, New York, (quoted by permission of) Henry Holt and Company.

process is purposive, the unfolding of it determines that which is relevant to it; but the verification of the purpose which is thus engendered is ultimately testified to by the successful experience, through which relevancy is transformed into immediate experience. This experience is the silent testimony of the success of the artist.

(We are led to the conclusion that the aesthetic attitude can be maintained only where there is an object which commands respect.) Otherwise, as we have urged, appreciation can be only sickly sentimentality. The aesthetic attitude may be defined, then, as that attitude which directs attention to an object as the fulfilment of experience. Any attempt to make the attitude further intelligible must look to the rôle of the object.

CHAPTER II

The Aesthetic Object

Although a complete philosophy must face the ultimate and perplexing metaphysical problems concerning the nature and status of objects, we may proceed in our study by focusing attention upon what is involved in the "aesthetic object." We shall not attempt to deal directly with the problems of knowledge, even though we should expect aesthetic analysis to shed light on these problems. We need to make, however, the basal assumption that knowledge emerges from a world of perception, which is ordinarily thought of as a common, perceptual world. For aesthetics this assumption is indispensable. Should we lose sight of it, we would come to consider that experience is a purely private affair, and that art is a cloistered thing, unanalyzable and ineffable. Communication would thus be made impossible, and we would be led to the insufferable paradox that art—a social enterprise—is neither shared nor shareable. To avoid such a paradox we propose by reverting to the pivotal concepts suggested in the preceding chapter to reconsider the aesthetic object through a discussion of determinateness, unity in variety, and imagination. We hope thus to clear the ground for the construction of an adequate aesthetic theory.

Determinateness

Determinateness is easily misconceived as being something merely given or simply had, instead of that which must be gained through striving. The misconception is strengthened by the facile identification of the determinate with quality. In formal terms, this conclusion may be reached by asserting that the immanent is

quality, and the determinate is immanent and hence quality. Formally considered, the conclusion is valid; yet its meaning is far from clear. Although in aesthetics we may initially insist with good reason that intelligibility consists in being determinate, it is not in the least clear that we understand precisely what is meant by quality.

When, for example, a person identifies quality with sensations or the so-called primary and secondary qualities—number, figure, sound, color, etc.—he cuts the ground from aesthetic analysis. His procedure forces him to become a subjectivist who can apprehend only sensory atoms. These atoms cannot be related except as associations of sense-data. Because the sense-datum is considered to be determinate, the art-object necessarily dissolves into a multitude of determinates, and can have no integrity of its own. However worthy and important is the initial insistence that the intelligible is the determinate, the view that sensory atoms, considered to be qualities, constitute beauty, will not satisfy the rigorous demands of the aesthetic object. The doctrine that simple qualities constitute the object is vulnerable in two regards, neither of which is quite independent of the other: the larger context within which qualities appear, and the alleged nature of the qualities themselves. Our criticism insists that, so far from being given, aesthetically determinate quality is the resultant of the art-process.

(That qualities appear only within a context and that they have relations beyond is, I take it, the essential lesson to be learned from the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Such a lesson is abstract and does not of necessity lead to Kantian idealism, but it does suggest that qualities appear and are located only within a larger complex.) The synthetic activity, of which Kant speaks, is his attempt to explain how we apprehend an object. As contextualists have observed, the "this" or the proper name never uniquely identifies an atomic thing. The "this" is as bad manners in logic as it is in social behavior, for the exclusive principle requires the pointing out of the not-that, and the process of elimination is infinite. Thus the wholly praiseworthy attempt to discover the determinate is still-born, resulting in the correlation of so-called immediate presences, which can never be identified save as the indefinite; and the indefinite is, of course, the

opposite of determinate experience. Immanence is lost in the external procedure of counting and measuring; and although the scientific enterprise is furthered, it is at the cost of forfeiting immediate experience of things. In this regard, science is a different kind of undertaking from art.

If we are correct in insisting that quality appears determinate only in its context, we must reconsider its nature. For then it is not an atomic given, but an aspect of a situation becoming determinate. When the poet says, "Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow," it is not "three tomorrows," nor are the second two tomorrows tautologous; they are inherent in a growing expression, an expression to which the addition of a fourth tomorrow would completely destroy the sense of the line. Even the lexicographer recognizes this principle, and often tries to render the meaning more determinate by means of an example—nor is it strange that his example more often than not is taken from poetry. The same is true of tone. A tone in music is the bearer of rhythm, melody, and even of harmony. A tone in isolation is not only shorn of aesthetic value but is scarcely discriminable, and consequently is put not in an aesthetic but in a scientific context, where its intensity, pitch, etc., are measured. Moreover, it is notable that the more scientific the procedure the less is required of the ear. The technique of measuring by means of instruments drains quality of its inherent character and leads to the external and experientially poverty-stricken act of reading pointers. We are consequently confronted with an infinity of external relations which take the place of what was originally alleged to be determinate, and immanence is lost in the more complex and less direct operation of pointing by means of the aid of mathematical formulae. Hence the scientific bias is precisely that which ends in the defeat of quality as immanent experience.

In order to interpret quality aesthetically, we must revise our conception of it radically. Sensory stuff is the bearer of value in the growing experience, and we can see that on the one hand were sense-datum of itself determinate, expression would be effected, and there would be no reason to proceed further; on the other hand, were it not contributory to expression, it would be irrelevant to aesthetic experience. This can mean only one thing; namely, it

must be expressive. The expressive makes for direct, sensuous passage into, and is itself borne into, further determinateness. This is only the obvious fact that art is not a series of discrete data and that the earlier must be amalgamated in the later. The last act of a drama is meaningless without the preceding ones. The conclusion of a novel requires all that has gone before. Painting and architecture, also, breed rhythms and movements, which can be appreciated only in the temporal process which works itself out in a conclusion. The art-process is that which as expressively given engenders tensions which can be resolved only in the thing. Resolution looks to the end, an end which encompasses all that has gone before, and this is an end to be gained only through a process intrinsically arresting but not arrested, except as it becomes finally determinate in fulfilment.

The process by which this end is attained is affective, for affection constitutes the dynamics through which expression becomes actual. Where affection is sundered from the sensory stuff, experience is frustrated by being directionless. Discrete data, which are directionless, make immanent passage impossible. Purpose can at best be superimposed upon the data *ab extra*, but immanent purpose cannot be engendered. When experience is atomized into data, emotion can be interpreted only as associated with the data. This procedure makes nonsense of art; for art could then be grounded only in the contingent, where certain qualities would be taken to be beautiful *because* a particular person has such and such an association with it. Art would thus lose its social status, and would become only the sentimental feeling which biographically chances to be juxtaposed with the datum. My insistence is that since feelings are processes, it is possible for them to be fulfilled in art. Joy, shame, sorrow, fear have their own natural histories pulsating in the rhythms of experience. Feelings are not a bare set of data, but are problematic, by reason of which they excite purposiveness and are expressible through the artist's intention.

‘Feeling is initially not quality, but the generation of structure; it is urgency demanding fulfilment.’ As feeling progresses aesthetically, it becomes increasingly more determinate, and is not recognized for what it is until it is fully expressed. Conceived in a proc-

ess directly lived through, the qualitative emerges as the aesthetic object or determinate being. The determinate is thus an ordered thing, and calls for a discussion of the aesthetic principle of unity in variety.

Unity in Variety

The reason for the ever-recurring theme of unity in variety in aesthetic literature is unquestionably its essential correctness. Discussion of the principle is necessary only in view of the varied interpretations, in consequence of which some are misinterpretations. For convenience's sake we may roughly distinguish between a metaphysical and a scientific formulation. The metaphysical formulation states that art should express the ideal, the universal, the harmonious, the symmetrical; the scientific formulation states that art should express the typical or the norm, and it accordingly prescribes canons for art-production. Both formulations refer to the object, and both fall under the more general principle of unity in variety.

In Greek times, Plato set the stage for the more metaphysical aspects of beauty. In the *Philebus*, he identifies beauty with symmetry or harmony as principles of the aesthetic object. (The beauty is in the thing, and is quite independent of subjective whims or human caprice.) Symmetry refers to the actual relations within the object, not to our relation to it. Aristotle continues the tradition, but with middle-sized principles, which bridge the gap between the more abstract, metaphysical principles on the one hand, and the more specific canons, for example, of tragic poetry, on the other. Art, at least tragedy, should express the universal history of the particular. The way in which unity is to be effected becomes specified in his dicta on tragedy. The tragic poet should derive unity from the plot rather than through portrayal of character. Nevertheless, character must be not without unity; for it must remain consistent, or if inconsistent, consistently inconsistent.

Aristotle and Plato are obviously speaking of different things. Aristotle refers to tragedy as a type of history, pre-eminently aes-

thetic. Plato is speaking of immutable aesthetic forms, though curiously enough in some cases they come into empirical being—the “straight lines and circles, and the plane or solid figures which are formed out of them by turning-lathes and rulers and measurers of angles; for these I affirm to be not only relatively beautiful, like other things, but they are eternally and absolutely beautiful . . .”¹ Although the empirical process of becoming cannot constitute evidence for Platonic forms, one sees that in these cases the temporal process is reduced to a minimum and gives a show of the timeless. For Aristotle, the temporal process is indispensable: tragedy is a *history*; unity belongs to the *plot*, where there is *portrayal of character*. There is drama, and drama is action, involving conflict and developing character. }

Plato is unquestionably the metaphysician; Aristotle is more the critic. If, however, this is the case, surely the subject-matter of which they speak is different. Plato wishes to define absolute beauty, that he may have some standard for legitimate enjoyment. Aristotle takes the more empirical view of the things which have worth, and he inquires into their underlying principles. There is a wide gap between the ideal as that which has absolute validity, and the historical process, even though universal, as that which has temporal validity. The aesthetic object differs in the two cases. Plato seeks a definition of the beautiful; Aristotle seeks the principles of art. (The concept of beauty is dominated by the desire for metaphysical unity; art is conceived of as an activity controlled by guiding principles.² We observe here the fundamental ambiguity of the term, aesthetic object: sometimes it refers to beauty and sometimes to art. Facile identification of the two has played havoc with aesthetic theory.)

Assuming the more Aristotelian point of view—and whenever there is an adequate aesthetic object which is the fruit of culture, this point of view is forced upon us—inquiry may better proceed from the internal meaning of art to the metaphysical essence of

¹ *Philebus*, 51, Jowett's trans.

² Cf. Aristotle's definition of tragedy. Also: “For tragedy is an imitation, not of men, but of an action and of life, and life consists in action, and its end is a mode of action, not a quality.” *The Poetics of Aristotle*, Butcher's trans., New York (quoted by permission of) The Macmillan Company, 4th ed., p. 27.

beauty. Dangers arise from this procedure only if the Aristotelian principles are interpreted too narrowly, when, for example, the so-called Aristotelian "unities" are set up as hard-and-fast dogmas, thus making criticism sterile. These dangers are often encountered, but they result rather from the scientific formulations of the doctrine of unity.

As a scientist and aesthetician, on the one hand, and as an artist, on the other hand, Albrecht Dürer concretely sets the problem. In insisting that art should express the universal, he is imbued with something of the Greek spirit. As a painstaking, exact draughtsman, seeking in his work proportion and exactitude above all, he gives concrete embodiment to this spirit. But the whole Dürer is above mere scientific and mechanical feats; his art defies predetermined canons of art-production. In taking account of the two sides of his nature, we cannot fail to be instructed on a crucial point of aesthetic theory.

Attempting to enunciate fundamental principles of creation, he sets forth a doctrine of the norm. Like the Greeks, he seeks the perfect proportion. On a manuscript page he writes:

"Vitruvius, the ancient architect, whom the Romans employed upon great buildings, says that whosoever desires to build should study the perfection of the human figure, for in it are discovered the most secret mysteries of proportion. So, before I say anything about architecture, I will state how a well-formed man should be made, and then about a woman, a child, and a horse. Any object may be proportioned out . . . in a similar way. Therefore, hear first of all what Vitruvius says about the human figure. . . . That the face from the chin upward to where the hair begins is the tenth part of a man, and that an out-stretched hand is the same length . . ."³

Dürer further formulates the canon that: "If the best parts chosen from many well-formed men are united in one figure, it will be worthy of praise."⁴ This theory attempts to reduce art to the certainty of mathematical principles. Critics have convincingly shown that in his art Dürer was actually striving after a higher ideal in determining the perfect norm than that of mathematical certitude of super-imposition. And indeed, other of his writings undoubtedly

³ Quoted from T. Sturge Moore, *Albert Durer*, New York, Scribner's, 1905, pp. 288-289.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 290.

indicate quite a different train of thought. Speaking of the "Word of Difference," he points out that he does not mean those accidental differences which are exemplified, for instance, by two engravings taken from the same copper plate, but rather "that which a man specially intendeth, and which standeth in his will." And this difference "maketh a thing fair or foul."⁵ Here he weights that which makes an artist an artist. Mathematical or canonical norms applicable to all cases can never be laid down. Although minutiae are important and must be rightly employed, even more important is deviation. Deviation, however, must not be brutish, but must be masterfully conceived. The notion that exact laws which are applicable to art can be formulated, leads to a misguided goal.

Regardless of Dürer's dicta, certainly the problem is vividly forced upon us: Is it possible to reduce art to a technique? Is it possible to formulate a set of objective canons, however complex, in which alone art-production consists? Were we to form our answer from Dürer's own works, we should have to reply in the negative. Yet such an answer is not conclusive. There is still the possibility of a more refined technique affording the open-sesame to the production of art. From another point of view, however, the suggestion is altogether unacceptable. When Dürer abandons the fantastic apparition of the perfect norm and speaks of the difference which "maketh a thing fair or foul," he directs us to the more fruitful path of creative art. There is technique in art, and so far, canonical prescriptions are applicable. Since technique is not art, however, canonical prescriptions have only a limited virtue. A science of art, *after the fact*, may be possible, but such a science examines only the desiccated bones of a glory that has departed.

Perhaps an artist should not be ignorant of the structure of bones, especially where his ideal is "naturalism." This is only to say that there is no art without technique; but technique does not constitute art. Since art is pre-eminently creative, technique must be subordinated to the artist's intent. Modern rules of perspective are, for example, inapplicable to primitives or to Japanese prints. Jan Van Eyck is unquestionably a master in his own style; but the flatness of his painting, meticulously emphasizing detail, requires a

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 287, 285.

technique responding to his intent. The same is true of all the arts. Anton Halm, it is reported, once brought one of his sonatas to Beethoven for criticism. "When Beethoven pointed out certain errors, Halm retorted that the Master had allowed himself many violations of the rules. 'I may do it, but not you,' was the answer."⁶ Though we may regard Beethoven's answer as lacking in modesty, we cannot fail to see in it the embodiment of an essential truth. Objective rules are necessary propaedeutics to art-production; pedagogy in art must recognize them. Yet art-production is more than technique. In this sense we are right in saying that an artist can be permitted to violate the rules only after he has mastered them.

Canonical rules for production can in and of themselves lead to one thing only: imitation. They are empirical generalizations from extant art. Accordingly, to recreate a work of art from these generalizations is to recreate the original, or a composite of originals, from which the canons were formulated. "Creation according to rule" can yield only a copy of the original. And the more precise the canons the more similar the copy to the original. Perfection of canonical statement is complete resemblance. But this, we perceive, is the blind alley of imitation. Since copying is not producing, but reproducing, canons of art can lead only to reproducing. Or if they are not fully determinate, they leave the artist a measure of freedom. As indeterminate, however, the fundamental difficulty breaks out once more. When art admits a measure of freedom, it is not imitation, but creation. Creation is the extension and fulfilment of experience; in this we find the principle of unity in variety.

Aesthetic unity is not a logical principle, nor is it a form independent of sensuous embodiment. It is nothing more nor less than the historical process in which feeling embodied in its sense-medium comes to its inherent resolution. This is the definitive process of the expression of feeling; through this process, it becomes individualized. That art could be produced by rule arises as a pseudo-problem from the gross confusion of individuality with particularity. Empiricism in science jades our notion of aesthetic reality.

⁶ Reported by and quoted by permission of Robert Haven Schauffler, *Beethoven: The Man Who Freed Music*, Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday, Doran, 1935, p. 145.

New art-forms will continue to develop as long as man has feelings to express. The conception of aesthetic unity must be able to include the art of a T. S. Eliot, a Szostakowicz, a Picasso, as well as art-forms yet undreamed of. Unity is embodied imagination effected in the process by which opaque feeling becomes clear and determinate. We may better understand what this process involves by focusing attention upon the aesthetic object as an object of imagination.

Imagination

The aesthetic object is often said to be an object of imagination. A complete and thorough understanding of what imagination is would no doubt yield a definitive aesthetic theory. Actually, to achieve this end as nearly as possible is the task to which we have set ourselves throughout this study; for in the unfolding of our analysis we hope to comprehend more and more adequately the meaning of the satisfied imagination. If, however, our initial approach is somewhat more modest in scope, we are more likely to succeed. We propose, consequently, to proceed by first making some common-sense distinctions and then by trying to see what underlies them. Through such progressive clarification, we may hope to come to a deeper appreciation of the nature of art and of the beautiful. Accordingly, we shall briefly review in what sense the aesthetic object as one of imagination thrives only in the disinterested aesthetic interest, and in what sense such an object is one of contemplation. In consequence, we shall then distinguish between the aesthetic and the physical object. Finally, this latter distinction will lead us on to discuss some aspects of expression, and more specifically to considerations of the embodiment of feeling and of the social character of the aesthetic object.

The disinterested, we have suggested, is to be contrasted with the interested in which the ulterior is divisive. Practical purposes have such an ulterior compulsion; they look to the use to which a thing can be put, instead of to the individual character of the thing

itself. Use engenders a dualism between means and end; and, moreover, it makes impossible a complete apprehension of the thing. Otherwise, the thing would be its own end, and self-sustaining contemplation would be its fulfilment.⁷ "Practical purpose" invariably entails compromise, and because of its unsatisfactory resolution it is unable to exploit a thing to the full. Such a purpose loses elegance to the extent to which one thing could equally well be substituted for another. Hence, when a person is being merely practical, he looks not to the thing itself, but to its earmark, which in the practical situation he can substitute for the thing. In this activity attention shifts from things to symbols, not as having intrinsic meaning, but as standing for something else. The historian thus correctly discovers the parentage of science in the so-called practical arts. In its purest form, science culminates in mathematics, the one discipline in which symbols may be substituted one for another without loss of meaning. Art, then, which flowers only in direct perceptual meaning, contrasts with mathematics, in which the conceptual is defined by assumptions, laws, and other concepts. This is not to deny the alleged elegance of mathematics, but to assign to it a different status from that of art. Mathematical elegance resides in simplicity; the elegance of art, in expressiveness. The one is grounded in universality; the other in individuality. /

The disinterested is an interest in the expressively evolving order for its own sake. Its essence is process. The opposing interest is that which looks to the end, and takes account of the means only so far as it is necessitated by the end. In ordinary perceptual activity, we make the distinction between looking and seeing. (The look is only for purposes of identification, where formal notice is taken. One looks at the pole star; at the approaching bus; at the thermometer. Ordinarily such things hold for us little intrinsic interest. But one sees the full moon; or the auto on display; or the burning clouds at sunset. Mere identification or recognition taken in at a glance and subsequently tagged is seldom confused with per-

⁷ "Contemplation" is instructive in its ambiguity: aesthetically, it means to be absorbed in; its meaning, "to consider with a view of accomplishing," may or may not be aesthetic, depending upon the kind, and the manner, of accomplishment. Cf. Chapter IV on the problem of practical purpose, and especially on the aesthetic character of architecture.

ception, to which we cling for its own import. But after having experienced the original, we tend to substitute recognitions and titles for it. In this abbreviation, we find the basis for the naive realistic object, which is sometimes confused with the aesthetic object.

The truth of the realistic object is a half-truth, an abstraction from experience. Having a kind of physical permanence, the abstracted object, which can be roughly identified by pointing and with which we can *associate* experience, comes to be considered as the work of art—that is, the painting on the wall, the statue in the museum, or the like. Thus, by giving locus to the physical object, one may easily deceive oneself that there too is the aesthetic object, which contains the beauty. A localizing tendency is essentially correct; what is incorrect is the substitution of physical qualities, with which we associate experience, for the immanent experience as it is processually had. Aspects of the two may share much in common; but the peculiar virtue of the one is absent in the other. The primary, aesthetic object is the object being experienced in its integrity. Only in a secondary sense is the object physical and identifiable; as one identifies the chair in the corner, the book to the left, etc. The tagged object is referred to by signs which are partial, and is not the individualized object of experience. One can refer to the *Waldstein Sonata* in a superficial way; one may even recognize the style as Beethovenish, but this sort of recognition is primarily extrinsic and non-aesthetic.

Aesthetic contemplation is activity the locus of which is in immediate sense-experience, whose inherent forces require further integration. Without activity there is no experience, but at best, ideas in Locke's sense of the term when he speaks of them as being impressed upon a blank tablet; without sensuous locus activity is not aesthetic; for sundered from experience, it is at best disembodied, pseudo-will. A pure act free from the sensorial is, at least for human experience, pure denial of being. A human act always requires subject-matter. Thus the inherent forces refer precisely to the ordering of experience through media. This relationship is not that of means to end, but of meaning generated in and through sense-representation. Order is generated by feeling, and means becomes medium. When this occurs, the physical object becomes

transformed into an aesthetic object; hence, the reason for calling it one of imagination.

The physical thing is not aesthetic activity, but a thing proper to the furthering of such activity. We commonly note this distinction in the difference between scientific and aesthetic analysis. The coherence of parts in a statue is scientifically describable as an instance of a law. Though present for the observer, qualities and feelings are unessential and irrelevant; quantities and relations are essential; hence, the procedure is fundamentally reductive. Aesthetic coherence is made possible only through qualities and feelings; not quantity, but proportion, is its essence. For this reason, works of art may be enlarged or made smaller without losing worth, depending simply upon one's power of imagination.⁸ Appreciation being unique, law and instances are irrelevant. In science many instances are necessary for the validation of law; in art, one instance suffices to validate worth, for universal and particular coalesce in the individual.

Are we to conclude then that the physical thing is irrelevant? An answer to this question is made difficult by reason of ambiguity of the term, "physical thing." So far as it is relevant to aesthetic analysis, we use the term to refer to the observable qualities and relations that are customarily thought of as constituting the naïve realistic object—color, design, tone, etc., those aspects of objects which are most capable of being pointed out. Such aspects of an object can be pointed out whether they are qualities of an external or of an imagined object. I can, for example, imagine middle C, hum it, or strike it on the piano. If my hearer has a good ear, the name alone may suffice; otherwise, I am compelled to find some other technique for indicating it. Even a so-called external thing, however, can be pointed out only by some overt act. In this respect the two are on a par. Consequently, the physical aspects of a work of art which is not objectified can, given sufficient fortitude and patience on the part of communicator and communicant, be identified even though they are only imagined. In other words, the imagined

⁸ In most cases it is true that the object of imagination is less vital, and consequently the physical object is required; but such a condition is traceable to weak imagination and is not intrinsic to the "aesthetic object."

object has identical correlates which may be substituted for the physical thing. And although the imagined correlates cannot be weighed or held next to color-charts, they are none the less physical, by reason of the way in which they are identified. Since this ability to make such substitutions is the only ground for asserting the irrelevance of the so-called physical, one is on unfirm ground in asserting its actual irrelevance. Although the so-called external object may be absent, it is still present for all legitimate aesthetic purposes. Were this not the case, we would need some explanation how an irrelevant physical thing nevertheless operates in the aesthetic situation. To this objection, I have found no reply, save the hedonistic, which asserts that aesthetic value is a kind of pleasure in which the object is irrelevant; or a pure act, in which apparently nothing is relevant.

We may mention two points with reference to extrinsicism. First and foremost, expression usually comes to fruition only when there is an external thing, the reason being that actual manipulation of the medium vivifies the imagination. Otherwise, imagination may be halt and arrested.⁹ The second obvious reason for extrinsicism is to be sought in the social character of art. In the process of actual externalization the artist is better able to test the success of his imagination. Moreover, it is then possible for others to reaffirm the result in their attempt to reconstitute the object of imagination as a work of art. In this sense the artist's feeling is disinterested. When the disinterested and the interested coincide, we may say that the artist creates for himself. This sounds like the old, disreputable dogma of art for art's sake, but there is a difference.

When the artist creates for himself, the self is devoted to the creation of an object, so that in creating for himself he is at the same time creating for anyone else who will take the trouble to appreciate his work. If he is creating for anyone else and not himself, his art is bound to be pap which is meant for popular consumption

⁹ A friend of mine, who is a painter, and is not without a sense of superiority for the male sex, once suggested that the reason why a great many women take to sculpturing rather than to painting is that the latter requires a more lively imagination in that it must portray a three-dimensional world in a two-dimensional space. Regardless of the sex issue, one can easily see the different type of imagination involved in, and the different intellectual abilities requisite for, the one art as opposed to the other.

or at best propaganda, which has the intent of influencing a person for ulterior purposes. The public character of the object is carried by the physical thing, which we have seen is equally as integral to the imagined as to the externalized object. The process of externalizing is, *after* a thing has been expressed, merely a matter of recording or transcribing—for example, such as we find in Mozart's work. The process takes on a different and much more imaginative coloring, however, when creation proceeds more haltingly and laboriously and when it must be continually revised and worked over—as, for example in Beethoven's work. In the former case, the aesthetic activity has already been resolved in advance of the process of externalizing. In the latter case, the aesthetic activity is actually furthered in the process of externalizing, and the fingers or the pens or the brushes run ahead of the artist and help him to think through his work of art. In this case, da Vinci's statement that the artist creates with his brain is only a half-truth; for the artist must also think with his hands.

Even though we set up the test of expression to be that which is self-satisfying, the test cannot be performed unless we can *contemplate* the object and have it reflect back to us the intended expression. Contemplation may, of course, be of an object which is not externalized, but it usually requires one which is externalized. The test of expression as that which is self-satisfying, however, is not in the final analysis conclusive; for one can never be quite certain that the intended expression is satisfactory until it is actually embodied in a physical object. Physical embodiment, moreover, has the added merit of showing up for what it is worth the "I know what I mean but I can't express it," and it is besides a sure test by which the incompetent artist can disillusion himself. The social determinant of art is not public acclaim but self-satisfaction with the product, from which alone criticism can legitimately evolve. The physical object is then the bearer of meaning, which can be aesthetically charged, not as physical, but as being capable of experiential grasp. In short, it becomes an object of imagination.

A few words are in order with respect to the legitimacy of the term, "physical object," as an abstraction from experience which nevertheless operates as the locus of felt experience. The distinc-

tion between the physical and the aesthetic object has validity not in the aesthetic experience, in which the two coalesce; but only in the fact that, so far as we can critically observe, the same sense-data are observable in varied situations. For example, a design of an Indian vase may be appreciated in the aesthetic context; it may be a sign for distinguishing this vase from that; it may serve as part of the stimulus to overt activity—carrying water, and the like. The various data, then, are got at essentially by pointing, which always refers to a partial aspect of a total situation. By a further process of abstracting various sense-data, and then conceiving them together as constituting an object, which of course is a highly mature and often useless process, we come to a conception of the naïve realistic object.

The problem of putting together sense-data so as to constitute an object has been the task to which some thinkers, both in philosophy and in science, have set themselves. The alleged object resulting from totalling pointer-referents, which are always abstract, can yield, however, only an abstract object, one not of contemplation but only of the blank stare. Such an object is something to be looked at, but not seen. *Looking at* is the only attitude which can be taken toward it; for the complex is essentially and fundamentally multiple, and must be regarded from various *aspects*, which can only be added summatively. Thus an attempt to get at the real, immanent object through sense-data, whose original function is to serve as a sign for something else, yields only ennui, not experience. Ennui is inevitable, for by reason of an arbitrary procedure the object cannot make sense; consequently, the realistic approach defeats itself and ends in the only road open to it—namely in psychoanalyzing a self bored with life, because it has alienated itself from the world of immanent meaning. Functionless data spell the decadence of a culture. The physical object has no integrity of its own, and we call it an object only because it satisfies some of the conditions which are necessary for that which is an object.

The genesis of the concrete, aesthetic object is to be found in feeling, and because it is the nature of feeling to run a course, feeling is consonant with activity. One leaps with joy, cries with sorrow, groans in agony. Activity without feeling is mere motion,

the subject-matter of physics. Feeling without activity is disembodied spirit. Activity followed by feeling is the curious paradox found in the James-Lange theory of emotion, which adds together motion and spirit, polar opposites. Feeling as activity in the object is aesthetic. In art gay colors leap, distressing sounds groan, dolorous tones cry. By reason of its embodied imagination, art is neither psychopathic nor physical; it is indifferently sensitized motion or structured feeling.)

(The artist's problem is how to make feeling social; since, as we have insisted, if he makes feeling determinate for himself, *ipso facto* he makes it social. The procedure involved—starting from the more instinctive, as that which is relatively immediate, and moving to the more intellectual, as that which is relatively mediate—should be verifiable in extant art. And art does seem to substantiate the two phases of experience, though, as we should expect, the transition being continuous, only a rough, practical distinction can be drawn. As for the instinctive, relatively immediate, yet anticipatory, aspect of art, we have little difficulty in identifying it. The prologue of drama, the theme of music, description in the novel, the dominant color-scheme or brush-strokes of a painting—all set the mood, as yet inchoate, but to become determinate in progressive appreciation. When the famous four notes opening Beethoven's *Fifth* are roughly transposed as "Fate Knocks at the Door," they are but metaphorically expressive of *something like* Beethoven's intent. One cannot be substituted for the other; but the dull imagination might find stimulation in the idea.

Only an incomplete and often misguided aesthetic will take specific atomic sense-data as the essence of expression. Psychological experiments give evidence which challenges the over-simplified notion that simple colors or tones have their own invariable, unique expressive qualities. Investigations reveal that they vary from individual to individual and with changing circumstances. But although there is great variability, Professor Chandler is led to believe that one should not conclude that there is complete chaos.¹⁰ The danger in insisting upon more or less standard interpretations

¹⁰ Albert R. Chandler, *Beauty and Human Nature*, New York, Appleton-Century, 1934, pp. 114 ff., 220 ff., and *passim*.

of data, gaiety of color, morbidity of tone, etc., consists in overlooking the individuality of a work of art. At best such abstract data give a *clue* to further expression, which involves the more intellectual or relatively mediate, structural character of art, through which expression comes to fruition.

The indeterminacy of the instinctive or relatively immediate becomes informed in the intellectual or relatively mediate. Colors are not unambiguously expressive; but they become so as they develop into structure, when inchoate mood becomes determinate feeling. El Greco's mordant bluish greens become truly arresting only as they issue into a structural, vibrant form. In painting, color and structure are indissoluble. A theme in music can be engaging; it can have rudimentary aesthetic value; but without adequate development its value is dissipated or nullified—as is witnessed by much of our "popular" music, or on a higher plane, by some of Tschaikowsky, where boresome repetition often takes the place of development. Themes gain in value when as motifs they bind music together in monumental architecture, as in Beethoven's *Appassionata*, especially the third movement. In the literary and dramatic arts the same principles are at work. Description in the novel must be integral to the whole. For example, Steinbeck's description of the turtle which always heads for the southwest sets an inevitable, restrained pace characteristic of the whole moving action of *Grapes of Wrath*. Description fixes mood, which is in itself inadequate save as it is carried through in action. Literary description whether of nature or of physiognomy and personal attributes senses further developments. Drama, like the symphony, is highly intellectual, in which successive conflicts and harmonies must be inextricably interwoven as the designed warp and woof of individuality. Aesthetic development thus moves from the instinctive to the intellectual, or to put it somewhat differently, from opaque feeling to individuality. The course of art is from the arresting but unclear to the arrested and clear. In this process, emotion is embodied, freely working itself out in the imagination.

By freedom is meant the socio-emotionally acceptable generation of order. That which is social alone, is ideally pure intellect—classicism as abstract form. That which is emotional alone, is

ideally pure feeling—romanticism as psychopathic. When form is the outcome of feeling, the order generated is acceptable. A purely social order is the machine; a purely emotional order is a contradiction in terms, chaos. The individual is the socio-emotional order generated in the fulfilment of feeling. These are the implicit principles which one can observe in aesthetic criticism and art-analysis. Dreams fall short of being art for the very reason that they are a-social. They do not lend themselves to re-observation, precisely because they are unordered. Delusions fall short of being art because they are anti-social and disordered.¹¹ The order which the psychoanalyst is capable of establishing for dreams and insanity does not invalidate these aesthetic principles; for instead of being intrinsic to conscious experience, this order must be explained by genetic, discontinuous principles. Analysis thus is not of experience which is its own intelligibility, but of follies explicable only by analyzing personality. Such principles are anti-social, for they do not lead to ordered structures which are their own social justification, but rather we are led to analyze persons who cause disorder, and thus we “explain away” the disorder unintelligently.¹²

Finally, aesthetic principles lead us further to reflect that craft and machine work are not in and of themselves generation of emotionally acceptable order. This is not to say that the objects produced are incapable of possessing aesthetic value, but that they do not possess it necessarily. Craft work, it is true, has apparently more often given rise to aesthetic objects than have machines, but the reason is to be sought in the gratuitous fact that greater ability to exercise human control is possible in the one than in the other. The magnitude of the problem being considerably lessened, the results are more often happy. But should one affirm the intrinsic aesthetic character of craft work, he has a big task in explaining away monstrosities produced by craft, which though less insistent are none the less real than many machine fabrications. The problem to be solved by craft and industry alike is the overcoming of the

¹¹ Cf. Christopher Caudwell's brilliant analyses in *Illusion and Reality*, chs. 9, 10.

¹² Unintelligently, because we do not get at the roots of the disorder, save in a few cases of organic disturbance. The clinicians' commentary that the number of inmates in asylums for the feeble-minded increases in times of economic distress seems to be significant.

abstract means to end relation, which is an almost purely intellectual relationship, and which does not become aesthetic by having "art" added to the product by way of decoration.¹³ Dissatisfied with the technical aspects of the product alone, the designer adds an emotionally insistent and detractive element to his work.

The disparateness between intellect and emotion thus leads to monstrosity. The problem to which industry is finally awakening is the problem of design.¹⁴ Although design must work through mechanics, only imagination and feeling expressively embodied can create machine objects worthy of being called art. Instinct, as we have been using the term, gives the starting-point of the problem, but it must be solved in imaginative terms germane to its subject-matter, as the novelist, the dramatist, the poet, the composer, each does in his own peculiar medium. In the working out of such problems, we are in the presence of the aesthetic object as the consummating experience, experience which in the unity of emotion and intellect not separated from the start, is purposive. When the experience is consummated, it is both specious and immanent, and we may in the generic sense properly call it beauty.

The intent of our discussion has been to put the aesthetic object on surer footing. In large measure our discussion has been destructive, in that we have tried to quash what appear to be misconceptions of the object. We have been guided in this analysis, however, by the assumption that art flourishes in a common, perceptual world, and that it is definitely a social enterprise. We hope to have made some progress through an understanding of what it means for an object to be determinate, of how a determinate thing is a unity in variety, and of the sense in which the aesthetic object is one of imagination.

The determinate object, we have insisted, is not one which is just given, but one which must be striven for. Determinate being

¹³ See a classic example of the "rose-engine" in Herbert Read's *Art and Industry*, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1935, p. 8.

¹⁴ The problem is being attacked by an increasing number of books, such as Norman Bel Geddes' *Horizons*; Cheney's *Art and the Machine*; Mumford's *Technics and Civilization*; Herbert Read's *Art and Industry*, etc.

is not achieved without an antecedent process. The process is, however, one of growing determinacy, as art is the process of progressive fulfilment. When the process comes to a conclusion, it is immanent in a different sense: as determinate and self-revealing it is what we may call the specious present. Quality-theories refuse to recognize that the object can be grasped only as the process of growing determinacy is fulfilled. Ordinary sense-qualities are not determinate but indeterminate. Thus the doctrine of simple sense-qualities does not perform a positive, aesthetic service. Qualities, which are relatively permanent aspects of things, serve at best the purpose of identifiers or tags. That qualities are not to be equated with the determinate art-object is underscored in the principle of unity in variety.

Aesthetic unity is not a sum-total of simples but is the culmination of an historical process through the embodiment of feeling. We have to take into account then a dual rôle: unity refers to the determinate being which a thing is, and the unifying refers to the growing harmony apprehended in temporal appreciation. The unifying issues into unity in variety. This unity characterizes not the abstract, physical object, but the concrete, aesthetic object, which is the object of imagination.

Imagination is disinterested, contemplative activity, which is purposive. In this activity, imagination, as directive feeling, coalesces with the sensed thing to effect consummatory experience. If feeling is sundered from the sensuous thing, then both sense-data and feeling are aesthetically meaningless. Concreteness is achieved through the resolution, and imagination as embodied feeling makes art determinate and social; for then it is wholly structured. The aesthetic object is thus the realization of the artist's objective, a realization which brings beauty into being.

If the various categories seem to be circular, it is only because of the fundamental integrity of the aesthetic object. When any category is intrinsic to the aesthetic situation, the realization of its full meaning must lead through the other categories back to itself. The process is not so much circular as it is one of growth and accretion. To observe how the fuller integration of the aesthetic whole is effected, we must turn to a discussion of expression.

CHAPTER III

Expression: The Satisfied Imagination

Aesthetic theory generally suffers more from partiality and incompleteness than from error and contradiction. Any attempt, however, to bring the various theories together into a synthesis runs the even greater danger of an eclecticism, which in the contemporary scene is likely to be only facile juxtaposition of "subjective" and "objective" theories taken together as constituting an alleged synthesis. The result can be only a potpourri of many things proposed under the head of aesthetics. A systematic theory is the only legitimate alternative. The task may seem presumptuous and the odds against success great; but despite the hazards, I shall offer as a point of departure for further discussion a definition of beauty suggested by our preceding analysis.

We may define beauty as the expression of a purpose in a sensuous medium. The theory of beauty implicit in this definition we may for the sake of convenience call the theory of the satisfied imagination.¹ Our present task is to explore its meaning. In speaking of the satisfied imagination, we should not conclude that beauty is either a succumbing to illusion or that it is merely something in the head—a "subjective" phenomenon. On the contrary, we must insist that it is fulfilment of intention, and a fulfilment which necessitates the creation of an object, implicitly or explicitly sustained by and through physical things. This insistence raises a complex aesthetic question, which may be put as follows: how does (1) a physical object become (2) an object of satisfaction, which (3) is at the same time public or social in character? The success or failure in answering this question will mark the success or failure of the theory of the satisfied imagination.

¹ Although I have borrowed the suggestive designation from Professor Fite, I do not mean to impute to him the ideas here developed.

Too much of the literature of aesthetics errs by analyzing beauty into elements, and consequently by making for itself the impossible task of getting the elements back together again in an aesthetic whole. The usual means of covering up the problem is a verbal one, which falls back upon such terms as synthesis, fusion, integration, and the like. After one has set the irresolvable problem, no other procedure is open to him but to assert dogmatically that in actual experience the elements are synthetized, fused, integrated, or somehow made whole again. Such analyses completely miss the point, for no one really questions the unity of the aesthetic whole. The real problem is to show *how* the relations obtain in the genuine aesthetic unity. Our general approach to this problem has already been suggested and depends in part on the distinction between art² as process and beauty as product. We must inquire into the relation which art as process bears to beauty as product, and how each is constituted. In this inquiry we shall show how expression is the expressive which comes to its own inherent conclusion; that is, as the expressed. The process is double-edged, involving on the one hand the so-called physical object and on the other hand feeling.

If beauty is the expression of a purpose in a sensuous medium, the question arises, how in expression does feeling become objectified? Or put more concretely, how do "physical objects"—the objects of our common, perceptual world, with which scientist and artist alike must begin—come to have aesthetic worth? Actually, the question is constituted from the scientific rather than from the aesthetic point of view. The scientist's feelings are irrelevant to his subject-matter, which becomes accurately denoted when it can be measured or weighed by means of physical instruments. Abstracted from immediate experience, the scientist's subject-matter is conceived of in a space-time order and is independent of the feeling-tone it may have for him. The problem of how physical things come to have aesthetic worth is thus really inverted. On the contrary, it should be, how does the scientist come to con-

²In this connection we take art in the generic sense to signify the aesthetic process whenever and however it may occur. Subdivisions into the fine arts, nature-appreciation, and the so-called practical arts, when they come under the rubrics, need not detain us now.

ceive of things apart from aesthetic worth? Then we see that it is science which is an abstraction, and that if the aesthetic fact is originally conceived from the point of view of science, one is inevitably compelled to invent some kind of incomprehensible synthesis in order to arrive at the aesthetic fact again. The aesthetic problems are rendered somewhat easier of solution through the apparent facts that (a) feelings are never completely sundered from physical things; that is, they are never completely indeterminate, and (b) the "physical object" is in experience never the completely abstract thing-in-itself; that is, feeling is not absent from the scientist's experience, but only irrelevant to his intent. Complete abstraction between feeling and object is ideal only.

If feeling is never completely indeterminate and, the object is never completely sundered from feeling, then any object or any feeling is potentially aesthetic. Any object, then, or any feeling is immediately expressive, and may lead to either beauty or ugliness, as the case may be. The aesthetic attitude is preserved as long as the immediately expressive moves towards its own fulfilment; it is destroyed when something foreign intervenes to disrupt the immanent process. In its inception, art is instinctive; but in its development it is a process which can be resolved only in imagination. The process must yield an object of satisfaction, and this is precisely the process of creation which becomes stilled in the aesthetic object. To facilitate inquiry we may proceed first to a discussion of creation and then to a discussion of appreciation, with a view to establishing their identity in principle.

Creation

No one in aesthetics, so far as I know, explicitly defends the position that art-activity proceeds in a vacuum. Sometimes, however, students of aesthetics seem unwittingly and indirectly to fall into a paradoxical rôle of defending it by implication. Even those who affirm theories of inspiration suppose that inspiration

follows upon antecedent acts, however irrelevant these may appear in the final aesthetic product. In these cases the antecedents are preparations for receptivity — acts which make for divine madness whenever deities are disposed to bestow their graces upon man. Theories of inspiration are usually unintelligible not because of insistence upon divine influence, but because there is no aesthetic passage from the divine influence to the work of art, and certainly in and of itself art becomes no more clearly understood by reason of theological arguments which affirm divine impetus to creation.³

If creation does not proceed in a vacuum, we seem compelled to assert that it is action undertaken by a mature, or at least a maturing, mind. The strictly aesthetic problem consists in distinguishing aesthetic features of the creative process from irrelevant psychological features. A failure to make this distinction calls into question that type of play-theory which is based upon a notion of super-abounding energies overflowing into overt activity, free from practical utility. Where such activity is undirected and maladapted, we should call it not play but frenzy; and certainly there is not the slightest reason, save in terms of misguided theory, to confuse it with art. When play is considered to be preparatory to later useful activity, it comes to have nicer adaption and form; but it is still not to be confused with art. Finally, when the child begins to make "an environment for itself, commensurate with its abilities," the activity may properly be called play; but as Professor Langfeld states, the child "withdraws to a world of its own imagination, peopled with fanciful playmates who speak a language probably *only partly intelligible* to itself."⁴ The apparent inconstancy and vacillation of the child's imaginative world should make us chary of accepting the notion, too common in aesthetics, that the child is a supreme artist. That play includes aesthetic elements can be reasonably asserted; but that it is therefore art is a thoroughly unwarranted conclusion.

³ The same is true, *mutatis mutandis*, of psychological theories in which we must distinguish genetic impulses preparatory to creation and the process of creation itself.

⁴ H. S. Langfeld, *The Aesthetic Attitude*, New York (quoted by permission of) Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1920, pp. 261-262. Italics supplied.

The distinctive feature of art resides in the fact that it achieves a high degree of intelligibility or determinateness. In saying this we must nevertheless disavow aestheticism. We are not saying, as Croce sometimes seems to say, through implication, that there is no experience but the aesthetic. We are merely asserting that art arises out of gross experience and that it develops through an intrinsic order different from other types of activity—for example, that which is dominated simply by utilitarian ends.

Dewey's description of problem-solving as a process from the indeterminate to the determinate is suggestive. Problem-solving, however, which is merely a means to an end, is non-aesthetic. Moreover, in aesthetics the problem is not only one of the feelings but also one of the intellect. As we have before indicated, the art-process moves from obscure, present feeling to intelligible, satisfying purpose. What is aesthetically arbitrary in the various arts is the starting-point, the diffuse feeling: the theme of a musical composition, the inchoate mood of a painting, rhythmic progression in poetry, anticipatory description in a novel, and the like.⁵ Although the starting-point may be arbitrary, what follows is, however, ideally determinate.⁶ The arbitrary is signified in a general way by the title—*Allegro*, *Rondo*, *Man with the Pink*, *Kristin Lavransdatter*, *Chicago*, etc. Titles are the legitimate bridge between so-called practical activity and aesthetic appreciation. Even when the choice of a title is an after-thought, it is, nevertheless, indicative of the artist's own passage into the art-work. In advance of actual production, he may decide beforehand, as many historical cases show, to write a symphony in three movements, a proletarian novel of migrant workers, a mural of American civilization, etc. What we need to emphasize is that the art-processes is conceived in hazy anticipatory meanings, arrestingly caught, and developed through their own intrinsic logics.

Both art and science proceed from the obscure to the enlightened, but the processes *qua* art and *qua* science differ materially.

⁵ Cf. Frank Jewett Mather, Jr., *Concerning Beauty*, Princeton, 1935, Ch. VI; also Aaron Copland, *What to Listen for in Music*, Ch. III.

⁶ Ideally, for perhaps the perfect work of art has never been created; moreover, there seem to be legitimate junctures in art—as, for example, the various movements of a symphony, which could conceivably be different, so as to produce quite a different work, neither inferior nor superior to the original.

Although scientific procedure unquestionably thrives only in the dramatic medium of emotion, this medium is irrelevant to the more refined forms in which science attains acceptability. However emotional and irrational the hunches and guesses from which science takes its point of departure, once they achieve public status they become hypotheses statable as propositions. The procedure by which hypotheses are to be tested must also be statable. Finally, when the method of verification is legitimate, it is heedless of emotional biases; consequently, greater objectivity of science obtains when sense-experience is reduced to a bare minimum, such as is in pointer-readings. Although the possibility of error through deductive interpretation is thus augmented, error through biased observation is accordingly diminished.

The history of science is a record of ever-increasing abstractness, with emphasis upon refined technology and intellectualism. When one reads the biographies of the great scientists one is easily misled to believe that science is an aesthetic drama strictly comparable to the great classics in art. Biographies, however, are not reliable. The great man of science may be comparable in mental stature and abilities and in refinement of feeling to the great artist; but such comparisons are historical, biographical, and aesthetic, and are not relevant to science, which is *per se* cloaked in anonymity. Science must be understood in its own terms—through hypotheses and verification of them by observation and experiment. The emphasis falls definitely upon physical manipulation and intellectual grasp. Whatever of the aesthetic is present is fortuitous and not intrinsic.⁷ Nevertheless, the aesthetic is to science *qua* science extraneous; only as we come to our researches with dogmas as to what reality must be in advance of investigation, can we assert that scientific entities are inherently aesthetic.

Both science and art proceed from the obscure to the enlightened, but the one is essentially intellectual (not without physical manipulation and observation, of course), the other is essentially intelligent, in that feeling and sense-data coalesce in deter-

⁷ Perhaps the aesthetic features of the scientific enterprise help to promote science precisely because science falls so far short of its ideal. The aesthetic then is not a blessing given to inadequacy, but rather an impetus to further fruitful activity.

minate experience. In art we may in an analogical sense speak of hypothesis and verification as its method. Naturally, we do not mean by this, propositions from which strict deductions are made and tested. As a loose analogy we may, however, suppose that mood corresponds to hypothesis, that feeling whose inherent force demands further determinancy corresponds to deduction, and that the resultant satisfied imagination corresponds to the test of validity. Yet, unless we clearly distinguish the aesthetic from the scientific processes, the analogy is more harmful than helpful.⁸ Although we may with reason speak of the logic of art, in doing so we refer not to deduction as the implication of propositions but to the development of feeling as satisfactoriness culminating in satisfaction.⁹ The development in art is one of lively imagination proceeding through the immanent process to beauty, or that which spans the complete process in immediate experience. Such appreciation is possible in science only upon the assumption of a closed system which can be immediately grasped in its entirety. The assumption is doubtful, and leaves us at best with a metaphysical idea in which science and art may be ultimately identified. When, however, testability and confirmation are substituted for verification—as in the present-day tendency—and when correlation of events is substituted for immediate felt relations, the ideal appears as a pseudo-metaphysical will o' the wisp. Our urgent task is now to show how the satisfied imagination issues from the process of creating art.

An often repeated statement is that the artist is one who sees more clearly than the layman. To deny the statement is of second-

⁸ It seems that instrumentalism—and especially the popular instrumentalism which has been borrowed from Dewey—fails to make the necessary distinctions. Even Dewey seems at times to be not above confusion. What we must distinguish, of course, is the development of immanent experience from observations statistically correlated. Suggestions that death is a matter of experience because of "the role which anticipation and memory of death has played in human life, from religion to insurance companies" or that one can "know insanity without having been insane" make one suspect an externality alien to genuine experience.

⁹ Cf. Samuel Alexander, *Beauty and Other Forms of Value*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1933, p. 184.

ary importance, but to inquire into the meaning of the most abused word "seeing" is of prime importance. Seeing may signify superior sensitivity, which includes a host of coalescing meanings: feeling, sensation, being easily affected by outside influences, quickly reacting, and the like. At one extreme are objective sensibilities to things; at the other are subjective capacities for responding. Common to all the shades of meaning is the emphasis upon sensory processes, whether as sensation or as feeling. What is not quite clear, however, is whether sensitivity refers to a kind of sounding board sympathetically set in motion or whether it is a process of disclosure of something without. The ambiguity is present in the word "feeling," as in having feelings and in feeling an object. In value-theory the distinction is sometimes nicely made that feeling is a medium of insight but not itself constitutive of value. The distinction borrowed from a theory of knowledge, involves a suspiciously over-nice conception of a subtle diaphanous, whose purpose is to make things open to the purview of mind. A kind of legerdemain of getting the outside inside is, however, no solution of the problem. While we require a legitimate distinction between existing and non-existing entities, we gain nothing simply by getting images inside the organism; for the problem of perception only breaks out anew. In aesthetics the cardinal emphasis upon sensitivity is that pertaining to its rationality, not as reason but as emotion. The rationale of emotion, though not equivalent to, is grounded in, sensuous material, loosely thought of as primary and secondary qualities.

The so-called physical object is the ground of intelligibility of feeling. When the object is wanting, feeling is wholly arbitrary. This is also the case when the object is a simple quality taken by itself. If one feels a patch of yellow to be gay and another feels it to be sad, we may reply to both, "So what?" The "so-what" can be answered in the same vulgar jargon that it is intelligible only when "it gets you somewhere." Now the "getting somewhere" depends upon a structure without which feeling is at best described in terms of association. If we assume that the original, "instinctive" feeling is merely psychologically conditioned, in and of itself it has only associational value, and fails to lead beyond psy-

chological introspection. Because of such and such associations, I like or do not like or find interesting in one way or another this particular color, tone or odor. But if the so-called object is merely this sense-quality, then further activity cannot lead to further apprehension of the object. I do not mean to suggest that the artist is not highly sensitive to various qualities as having a tone, but rather that his superior sensitivity compels him to mold these quasi-atomic feelings into an object which is adequate to the purpose it can express. The aesthetic resolution of feeling is not in self-analysis, but in the construction of an object through which feeling comes to be expressed. The dilettante is the introvert; not the artist.

When feeling is successfully resolved in the object, there is no longer any dualism of thing and feeling. Dualism appears only when art-attempts are thwarted and the thing is consequently no longer an adequate bearer of feeling. In this case psychological interpretations are most convincing, for in the aesthetically irrelevant obtrusion of the psychological, only a psychological interpretation is appropriate. If on the contrary, human activity were always aesthetically successful, the mind-body problem, which is a sign of beings whose civilization is not in harmony with their world, would never have occurred. In the successful resolution of aesthetic activity, feeling is no longer obtrusive, and perception comes to fulfilment. The mark of successful activity is the completeness of the object perceived. Feeling facilitates perception such that the total structure of the object is consistently apprehended, not as a series of discrete phenomena, but as a perceptual unity. If the object is disparate, contradictory feelings record the disparity. When the object is grasped, feeling is implicit in the transaction and marks off the boundaries within which enlightened art-criticism may operate.

Cognition, volition, and affection all share in the emergence of beauty, for each is a phase of the process by which beauty comes into being. Any severance, in thought, of the phases from one another destroys the occasion for understanding beauty. A person can observe the truth of this statement by critically reviewing the specialized theories which insist upon one of the phases

to the exclusion of the other two. He will be obliged to conclude, in substance, that pure cognitive theories are unable to differentiate beauty and truth, that pure volitional theories are unable to differentiate action and quality, and that pure affectional theories are unable to differentiate passive suffering and active enjoyment.

Sensation, activity, and feeling all find their place in beauty when the process of which they are phases is consummated. If one phase of the process is abstracted from the others and is then equated with aesthetic value, the abstraction effects the reduction of the total situation to a single aspect of it. When this reduction is effected, the investigator's subsequent thinking is then confined within the limits of his reductive point of view. Because he has antecedently assumed a single mode of thinking, this mode of thinking alone is subject to confirmation. Moreover, since this mode is relevant throughout, it does receive confirmation, but only by forfeiting any grasp of the other equally valid modes of thinking. Since the reduction excludes the other aspects of the total situation, and consequently makes confirmation of them impossible, the empirical confirmation which is obtained is deceptive. Because the investigator's point of view is arbitrarily limited, the confirmation of his results is arbitrarily limited within the confines of his point of view. The gross error is committed by equating a phase of the situation with the whole situation; that is to say, by taking the part for the whole. This pseudo-empiricism can only impoverish aesthetic fulfilment, detracting from its richness and preciousness.

Aesthetic seeing must include the many-sided aspects of fulfilment, by which object and feeling become determinate. This inclusiveness permits of thoroughgoing perception. As one of my friends upon hearing Beethoven customarily remarks, "Beethoven is always right!" The felt rightness is the determinacy which clearly underlies the aesthetic judgment. This is a feeling which comes to have structure through action, and which finally eventuates in aesthetic seeing. A term commonly used to denote this fact is the grossly misused "good taste."

Taste refers not to the immediate, which is the starting point

of art—that is, what we have called the instinctive—but to the more intellectual or mediated as it comes to fulfilment. That it does not refer to the former is clear from the fact that the “instinctive” is psychologically and socially conditioned. This kind of immediacy relates taste originally to gustation, and by extension metaphorically to the flavor of things. Such metaphorical usage is clearly arbitrary, for the reason that such immediacy is not grounded in determinacy of the object, but in processes of conditioning and of association. Whether or not one likes red, or a C-minor chord, or knotty pine, or the four-letter words widely prevalent in modern novels, is aesthetically inconsequential. Either to like or to dislike them is not so much a matter of sensitivity as it is of conditioning. Their peculiar tang, genuinely aesthetic, can be appreciated only in the total context in which the thing becomes a work of art. Perceptual blindness relates not to simple sensations, which, because of their indeterminacy, must be put in the pedestrian context of likes or dislikes, but to the aesthetic object, where refusal to comprehend the artist’s expression makes for naïve judgments. In one’s failure to follow through the art-process in the molded object—or in the artist’s failure to mold the object toward fulfilment—one is deficient in taste. Since, then, aesthetic taste does not refer to instinctive immediacy, it apparently refers to the contextual.

The creative process, we have said, is one which makes feeling determinate through the molding of an object. Matters of taste, consequently, apply to the way in which the object becomes formed, and are predicated upon the basis of the inherent logic of the art-process. Judgments of taste are asserted following upon the successful outcome of the process, and this means that an aesthetic object has come into being. If the artist has successfully created such an object, he has then used good taste; if not, not. Taste thus has its ground only in the sober fact of determinate feeling, in which the imagination is satisfied in its object. Otherwise, conflicting elements destroy the unity of the thing. As feeling becomes determinate in the object, so the judgments of taste denote the relationships obtaining within it. Everything else is purely personal, and if not insignificant, is at least irrele-

vant. The refined feelings which the judge of taste often claims for himself are precisely those which do not belong to the thing, and actually are the mark of aesthetically bad taste. Caste feelings, which are so often tied up with art as the "finer things of life" are those most anti-aesthetic.

There is only one true judge of taste, and he is the artist. He reflects taste primarily in positive judgments, not in negative. The great critic, moreover, is the great artist whose judgments are made concrete, not by passing off something as badly done or ill-conceived, but by actually creating and conceiving better. In this kind of criticism, the master corrects the apprentice by showing him how to create. Such criticism may, for example in musical interpretation, be the grouping of a phrase or the emphasizing of a note in a context which brings out the musical quality and shows that music is not a series of discrete notes, but an object which can be perceived. Criticism is creation. Accordingly, taste originally belongs to the artist; in a secondary sense, it belongs to the appreciator's re-creation.

The relationship between feeling and object is clearly discernible in what we have called the molding process. When on one hand we speak of art as determinate feeling, and on the other, when we speak of feeling as irrelevant, there is an apparent contradiction; but it is only a surface contradiction. When it is purely private, feeling is irrelevant or even anti-aesthetic; for it is then not integral to art and can be understood, if at all, only in terms of psychological, not aesthetic, analysis. Aesthetic feeling is irrelevant to art-analysis, as we have suggested, only in the sense that it is a presupposition of analysis, but it can never be denoted, save indirectly as we indicate the relations which obtain in the art-context. When the context is closed, feeling becomes determinate, and the object is one of satisfied imagination. A problematic aesthetic situation having been resolved, beauty thereby comes into being. Instead of the misdirected analysis of art into elements, which are then alleged to be fused, synthe-

tized, integrated, or even upon which quality is supposed to supervene, we observe that aesthetic analysis refers to the dynamics of the molded object, which comes to rest in immediate perception.

Fusion denotes the expression resulting from the felt expressiveness, which constitutes the dynamics of art. When, for example, a person listens to a string-quartet, the fusion occurs in his listening. If, however, he hears only a series of tones or if he is more interested in "thoughts running through his head" than in the music, fusion is of course absent. If, again, he listens only partially, to the 'cello, for example, he is analyzing not music but technique. Since the 'cello is felt not in relation to the other three voices, it is more likely to be heard as a series of "booms" than a ground bass giving substance to the singing parts. The perception becomes aesthetic when the 'cello provides the mood (save, of course, in solo parts) which becomes determinate in its felt relations with the other strings. In hearing these relations, one listens intently and imaginatively, analysis being implicit and complete, and expression being the result.

Creation is significantly spoken of as a *work* of art. This underscores the fact that something is to be overcome with the materials at hand; secondarily, it raises some questions about play-theories of art. That something must be overcome in the process of making feeling determinate, on the one hand, presupposes an antecedent indeterminism, and, on the other hand, implies an objective or end to be attained. The intervening process is that which effects decision, to borrow a term from A. N. Whitehead. Through decision, the artist comes to grips with the finite. He cuts out the work of art from the myriad of possibilities which the subject-matter contains as sheer potentiality, so forming the thing that it excludes whatever is incompatible with it and includes whatever belongs to its essence. His intent is the "lure for feeling," which is decisive in making a thing individual.¹⁰

Since the art-process does not occur in a vacuum, the artist's intent is not independent of subject-matter. The artist, however,

¹⁰ Cf. the writer's "The Art-Process and the Aesthetic Fact in Whitehead's Philosophy," *The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead in The Library of Living Philosophers*, Vol. III, Evanston and Chicago, Northwestern University Press, 1941, edited by Paul A. Schlipp, pp. 472 ff.

cannot indiscriminately use just any material or any medium to fulfil his intent. But the empirics of the process defy canonization. The artist himself is in uncharted seas; for he cannot yet identify the feeling to be expressed, and, concomitantly, he cannot identify the object decisive for the feeling. Since he is unable yet to make resolute decision, in such waters he is unable even to see the perils which lie before him. Whether, for example, he is contending with a plurality of mutually destructive feelings, which cannot be resolved, or whether with complementary aspects of a complex feeling, which are resolvable, he cannot yet foresee.

Resolution succeeds only as feeling constitutes an urge to decision, and resolution must exclude anything which does not comport with the decision. Moreover, since the object must be grasped in its entirety, it must be made completely expressive in conformity with the feeling which it engenders. Only frustration can result unless the delicate balance can be effected in complete coalescence. Little wonder it is that the art-process involves agonizing travail, vacillating between hope and despair, inspiration and depression, belief in attainment and utter despondency. Whatever of humor and longing and frustration it contains, it is deadly serious and precarious. It is an adventure which issues a challenge and an adventure whose outcome is uncertain and unpredictable. The process is emotional and subjective; it becomes objective through resolution, for then it becomes understood and intelligible in its determinacy.

Art-work and play may have much in common; yet the differences are profound. A distinction on the basis of the onerous and the pleasurable is superficial, and helps little. Play is usually thought to involve nothing of the onerous; art may or may not. No doubt, energy is expended in both art and play; but the decisive question is the way in which it is expended and its result—not the mere fact that one feels pleasure. The distinction must be made on the basis of maturity, determinacy, or intelligibility. In these terms alone can we distinguish art from play, and from its cognate, amusement. Accordingly the subjectivity of pleasure is seen for what it is, and intelligible meaning is reserved for a *work of art*.

Work in art refers to the changing, altering, repressing, emphasizing activity in which the physical becomes freighted with determinate meaning. Impediments must be overcome to gain expressiveness. The expressive, however, is itself a source of the dynamics, which must be counterbalanced by contrasting expressiveness. Conflict is the very nerve of art, provided it is that kind of conflict which expressively leads the conflicting aspects on to fulfilment. Through the process we come to know both the how and the why. The expressive is not surface glitter, but purposeful brush-strokes, rhythm, harmonies, metaphor—in short, style—which constitutes the dynamics of the particular art in question. Style is nothing more nor less than the medium which expresses purpose. If one medium is substituted for another, then a new purpose is engendered. Whatever analogies there may be among the various arts, the same purpose cannot be expressed in a different art. The creative process through which the artist works to express purpose in sense material is a drama of feeling, whether restrained or impulsive, marked by anxiety and defeat or success. His only guarantee of succeeding is success, and his success is measured by his ability to make feeling intrinsic to a unique object.

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If our description of the art-process is correct, then art is not mere imitation or a merely correct reproduction. Imitation can be reduced to technical procedures in which feeling and expressiveness are irrelevant—as, for example, in photography, sound-recording, etc. Originals can be meticulously reproduced, but reproduction is no test of art. A skilled technician can always paint a “pretty picture;” he can always paint a likeness; but this does not constitute art. The pretty or the portrait painter’s flattering likeness always exhibits a discrepancy between feeling for sense-medium and suggestion. The fabricator tries to conceal the former in attaining the latter; wittingly or unwittingly, he uses suggestion to induce pleasant associations, which carry the mind away from the sense-object, instead of into it, and consequently he exploits his factotums by capitalizing on their emotional adhesions. Titian to the contrary, artists generally insist that if they prostitute their work in this way, they can never paint again. The truth of this matter is for psychology to determine. What

is necessary for aesthetics is to set up principles by which to distinguish art from pap.

The conclusion follows that feeling grounded in the sense-medium is the work of art. Because of this identification in the consummated experience, we see the asymptotic coincidence of art as expression of feeling, as perception, and as imagination. Feeling is determinate only in the integral perception of the object. Perception is not a pointing to "thises" and "thats," but the apprehension of an object constituted by its internal relationships. Dynamic feeling overcomes the atomicity of sense-data by generating an object of perception. Perception is thus intrinsically imaginative in its amalgamation of the retrospective and the anticipative aspects of the processual experience. Feeling and imagination are essentially dynamic; the former emphasizes the forward process, from the embryonic to the further development of art; the latter refers to both forward and backward rhythmical processes. Perception emphasizes the present, especially the consummated specious present. The use of all these terms is unfortunate for logic. Ambiguity arises primarily because their meaning is clipped. When we see them in their fullness and apart from a faculty psychology, we can observe their fundamental aesthetic identity. Special emphases they have, and though not entirely meaningless, in certain contexts they are used abortively. When, however, we understand feeling to be not pathological, but sensuously expressive; perception to be not the logician's hypothesized sensation whose referent is a *sensum*, but fullness of sense-relations; imagination to be not association of ideas, but integration of past and future in present experience—then we are ready to see the fundamental unity of experience.

In the light of these considerations, we can agree with those who insist upon the fundamental intelligibility of the object and the unintelligibility of subjective feelings.²¹ We now see clearly, however, that only inasmuch as feeling is implicit in the object does it constitute that amalgam in which we need not speak of feeling, for it has already done its task of marking off the object which we call aesthetic. The implicit feeling illuminates the rele-

²¹ Cf. especially Elijah Jordan, *The Aesthetic Object*, Principia Press, 1937.

vant and makes it possible to discard the irrelevant. A sour note from the French horn may jar us in listening to Tschaiakowsky's *Fifth*, but only the picayunish will take issue. Wrong notes, foot-shuffling, bad placing of pictures, slight personal discomforts are easily dismissed. When these become too insistent we do not pretend to judge art, but to explain why we are unable to enter into the creative process. Borderline cases help to confuse the issues, but successive attempts at varying intervals help us to eliminate the irrelevant.

The desire for objectivity in art is well founded. For art is a process of resolving a problematic situation. Its resolution yields an order and coherence in which nothing is inapposite and everything is contributory to expression. This highly organized experience is intrinsically unalterable, and constitutes aesthetic unity. Its ideal is perfection, not as perfection of its kind, but as satisfied imagination. Properly interpreted, imagination is, in its insistence upon intelligible relationships capable of being felt, a polar opposite of association. It is a seeing which is a feeling, a feeling which is immanent in and constitutive of the art-object. The object is then one of satisfaction, an intrinsic value. It is also implicitly social in character. To see how it becomes explicitly social we may turn to a discussion of appreciation.

Appreciation

Our purpose is now to show the fundamental identity of creation and appreciation. The inquiry by one who is not an artist may seem presumptuous. From what has gone before, however, it is seen that the analysis is only incidentally concerned with what may be going on in the artist's head. We are not concerned with the sources of inspiration, except in the platitudinous observation that art develops out of and through past experience. Nor are we concerned with the eccentricities of production, which are matters for psychology. Rather, we are concerned with the nature

of the art-process and how it issues into beauty. In the passage of art from creation to appreciation we can better observe its social character.

The bridge between creation and appreciation is actually suggested by the artist in the title of the work—suggested, we must say, for sometimes titles are deceptive. The burden falls, not on the esoteric things which the artist may have to say about his art, but upon the object as the ground of value, to which we must recur for the meaning. The artist's language is his art; it is the tell-tale evidence. As Goepp remarks, "A composer, we dare say, is not a good authority on the value of his own music; the musical intent is his, and there he is authority; not so the verbal label. For he utters his authority only by his music, not by his words."¹² Since art as realized meaning is objective, it can be got at essentially through appreciation. This is not to say that appreciation involves nothing of the personal and arbitrary, but only that when it involves them, they are fundamentally inchoate and unutterable, and hence dismissible. Thus the basic identity in principle between creation and appreciation makes for understanding the creative process. To repeat a quotation from Coleridge, "We know a man is a poet by the fact that he makes us poets." Moreover, we all know what creation is by having created, however humble and meager our creations may be. Whoever works out a melody on the piano, whoever voices a nicely turned phrase, whoever satisfactorily arranges objects in a room, shares, even though feebly, in the creative process.

Since both appreciation and creation are realized instances of satisfied imagination, the differences are to be sought not in the completed products but rather in the manner in which realization comes about, its thoroughness, and the degree of poignancy of the resultant experience. In the passage from creation to appreciation, art is explicitly recognized as communicative and transpersonal. This passage is made possible by a continuity between the "physical object" and imaginative experience. Without the physical object, communication is groundless, and without imaginative experience as its completion, the object is pointless. Al-

¹² Philip H. Goepp, *Symphonies and their Meaning*, Second Series, Philadelphia, 1902, p. 145.

though the direction of fulfilment in appreciation and creation may differ, the value enjoyed in the two is in principle the same. Since the physical object is the connecting link between the two, the emphasis in the directive process shifts from the making of feeling determinate through the construction of a physical object in creation, to the achievement of meaning in the already existing physical object in appreciation. The artist has presumably formed an adequate physical thing; the appreciator's task is to re-sensitize it that it may reflect in itself intrinsic, aesthetic meaning. Re-sensitization is a creative task, by which the physical becomes an aesthetic object, one whose meaning is fulfilment. The criterion of objectivity is the complete incorporation of the physical into the aesthetic object, as one determinately perceived. Determinateness is marked off by feeling become intelligible—that is, purpose. Further analysis is needed to show the passage from the physical to the aesthetic.

In the first instance, the physical object, roughly constituted by the sum-total of so-called primary and secondary qualities, is a presentation to a contemplator. A "presentation," I say, for it is something to be apprehended rather than something which is apprehended. Its sum-total of quasi-determinate qualities is a totality of successive data, not a unity in which the data are fittingly interrelated. The predicament is best described as a situation the meaning of which is problematic. When it is unresolved, we wonder what the artist is "getting at," a half-articulate phrase by which we signify the necessity of completing the situation. The completion, of course, refers to the necessity for grasping the thing in immediate perception; not to its utilitarian or its representative function. In the one case, we are left with an object instrumental to motor activity; in the other, with an imitation. If art signifies only the recognition of a cow in a cornfield, the only kind of criticism open to us is that of verisimilitude, which is best got at through photography. Today the specter of naturalism is easily put to rest. If, however, we do not have to represent a cow that

looks like a cow, and a cornfield that looks like a cornfield; nevertheless, it must feel like a cow in a cornfield. The aesthetically mature (who may be the intellectually adolescent) quite rightly look for meaning, but meaning which a thing has, not what it refers to. Referential aesthetic meaning can be only that which comes to fulfilment in the complete sensory experience.

We can now see the reason for the contemplator's original bafflement in being presented with successive awarenesses of data. As he himself is likely in the vulgar to put it, "The thing doesn't hang together." The physical presentation is not an object, but a totality of relatively determinate qualities, which may serve as referents of a series of "thises," comparable to color-charts, notes of the scale, progressions of chords, etc. Inasmuch as such referents are not fully determinate, they are not objects which will satisfy the imagination. If further reference is sought as a beyond, then, because it leads away from sensory material, there can be no aesthetic object.

Transcendence from sense-datum there must be, but a transcendence which is an expressing, not one which is a sign-reference. Felt relations which are satisfied by further movement into the thing¹³ constitute alone the objective ground by which we judge the thing to be a work of art. In the preceding chapter we noted that imagined physical data may function in the aesthetic object, and that their status strictly parallels the physical. But since they constitute the vehicular link between appreciation and creation, the space-time existence of such data is more necessary for the appreciator than for the artist. Felt indeterminate qualities advance experience to further qualities, not as aspects of the thing, but as further determinateness, purposively engendered. The completed, unified experience is a purpose realized in perception as the specious-immanent. Such realization is guaranteed solely by the fact that all sense-data are now felt to coalesce harmoniously in the total perception, and the thing now "hangs together."

¹³ The further movement, of course, may be suggested by the artist without actually being existentially present. For example, a fundamental in music may actually be missing, but is automatically supplied by the listener. In the literary arts, the problem of the sensuous is complicated by reason of their thorough dependence upon conventional meaning. The physical is separated from conventional meaning only with difficulty. I think, however, the problem is not insurmountable.

The physical becomes expressive through the movement of feeling by which complete perception results. According to all the best evidence, colors, tones, forms, etc., when perceived—that is, when attended to—are always expressive. However gratuitous the fact may be from some points of view, it is indispensable to the aesthetic. That which is not felt is not perceived. Science advances not because the scientist does not feel, but because he ignores feeling or insists upon its irrelevance to his situation. This is far from saying that feeling is not present. One need only to observe the scientist at work to blast the travestied picture of him as the cold intellectualist. Scientific data have utility only so far as they are relatively determinate referents, and what determinacy they have would be completely wanting were it not for feeling. The laboratory technician is expert only so long as he has a “feel” for what he is doing; and although his feel is no scientific guarantee for the validation of his experiment, its absence would make significant experimentation impossible. Because of the scientist’s interest to get along with his researches and because of his refusal to permit data to come to full perceptual realization (partly as a result of their intrinsic poverty), the scientific enterprise is incompletely aesthetic, and partakes more of the detective-like procedure for establishing conclusions. Were this not the case, science would lose its utility, its workshops would be ateliers instead of laboratories, and its products would be art rather than formulas for further action.

Expressiveness is partial determinacy; expression is fructified expressiveness. The movement is from the incomplete to the complete. The distinctly aesthetic problem, then, is how the expressive becomes expression. In these terms, the problem is not one of expressiveness itself, for all perceived things are at least incipiently expressive, but one of excluding arbitrary expressiveness, which is merely personal and associative; and of fostering that expressiveness which issues into complete perception. The arbitrary and personal yield only aspects of the physical object, with small talk about cold greys, subtle curves, spicy tones, etc. Although these may be suggestive, the artist would no doubt be horrified to have his work mutilated by such vulgar aestheticism. Taking these characteristics as determinate rather

than as suggestive, the critic destroys a work of art by trotting out his repertoire of hardened epithets.

Appreciation is tentative. It proceeds through the expressive not as a pause for romantic enjoyment but as engendered purposiveness which demands fulfilment by leading further and further into the physical object. The tentative becomes commitment when the whole physical object becomes germane to fulfilled purpose, or when the appreciator gives up in disgust and turns to something else. Success is sometimes easy, sometimes difficult. If too easy, we suspect the artist of capitalizing on the obvious and insincere. Our suspicion is confirmed when the surface glitter fails to fit the physical understructure, as when the pretty is pretentious or saccharine; it is pretentious because the fabricator attempts to conceal the technique, which is at variance with surface appearance. The crude is not the bold, but the intrusively blatant where we have the right to expect fit expressiveness—as the pyrotechnical, programmatic where the music calls for the expressive climactic. Fitness is achieved in the welding together of the physical and the expressive. If the artist demands too great an effort for resolving expressiveness and technique, we suspect him of being esoteric, with a too-insistent emphasis upon the personal and arbitrary.

Appreciation is controlled by the physical thing. When in experience, feeling charges the physical, it becomes aesthetic. In its complete fulfilment, the physical becomes spiritual; its physical status is then at best implicit, in that with respect to another situation the physical aspects can be reinstated. Since perception of the physical is seldom complete, appreciation usually involves a personal, opaque residue. Then not merely is the appreciator's perception less clear than the artist's (though this need not be the case), but the experience is accordingly less poignant. The significance of residual opaqueness is not for immediate experience, but rather for a future understanding of the work. The muddiness of a third-rate musician's playing makes something different of a composition from that clarity which is obvious in its mastery.

The mastery of art reveals not only surface expressiveness but also layers of meaning, not least of which are social mean-

ings.¹⁴ This is as obvious in much of our contemporary art—even including the work of some of the formalists—as it is in art down through the ages. The aesthetic problem is one of exhibiting these meanings through direct experience, instead of trying to teach a lesson, which can be only gross propaganda. As long as the directness is preserved in the object it is unquestionably aesthetic. But its status is precarious for the simple reason that it tends to become conceptualized and sundered from the immediate sense-appreciation.¹⁵

Similar problems occur in the compounding of arts to create a new one. Although the opera affords the most striking example, it is by no means the only one. Without going into detail, we may state the principle to be observed. Compounding is distinctly not aesthetic. When materials are borrowed from various sources, such borrowing is legitimate only when a new art is created. Bach's *Passion according to St. Matthew*, for example, appeals not so much to those devoted to music as to those devoted to the drama. The *Passion* does of course contain superb music (as for instance the viola solo, and the arioso) but the music does not carry the drama. The recitatives are musically dull. Consequently it is loosely integrated; and the work is at times extra-aesthetic. Continuity is sacrificed for breadth of scope. There is an analogous problem concerned with program music, in which the program is often unilluminating and trite. When the composer declares that a certain passage was inspired by "little birdies singing in the trees," he steps out of his rôle as artist to become autobiographer. No one cares about the "little birdies;" one cares only about the musical expression, and if the music will not carry itself, remarks about birdies will merely make one wonder.

We are approaching here the traditional problem of formal and representational art. When it becomes concretely centered upon particular works of art, the issues are rife, and are often revealing with respect to actual appreciations. In the heat of the argument, however, we usually fail to make clear what we mean

¹⁴ Cf. Stephen C. Pepper, *Aesthetic Quality*, New York, Scribner's, 1938, pp. 102 ff.

¹⁵ In precisely this respect there appears a major confusion in John Strachey's *Literature and Dialectical Materialism*, New York, Corvici, 1934.

by formal and representational. By way of anticipation we may say that the problem is *primarily one of definition*. If formal refers merely to geometry, rules of harmony, etc., then art is not formal; if representational refers to imitative naturalism, then art is not representational. Both conceptions must be waived because both refer to non-aesthetic transcendence; art is neither proved scientifically by way of postulational deductive systems as in geometry and harmony; nor is it inductively established by point for point correlation with worldly things. If we mean that perception can come to fulfilment only when sense-material has spatio-temporal order by which there is perceptual movement in the thing, then art is formal. If we mean that feeling becomes determinate only when the physical structure is such that it can be immediately felt, then art is representational. But then there is no issue in principle between formal and representational; the one refers to ordered data, the other to feeling which becomes intelligible in them. Data become ordered, however, only through feeling, and the intelligibility of the latter is attained only when it is propertied in physical data. In the satisfied imagination the two are corelates. This mutual inter-reference guarantees that the formal in art is plastic form—that is, feeling so inheres in sense-medium that passage is effected through the dynamics of feeling, from the purposive to the purpose which is expressed. Form is that which provides experience with bridge-material by which it leads to fulfilment; representation is the intelligible fulfilment which experience is.

From these considerations, we recur to our original insistence upon the identity of creation and appreciation, an identity which at the same time exhibits the essentially public character of art. The problem for both creation and appreciation is that of establishing coherent expressiveness brought to fulfilment. In achieving this end, problematic meaning is resolved, and the aesthetic judgment is grounded in the resultant experience. The processes by which expression is achieved may follow different routes, but in the end they must take into account the same data and make use of the same principles. Communication consists in the keen perceptual fullness achieved both in creation and appreciation. Continuity is thus established between the physical

and the social, and culture is safeguarded by reason of the physical becoming germane to experience. In this accomplishment, imagination is satisfied as a value made concrete and shareable by all who have the requisite patience and psychological disposition. In this accomplishment, a purpose is expressed in a sensuous medium.

If we like, we may say that beauty is mind-dependent in the sense that continuity between the physical and social is established through feeling. The personal and the arbitrary in feeling unquestionably play a large part in actual appreciations; but unless these are grounded in the physical structure, they may well be ignored as unintelligible and, for aesthetics, intrinsically pathological. Whether they have a spiritual meaning which is not aesthetic is not a problem for our discussion. By way of further explication of the meaning of the satisfied imagination, we may now try to clarify what we mean by the kind of purpose which art expresses.

CHAPTER IV

Aesthetic Purpose

In the preceding chapter, we set forth the theory of the satisfied imagination, in which we defined beauty as the expression of a purpose in a sensuous medium. Our chief task was to show how art is communicable. Accordingly, we tried to show that creation and appreciation are in principle the same. Their differences, we found, pertain to the intensity of experience, the direction by which it is consummated, and the fullness of appreciation; not to their basic structure of organization. Consequently, as appreciation becomes more discriminating and judgments more informed, the arbitrary and unintelligible tend to be dissipated. Sentimentality is therefore self-defeating, in contrast with art, which remains as a virile discipline, in which sentiment as aesthetic purpose abides in perceptual sensitivity. Our present task is the more sober one of clarifying the use of, and seeing the justification for, the term, "aesthetic purpose." Such an undertaking, unfortunately, makes some repetition inevitable.

The use of a term such as purpose has been prepared for, first, by our repudiation of the doctrine that beauty is a simple, irreducible quality of an event, and secondly, by our insistence that aesthetic value is intrinsically meaningful.¹ If, then, purpose is completely relational, it is completely analyzable, provided only we can set forth the method by which such relations can be intelligently understood. We may now consider aesthetic purpose from the points of view of both art and of beauty, however imperceptibly they shade into each other in practice.

¹ If not the happiest term, "purpose" does have good precedents in the literature of aesthetics. Besides in Kant, I find the term used, however sparingly, by most contemporary aestheticians. Perhaps it is a more felicitous term, even though not without dangers, than would be a newly coined one.

We have distinguished between art as the unfolding aesthetic process, and beauty as the completed experience. The two tend to coalesce at the point of continuity between fulfilling and fulfilment. This is the point of continuity between the temporal and the non-temporal, where the process issues into the product. We may now distinguish these two phases of experience as the purposive or the expressive, on the one hand, and purpose or the expressed, on the other. We may assert, then, that purpose is nothing more or less than purposiveness realized; but we must not confuse the aesthetic purpose with a set purpose which is intellectually anticipated in advance of, and apart from, the sensuous material. Purposiveness is embodied in those aspects of the growing experience which involve the peculiarly human contribution of past and future brought to the present. If the beginnings of experience simply register momentarily, and then fade, experience is doomed before it is had. Intelligibility in both creation and appreciation is marked by the arresting present which anticipates its intrinsic development. The creative process, consequently, involves a situation different from that in which creation has already been effected, and the intent is merely to set forth in permanent form the physical object—as when the composer merely transcribes his score, or when the poet merely makes a notation of his words. In this case, the intent is not aesthetic, but mechanical reproduction for ulterior interests. Because creative anticipation is vague and indeterminate until imagination is actually satisfied, aesthetic purpose is not intellectual. It comes from the artist knows where; and if it is seized upon out of context, one can speculate indefinitely upon sources of inspiration, being possessed, divine emanation, and the like.

Purpose is not cold, meticulous intellect at work, but is that which completes experience and satisfies the imagination. The relations within this complex have no loose ends, which would thwart perception. Purpose may not be abstracted as something separate from the art-process; it is precisely the end of the process as cumulative resolution. Such an end is not an abstract referent but a consummation; and we say of it, not that it means, but that it is meaningful. When the experience is completed, immanent meaning is effected. In this situation, no further predications are

necessary; what predications may be made, however, refer to the developing experience as forecasting the completed experience. The intent of such assertions is largely pedagogic, for he whose imagination has been satisfied has no further need for analysis.

Aesthetic purpose inheres only in sense-medium, perceived or imagined, since it is aesthetically intelligible only as sense-material and purpose coalesce in a perceived object. In the absence of the sensuous, purpose is non-aesthetic. The inherence of purpose in the thing accounts for all that is aesthetically relevant in the doctrine of empathy. Since the art-process is constituted by feeling, we are not on firm ground in asserting that the physical thing in the absence of feeling is aesthetic. Although the ground of value is referable to the physical object, it does not follow that the value is there apart from experience. The refusal to countenance anything so subjective and unscientific as purpose comes largely from the current scientific temper of mind. Precisely in what sense purpose is either subjective or unscientific is not certain. To make our position clearer, and incidentally to develop the thesis that expression of purpose is the unfolding of meaning, we may first compare some of the salient features of scientific inquiry with the art-process, after which we may show in what sense unfolding is the inherent process of art, and how aesthetic inherence is not incompatible with imputation and with varying interpretations of the physical object serving as the focus of aesthetic value.

Science and Art

By and large, the scientist has no faith in purposive explanations. Since they are seldom explanatory, his attitude toward them is not unwarranted. What he usually overlooks, however, is the utility of purposive terms, not for solving problems, but for setting them. For example, to call something a vital impulse or an instinct is not an explanation of it, but is to recognize that a patterned course of events is preliminary to its detailed, minute

analysis. The pattern is *to be analyzed* and to be accounted for in the only terms in which science can account for them; namely, through hypotheses and experimental testings. Without hypothesis, the scientist has nothing to look for; he could remain only passive and dumb. Without experimental testing, he at best indulges in a kind of mathematics or at worst in an idle game. Yet, although the casting of a problem in purposive terms does not solve the problem, it does, nevertheless, demarcate a field of inquiry.

We have referred to both science and art as developing from a common, perceptual world; and we may now note that whereas science relies upon maximum structure and minimum perception, especially in its more advanced intellectual stages, art relies upon maximum perception and minimum structure. That is to say, science becomes increasingly dependent upon a procedure which involves hypotheses and deduction, whereas art continually resists what cannot be grasped in sense-experience. The methods involve the difference between observation or recording, on the one hand, and experience, on the other. Observation connotes fundamentally an external point of view, in which we speak of phenomena, and in which relations are got at largely by means of definition and hypothesis, and are at times even abstracted from the phenomena. Experience connotes an internal point of view, that of determinate feeling, in which relations are felt, not measured by yardsticks, clocks, and the like. It recognizes the concrete, rather than the abstract.

Science neglects or even refuses to accept purposive relations. So far as purpose is applicable, it seems to refer to a point of view defined primarily by hypotheses to be tested on the basis of observation and experiment. Purposiveness in art engenders the contemplative, which is at the same time participative. One does not contemplate phenomena; one notices or takes notice of them. The scientist is aloof and non-participative. The artist is immersed in his world, and achieves objectivity only through a natural resolution of his participation. Thus, purpose in science is intellectual and confirmable, whereas in art it is sensuous and emotional drive which becomes determinate in immediate experience.

Again, whereas the scientific process is analytic, the art-pro-

cess is synthetic. The former tests selective factors under controlled conditions, varying, under ideal conditions, only one factor at a time. Under such circumstances, made possible by use of the hypothetical method, the scientist gives minimal attention to the whole and maximal to the selected features to be tested. The statistical technique, which makes possible the testing of two factors at a time, illustrates the discursive procedure which science may follow. Verification becomes a confirmation as either repetition of experiment or the setting up of cross-correlations. The art-process is synthetic. Maximal attention must be given to the whole; the artist must "conceive" his work; that is, he must feel the whole as it is brought into the part. He must judge many threads at once, not through repetition but through integrated individuality. In art, verification, like conception, ultimately becomes the unity of experience. Where the cross-threads are longest and least complex, both conception and verification are relatively simple—as, for example, in the novel, in which a single reading may suffice. In more concentrated art, both conception and verification are more difficult—as in the sonnet or the fugue. Repetition is necessary in order that we may appreciate the intensity of the effect, not because of any virtue in sheer repetition, but because of the complexity, whose elements cannot be singled out for study independently of the interwoven harmony, which makes a thing art.

Whenever we fall back upon the external point of view of considering abstract relations between phenomena, whenever observation is substituted for experience—as appears to be current scientific procedure—then *ipso facto*, aesthetic purposiveness is excluded. Science achieves only quasi-aesthetic values, such as appear in theoretical ingenuity, with its counterpart in physical manipulation. Externality of technique and dependence upon only the most poverty-stricken sensuous materials, which are sheerly sign-references or pointer-readings, mark not aesthetic understanding but shrewdness. Our intent is not to depreciate science, but only to suggest that the values achieved are different in character from the rich, directly expressive values of art.

Though in the so-called social sciences, and especially in history, there is a rapprochement to art, for the most part, the ex-

ternal and arbitrary procedure condemns even the social scientist to the point of view of the observer and statistician. This externality is recognized in the prevalent criticisms of the economic man, the prudent man, etc., abstractions which are a thin echo of the realities. Prediction of behavior of abstract things bearing the stamp of an ingenious, if not too imaginative, maker does not accord with a virile conception of art, precisely because the entities of scientific creation possess no individuality. Having worked through to a technique of statistics, a growing number of scientists themselves are beginning to criticize the externality and even relative insignificance of many prevailing conceptions. Because he has initially sheared his subject-matter of its unique potentialities, the scientist can in the end discover only common, dead-level data, in whose co-efficient correlations he conquers matter only *en masse*, but cannot understand individual beings.

The scientist usually deprecates feeling as utter romanticism. Until he recognizes the claims of feeling in keen, perceptual experience, the chasm between art and science must continue to yawn. The problem yields no facile solution.² However, the triumphs of science are amazing. Its monumental successes have led us to accept science in our culture almost as a fetish. And not until scientists lose their faith in abstract correlations is there any likelihood of a rapprochement of science and art. But should this occur, science, as we now know it, will disappear, and our hope in mass, technical reconstruction will be dashed; for then the point of view of immediate, enveloping experience will be substituted for observation, and science will lose its footing. Certainly the problem will remain incapable of solution as long as we fail to understand both art and science and as long as we ignore the peculiar claims of each. It behooves us now to look more closely to the nature of the unfolding process of art.

² For example, it appears to me that Dewey over-simplifies in identifying an operational procedure in science with his conception of reconstruction of experience as in his educational and aesthetic theory. The externality of the relations in the one as compared with the internality in the other makes the identification a travesty.

The Art-Process

The basic difficulty in the opposing claims of art and science, as we have insisted, is to be discerned in the rôle to which each attributes feeling. Early psychology in the eighteenth-century had to reconcile its theory of feelings with seventeenth-century science. Science had implicitly made feeling an irrelevant residuum, separate from the processes of nature. Finding no intelligible place for feelings in nature, psychology was, for the most part, led to the view that they are simply associated with ideas. Since association can discover no inherent necessity between feelings and ideas, the relation obtains as one of mere contingent fact. Aesthetic theory is still beleaguered by the "cultural psychology" of some two hundred years ago, and aesthetic imputation continues to be interpreted in terms of association, in which atomism usurps the place that ought to be reserved for dynamism.

No doubt the principles of association both by contiguity and by similarity are not irrelevant to the aesthetic transaction in which the aesthetic image is born. Yet, as often interpreted, these principles tend to be a disservice to aesthetic analysis. In *Poetry and Myth*, Professor Frederick C. Prescott writes: "In the simplest fusion two elements (a and b) enter; when a good rider and his horse are felt as one (association by contiguity) the fusion is obvious, and a centaur (ab) results."³ Unquestionably, contiguity aids in the formation of the image, but it does not account for the image. If it did, we should have to inquire why some contiguous things are neglected, and why other specific ones are selected for an image. In Professor Prescott's statement, the principal clue is found not in contiguity but in fusion, as in the words, "a good rider and his horse are *felt as one*." Contiguity denotes touching or nextness in space or time; it is a this *and* a this in abstract space or time. Mere juxtaposition, however, does not constitute an art-image. The fusion is the sensitized feeling of the horse-rider. The poet is not likely to use the image of the fish-horse, and the suggestion would in most contexts appear ugly. The reason is not far to seek. The feeling-textures of fish and of

³P. 27.

horse seem both serious and antithetic. They are not satisfactory for comedy (Shakespeare's Bottom is a much better figure for that); nor do they have common ground for tragedy. Only a super-ingenuous poet could use the figure. But no great imagination is needed for woman and fish as mermaid. Since art, as may be illustrated in a simple degree by the metaphor, is not a compounding of atoms, the principle of contiguity is more likely to be misleading than helpful. It dislocates the essential truth that metaphor is sensitized perception, which is always integrated. Contiguity can be seen as following from perception; not *vice versa*. Sensitized perception immediately informs us of what happens when rider and horse are not contiguous, as the novice rider knows only too well.

The so-called law of similarity is not different in principle—though because of additional meanings of similarity, the matter is somewhat more complicated. Similarity sometimes refers to a conceptual thinking and sometimes to a perceptual recognition, neither of which is aesthetic. When the scientist states a law, he refers to the similarity of things as satisfying the conditions of the law—as, for example, when a book falls to the floor and when a ball rolls down an inclined plane, the law of motion is presumably the same, being a function of the distance through which the body falls. On the perceptual level, two postage stamps look alike, but the similarity does not constitute aesthetic value, for mere repetition of instances does not add aesthetic character.⁴ Both conceptual and perceptual resemblance are fundamentally substitutive instead of cumulative, though the abstractness of the one makes for mathematical, substitutive value in comparison with the more utilitarian, substitutive value of the other. In aesthetics, similarity is more properly called simile or metaphor. As is the case in contiguity, the principle is one of fusion, in which immanent meaning inheres. It is interesting to note in this connection that analysis is always simpler where the metaphor is inappropriate and where the wrong kind of suggestiveness is connoted. Analysis always detracts from a good metaphor, because

⁴This is different in principle from the repetition of a theme in music, which aesthetically is not additive, but cumulative, and where the original statement is followed by a semicolon, calling for further development.

it intellectualizes and at best suggests only part of the meaning, to the detriment of its full and rich blending. It leaves us with meanings to be added, instead of directly felt in their individuality. The critic and poet, Arthur Mizener, illustrates in a firm essay on practical criticism the pregnancy of figurative language in Shakespeare's sonnets.⁵ In sonnet CXXIV, which begins, "If my dear love were but the child of state . . .," he shows how the many-sided meaning of "state" is appropriately carried throughout the sonnet. The richness of the term permits the sonnet to develop figuratively, provocatively, and precisely. The structure of figurative language creates the dynamics of art.⁶

A word is in order concerning emotional congruity. In his discussion of association, William James asserts that it is not ideas but things which are associated. And as for emotional congruity he says: "The same objects do not recall the same associates when we are cheerful as when we are melancholy. Nothing, in fact, is more striking than our utter inability to keep up trains of joyous imagery when we are depressed in spirits."⁷ Although here too appears a disparateness between images, one given and one recalled, the suggestion is clear that both what is perceived and what is recalled are intimately bound up with emotional disposition. If the melancholic is led to thoughts of war and famine and pestilence, the joyous is led to sunshine and spring and nature. Now James may be quite right in speaking of ordinary association as trains of thought. In aesthetic activity, however, it is not trains but a drama of imagery which becomes satisfyingly resolved. The guide to imagery, one may even say the productive factor, is feeling. For feeling surges up and searches out images which bring it to expression. Atomic images in and of themselves can never be the guide, for mere juxtaposition does not constitute appropriateness, without which there is no interplay or drama. Thus, art is not an intellectual discipline, and the artist with a bag

⁵ "The Structure of Figurative Language in Shakespeare's Sonnets," *The Southern Review*, Spring 1940, pp. 730-47.

⁶ It is also significant to observe the effect of blending. Mizener writes that the fusion of "two meanings brought about by the compound metaphor is richer and finer than the sum of them which would be all the poem could offer if the two metaphors did not coexist." *Ibid.*, p. 732.

⁷ *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 576.

full of dancing images is certain to give himself away by pulling out some gross and inappropriate image.

In art, the metaphor is not an association of ideas but the development of meaning. It is the bearer of inchoate beginnings brought to a fuller present and pregnant with further growth. The beginnings are cold and dispassionate enough. The artist need not first work himself into a frenzy before he creates, though it is difficult to see how in the process of creation he can keep the emotional temperature from rising, when metaphors, charged with what has preceded, accumulate ever greater and greater breadth and depth of meaning. Metaphor upon metaphor, the significant reappearance and growth of themes, the heightened rhythm of colors, the interweaving of action—these are the bearers of aesthetic meaning. The challenge to the artist resides in the restraint he must observe; for the art-process tends almost irresistibly to break its bounds, overflowing into vacuity.

The undercurrents of great art are beyond the perception of the artist himself, and art may be read in different ways. The meaning of art is blended with the appropriate experience which we bring to it. Professor Prescott writes:

"Shakespeare always meant more than he intended, and of the poets generally it may be said, 'They know not what they do.' . . . it is not only legitimate but inevitable for readers to read poetry in their own way—that is, to find in it their own associations of thought and feeling. And as a matter of fact great works of literature are thus always developed and enriched from age to age with the growth of thought. Shakespeare's works therefore mean something less, something different, and something more to us than they meant to him or to his contemporaries."⁸

Though we cannot agree that different readings are simply a matter of association, we can agree that experience may so blend into art as to make different readings legitimate. The *sine qua non* of art is the irreducible, affective meaning, but the affective abides and remains permanent only in the cognitional, which makes it determinate. The seen and unseen, the heard and the unheard, complement each other in the integrative whole. The affective is the mark of the appropriate (or the inappropriate), but its expres-

⁸ Quoted by permission of Frederick C. Prescott, *The Poetic Mind*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1926, p. 231.

sion is the determinate form in which past is blended in present. Developing emotional congruity is the guide in art; keen perception is its ground. If our basal assumption is correct—that feeling is in its initial stages indeterminate and that it becomes determinate only so far as perceptual content is unified—we can see how the rôle of feeling differs in science and in art.

Feeling is not intrinsic to science for the simple reason that science is not fundamentally experiential, but is essentially an intellectual system in which data are manipulated as clues to further findings. Originally, science builds its structures on the basis of models. The ever-recurring models are the machine and the living organism. But in its further development, science neglects these models and concentrates upon data and relations. The data are alleged to be factually given as *sensa*. Between *sensa* there are relations. The nature of relations, however, is the most moot question in science. All sorts of accounts are given, opinions ranging all the way from the view that relations are mind-imposed, to that of their being useful conventions, to that of their being disclosed in *rerum natura*. By reason of the way in which the problem is usually cast, we should not expect scientists to agree upon an answer. Seemingly, a tentative solution can be had only in their agreement upon the technique of using hypotheses, through which the relevant is segregated from the irrelevant. But in their refusal to analyze the conception of the relevant, scientists are necessarily thrown back upon an unenlightened experimentalism of setting up relations *ad nauseam*, the extreme depravity of which is demonstrated in unproductive statistical studies. Science thus comes to analyze relations between *sensa* without paying due regard to the *sensa* themselves, and consequently without allowing them to come to the perceptual fruition.⁹

Analytic procedure in aesthetics differs vastly from that in science. Science analyzes, say, piano notes with respect to vibrations and clock-intervals. In aesthetic analysis the important features are tang and rhythm, and where there is sufficient linear direction, melody, finally issuing into harmony. Tang is peculiar and intrinsic to a note, though as such it is indeterminate. It tends

⁹ I would not argue that the technique has not had success, but one can raise—and apparently many are raising—questions as to precisely what this success means.

to fade and must be brought back to the foreground of consciousness, much as when one rolls a substance on the tongue to see what it tastes like. But even the indefinite tang of the piano note differs markedly from that of the violin. Whereas the percussion has a harshness, the slow-drawn bow has a song-like quality. Tang persists and then fades, and forges ahead inevitably into rhythm and melody. It becomes more precise in rhythm, for its cumulative effect makes it more nearly open to perception. But then rhythm itself needs to become more determinate, for rhythm is not simply the metronomic one-two-three-four, one-two-, etc. The metronomic is the clock-pattern of recurrences, mere repetition. Art-rhythm leads on purposively; it has direction, which becomes melody. The linear direction of melody reacts upon rhythm, especially in the beats within the measure. Then on a higher plane rhythm and melody lead back to tang. Now it is the staccato or the legato, etc., which itself has its own peculiar tang with its resurgences and falls, until it finally becomes determinate. This determinacy, which is the fulfilment of tang, is called orchestration. In orchestration, the interrelations of tone, rhythm and melody are adequately understood in full and complete perception. Moreover, the development from melody to harmony can be recognized in orchestration. The linear direction of counterpoint issues into the vertical structure of harmony. By bringing the note into simultaneously perceived relations with other notes, the resultant chord helps to articulate the note, even though it still requires directional resolution. Thus, melody in its horizontal and harmony in its vertical structure become fixed in orchestration. Appropriateness, then, is effected by the growth of feeling which permits full perception.

There is nothing either appropriate or inappropriate in science. In it there are alleged data, which either appear or do not. The scientific counterpart of the appropriate is the relevant, and relevancy can be determined only by experimentation in which the scientist ascertains the spatio-temporal order of data. In art the appropriate refers to the purposive relations through which the present becomes determinate in anticipative feeling. "Quality" as tang is a felt relation, which ultimately demands a return to the tonic. When the felt relation becomes resolved, the purposive

becomes purpose expressed. Accordingly, we are in a position to interpret quality and substance.

Quality is not determinate appearance given once and for all as intrinsic; and substance is not the unknowable substratum which underlies qualities. Quality is the moving sense-datum becoming tang, and tang, as we have seen, is relational and indeterminate until it comes to rest as a larger, perceptual whole. Though in comedy the relational takes abrupt turns, even comedy has its own rationale, which surrogates the abrupt turns into a continuous advance into novelty. Substance is the determinate in which purposive relations are effected in immediate experience as determinate purpose. In such a purpose value is intrinsic; it is substance, the presence of which is guaranteed only in immediate verification.

If our language in describing the process by which this comes about has been borrowed largely from music, we can also indicate how it applies elsewhere. In poetry, we can perhaps better see it as the growth of the metaphor. In the *Ode to the West Wind*, we can see how Shelley makes use of the principle. His themes are clearly death and regeneration, and the seasons of nature, which become personified as expressing the cosmic processes both in nature and in the soul. The West Wind is the "*breath of autumn's being . . . from whose unseen presence the leaves dead are driven, like ghosts [suggesting both the living and the dead] from an enchanter fleeing.*" The next three lines carry the theme in color.

"Yellow, and black, and pale, and hectic red,
Pestilence-stricken multitudes: O thou,
Who chariotest to their wintry bed."

Yellow is a neutral color, whose tang requires a complement, but when the complement is black and pale, there is ominous foreboding. Yellow and red may be sad, but yellow and black and pale and *hectic* (consumptive) red inexorably lead on to "pestilence-stricken multitudes." Only the consummate artist can use the last metaphor, for if the ground is not prepared, the suggestion could be only melodramatic. Having now secured an indigenous rhythm, the down swing comes naturally to the dark, wintry bed, where winged seeds lie cold and low,

"Each like a corpse within its grave, until
Thine azure sister of the Spring shall blow

Her clarion o'er the dreaming earth, and fill
(Driving sweet buds like flocks to feed in air)
With living hues and odours plain and hill:

Wild Spirit, which art moving everywhere;
Destroyer and preserver; hear, oh, hear!"

But if seeds lie cold and low, they are also the harbingers of a new life, with living hues. The Wild Spirit is both destroyer and preserver. The interaction contains all the elements of drama, finally resolved in the rhetorical question: "O, Wind, if Winter comes, can Spring be far behind?"¹⁰ Although this analysis is fragmentary and incomplete, I believe it is in principle correct. If it is suggestive of the sort of analysis required by our preceding discussion, it has done its part.

In its temporal aspect, art is purposive; as beauty which is consummated art, it is the expression of a purpose. As purposive, art generates its own dynamics, if only we heed the sensuous material directionally. The composer announces a theme; a theme is meaningful only as problematic. Since the theme is a subject, we naturally want to know "what about the subject?" Art, like a book, is meaningful only when it raises questions. But art, unlike a book, is good only when it resolves the questions. The questions must, of course, be pertinent to and engendered in the art. Then alone can the imagination be satisfied or a purpose expressed. We observe, however, that this involves a further stricture; namely, that the satisfaction obtained in art must be engendered in the sense-medium. For this reason, aesthetic purpose cannot be sundered from the immediate experience whose individuality constitutes beauty. But if this is the case, we must ask how we are to understand so-called symbolic art, whose meaning is ostensibly trans-sensuous.

¹⁰ For the above analysis I am greatly indebted to Professor Moody Prior of Northwestern University.

Symbolism

In a rough way we may say that, of all the arts, poetry and painting are perhaps the most symbolic, followed by sculpture, architecture, and the dance, with music (especially if we exclude program music) the least symbolic of all. Such a generalization is not very fruitful, but the theoretical principles involved go to the very heart of one's interpretation of art. That poetry and painting are the most symbolic is suggested by their seemingly rather intimate kinship to our everyday life. Words and pictures seem naturally to constitute the major medium of communication. Perhaps this is the basis of Plato's criticism of art in the *Republic*. He might well have had reference to the current practices of such a painter as Apollodorus, who apparently discovered the principles of foreshortening, which were, according to the tales, exploited by Zeuxis and Parrhasius to deceive the simple-minded.

Architecture, founded on the principle of enclosure of space and effected through masses involving stresses and counterstresses, is readily felt as intrinsic to its object, and consequently may not be obviously symbolic. In some ways, sculpture resembles both the pictorial and the physical principles of solids. Symbolism in both architecture and sculpture is far removed from daily life, and can be understood only in terms of itself. The dance may be thought of as mid-way between architecture and music. Such classifications have only suggestive value; when referred to specific works of art they may fall wide of the mark. Symbolism must be interpreted on the basis of principle.

In its broad sense, symbolism is constituted by referential meaning, such that conventions isomorphically denote their referents. Thus, symbolic analysis breaks down a complex symbol into its conventional elements, and identifies the referents which the conventions denote. The semanticist has staked out his claim in the region of semantic analysis. In this region, he engages in the process of semantic reduction; that is, of reducing complex meanings to their simplest components. Literature, especially at first sight, seems to lend itself to the process of semantic reduction. With the exception of a few onomatopoetic expressions,

words seem to stand for things only arbitrarily and conventionally. Language is ordinarily thought to emerge through learned responses, and is not God-given. Words are taken to be pointers, which stand for things. Yet in literature, one is compelled to observe a more intimate kinship than a mere denotative relation between words and things.¹¹ Words have power, as the Logos-doctrines supposed. The metaphor—which the semanticist conspicuously avoids—expresses things; it provides form, without which the thing is not a thing. The metaphor is essentially a crystallization, though perhaps not fully and completely determinate, which gives events a high degree of intrinsic meaning. Metaphor is not fully determinate; it must be put into the context, and may go hand in hand with alliteration, meter, rhyme, and rhythm. In “The play’s the thing wherein I’ll catch the conscience of the king,” had Hamlet said “my uncle” for “the king,” the line would, of course, lose not only force but also aesthetic meaning. In poetry, alliteration, meter, rhyme, rhythm are integral bearers of the idea.

If art were purely symbolic, exact translations could be made, for the essence of a symbol is that it may be replaced by an exact equivalent. Poetry has no equivalent. Because poetry embodies ideas concretely, it is unalterably opposed to the scientific or abstract use of language. The ideal of setting up laws of nature and the ideal of arguing conclusions are alien to the spirit of poetry. The language used in the pursuit of these ideals is arbitrary. Since the denotational references are the decisive objects of concern, the language may be translated into equivalent terms, without loss of meaning. In poetry, however, denotation cannot be separated from connotation, and its symbols are, therefore, not merely denotative.

On a somewhat higher plane, symbolism means the reference of the physical to the spiritual—as, for example, the cross, the flag, or emblems in general. When used in art, however, the symbol is transvaluated, and instead of being direct bearer of

¹¹ If the relation were only denotational, the violent criticism which many semanticists make of what is, not the meaninglessness of words, but the misuse of words, would not make sense. These semanticists largely ignore the connotational meanings, which are essential to the aesthetic process, or else they interpret them merely as “emotive responses,” which have only psychological meaning.

meaning, it constitutes the subject-matter for, rather than the intrinsic meaning of, art. Such art can thrive only on a highly intellectual plane, and easily falls into didacticism or intellectualism, as we can witness in much of medieval art. And in our own day James Joyce has performed similar experiments, using Freudian symbolism. In any event, Joyce's *Finnegans Wake* is pitched at a level which can have little popular and direct appeal.

What we demand in art, and what may sometimes be misinterpreted as symbolism, is the continuity between the physical and the social. For this continuity, which is effected only in and through feeling, embodies direct, sensuous meaning. When Shelley speaks of "yellow, and black, and pale, and hectic red, pestilence-stricken multitudes," colors progressively express meaning which inexorably leads to the more social suggestion of pestilence. Pestilence is abstract, and of itself hardly a poetic word, but it is prepared for by color-symptoms, in which the extremes of yellow and pestilence are channelled through *hectic red*.

When symbols are used to "stand for," instead of expressing, something, they lose their individuality and become intellectual markers for abstract universals or classes of particulars. The reason is not far to see. Symbols refer to classes, even if there is only one member of the class (or for that matter, even if it is a null class). A symbol is a blueprint, which itself is not the thing referred to, but a statement of the set of conditions which a thing must satisfy in order to be a member of the class. It is given by definition. Pointing and proper names, which are inelegant symbols, operate in the same way. They do not reveal the intrinsic character of the thing. Pointing does not individuate a thing; it merely gives a rough, ambiguous direction of a particular among particulars. But a particular is not aesthetic until it is further individuated in perception. An individual is not that which bears a name; it is that which is immediately found to be. The pointed thing is arbitrarily defined; it is not that which is directly had in experience. As Bergson has perceived,¹² experience calls attention, not to the observed particularity of things, but to the myth-making activity of man, through which individ-

¹² *Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, New York, Henry Holt, 1935, pp. 193-196 and *passim*.

uality comes into being. Mere intellectuality paralyzes action; myth-making initiates and resolves action in the aesthetic whole. Hence, symbolism defeats the art-process, for the symbol, besides stultifying activity, is an arbitrary reference to the thing symbolized. Being a class concept, it refers to particulars, not to individuals. To the degree to which art follows the class-principle, to that degree it is an abstract and to that degree it loses eloquence. By the aid of a few examples we can perhaps make our discussion clearer.

In medieval art we find the epitome of symbolism in the gothic cathedral. Broadly, one may say that the whole conception of the cathedral is the symbolic representation of the hierarchical order of the Church, or of man's individuality being expressed by virtue of his membership in the Church, and his finding salvation in it alone—both of which are apparently *motifs* of the same conception. So far as the value is aesthetic, one must be able to show concretely how this is expressed in the perceived structure. The hierarchical order is immediately felt upon entering the nave, where the eye is irresistibly drawn from massive stone pillars up to spindle-like colonnettes. The gothic arch permits no lingering over the delicate tracery work, save as it is integral to the larger rhythm, consummated only in the ultimate dematerialization of the stone structure. The statues of the cathedral have their proper places, marked off by niches, and they too are, for the most part, idealistically conceived, both in their intrinsic form and in their contextual setting. Intrinsically, we find passionless faces and draped bodies. The drapery is conceived in folds traced out with fond care. And of no mean importance is it that the drapery merely hangs; it does not clothe flesh, and so it does not cling to a human body. Flesh and matter are the principle of evil, and must be overcome in the ultimate synthesis, even as personality is the function of a greater, transcendent order. The symbolism, as Worringer has pointed out in *Form in Gothic*, ultimately reduces to the gothic line.

So far as sense-material is the immediate bearer of meaning, the conception of the cathedral is aesthetically beyond reproach. But as in most art which is thoroughly symbolic, there hover the ever-threatening dangers of didacticism and intellec-

tualism. Symbols have a way of persisting and having referential relation to the extra-aesthetic. We find something of the moral, antagonistic to the aesthetic, in the artist's intent to dematerialize matter. When the massive stone columns, functionally appropriate for the expression of the strength of the Church, finally dwindle off into the spindle-like colonnettes, then the medium of stone is abused and is no longer functionally appropriate to the conception. The dematerialization of the material in the medium of stone is not a happy solution. Of course, the stained-glass lends itself remarkably well to the illusion. But even the stained-glass, the purpose of which is not so much to let in light as to etherialize the emotions, is not appropriate for a wall, the basic function of which is to enclose space and to bear structural strains. From the exterior we discover what may also be considered an architectural shortcoming. Flying buttresses make it impossible for the eye to experience an essential solidarity of the wall. In fact, they produce an effect of perceptual confusion. This treatment of the problem is not the most felicitous way of obtaining the illusion of the universality of the Church, of its transcendence of all finite bounds. The final touch of intellectualization through symbol, is the transept, which gives the structure the form of the cross. But the cross cannot be *seen* from any terrestrial angle. It must be reconstructed intellectually.¹³

Where the symbolic dominates art, sentimentalism necessarily results, as when, for example, the sight of the handkerchief recalls the beloved. In *The Sacred Wood*, T. S. Eliot writes, "The sentimental person, in whom a work of art arouses all sorts of emotions which have nothing to do with art whatever, but are accidents of personal association, is an incomplete artist."¹⁴ We should say that such a person is no artist at all.

Because it is shot through and through with symbolism. Christian art is easily confused with the extra-aesthetic, and tends to be characterized by a non-aesthetic purpose. For example, Bosch's triptych, *The Garden of Lust*, whether or not the artist so intended, lends itself to moralism. The fundamental theme

¹³ In this criticism, though the responsibility is my own, I have borrowed suggestions from Professor Bert Friend of Princeton University.

¹⁴ P. 7.

obviously depicts evil attendant upon lust, portrayed by a riot of color and confusion of figures. Its baffling, we might almost say, dizzy, exemplification shows half-beasts, half-human characters which tumble over one another without direction and to no avail. The first panel shows creation, in which man is intrinsically good. It is contrasted with the third, in which good and evil as opposites become both vivified. The central panel is man on earth, man who gives full play to his sensual, carnal desires. Lust prevails; unbridled eroticism leads man hither and yon. Without stability of character, and in the futility and inanity of undirected life, he acquires all manner of queer bodily postures. In his final downfall he loses all semblance of personal dignity, undergoes horrible contortions, becomes one with machine and beast, suffering all manner of pain, even to being strung on a lyre.

The description sounds as though it were intended to be a moral lesson, a warning of what man can expect when he lives a life of unbridled passion. When it is so conceived, the purpose is misrepresented. It is the sense-medium which carries the powerful drama, in which the carefully-conceived composition works up to its powerful effect. In and of themselves the details are perplexing, but the composition of the three panels taken together makes for unity of expression. Again, we have the *motif* of synthesis, where petty desires and carnal lusts lead only to confusion and where dignity can be assured only as man looks to his larger, fuller nature. Because of the quasi-symbolic character of the painting, we can expect varied intellectualized interpretations, but withal, the varied interpretations reflect different aspects of one underlying aesthetic purpose. This it is which guarantees the truly aesthetic value, and which excludes the arbitrary and irrelevant. Because of the pervasive purpose, detachment is possible and communication vouchsafed by the object. That symbolism which is legitimately aesthetic, we may say, is that which is effected through purpose in which there is continuity between the physical and the social.¹⁵

In Breughel, we can see even more clearly the working out of symbolic continuity. In portraying the seasons, his masterful

¹⁵ Cf. T. S. Eliot's remark in *The Sacred Wood*: "The artistic 'inevitability' lies in this complete adequacy of the external to the emotion . . .," p. 101.

brush expresses the elemental drama between man and nature. The *Hunters in the Snow* communicates an intense and vivid experience through the interplay between man and the forces of ice and snow. The stark conflict between the white snow and the intent, silhouetted hunters, the hovering crow, the grim, leafless trees is relieved only by the playful skaters, more intimately responding to the green, smooth surface of the ice. By contrast, Breughel expresses in his summer scenes peasants who fairly blend into the lazy day. The corn harvesters become almost one with nature. The mid-day siesta finds man at home in the world of greens and yellows, even merging into restful sleep. The stark conflicts of winter have yielded to the rural harmony of summer. Breughel's greatness is achieved not through representation of subject-matter but through fulfilment of experience. Determinate mood, sensuously had, is the test of an artist's greatness. Art is no harbinger of verisimilitude; it is beyond abstract truth; its only truth is the logic of feeling, made determinate.

In Cézanne we can perhaps better see how representation is almost completely eliminated. A carafe, a wine-bottle, a glass, and a few pieces of fruit, under which is draped a cloth of complex design, are not intrinsically soul-stirring objects. Nor, as a matter of fact, do we care what the objects are. But when he painstakingly works out color-values, lights and reflections, unified and molded in a composition in which we fairly feel ourselves in the space, Cézanne expresses a purpose which only the most romantic would care to ignore. Cézanne shows us how it feels to be an apple; he makes us feel what space is; his art is at opposite extremes from photographic representation, which is the acme of non-aesthetic symbolism. Cézanne never paints a pretty picture; he never reproduces a lovely scene; he creates art. But when his style is truncated in a school of abstractionism and exploited by less consummate workers, we detect the odor of technicians, with results which are not always so happy.

In recurring to the aesthetic principles which are involved in art, we observe that aesthetic purpose is not something sundered from art, but is of its very substance. It is grounded in the immanent process of sense-perception which develops its own inherent direction. Art is not without its postulates, but they are in-

trinsic to the specific work. Aesthetic symbolism at its best must avoid the pitfalls and transcend the particularity of passing conventions; it must express the pervasive continuity of culture and physical nature. Otherwise, it attains only genre-art, which, like the literature of the twenties, has fast disappeared. The artist is one who sifts a culture and lays bare its driving forces. This is not truth, but expression, the immediate enhancing of meanings, expression whose significance is in realization.

If now we further discover what aesthetic purpose is not, we shall then be better able to see what it is. We may proceed by considering the differences between aesthetic purpose and practical purpose, didactic purpose, and the suppressed wish, respectively.

Practical Purpose

Where practical purpose signifies that which is undertaken not for its own sake, but for an ulterior end, it must be distinguished from aesthetic purpose. If the principle of utility referred unequivocally to this means-to-end relation, in which the means possesses only extrinsic value—that is, a value which is completely wanting unless the end comes into being—and in which intrinsic value inheres in the end only, then aesthetic value would have to be distinguished from the principle of utility. But the utility principle is equivocal. In his *Theory of the Leisure Class*, Thorstein Veblen writes: "Goods are produced and consumed as a means to the fuller unfolding of human life . . ." Then after asserting that the fullness of life, taken in absolute terms, is the end, he continues, "But the human proclivity to emulation has seized upon the consumption of goods as a means to an invidious comparison, and has thereby invested consumable goods with a secondary utility as evidence of relative ability to pay."¹⁸

No hair-splitting logic is needed to show that a clear line cannot be drawn between consumed goods and the unfolding of human life, "taken in absolute terms." If so, the legitimacy of

¹⁸ Modern Library Ed., p. 154.

setting up the means-to-end relation is questionable. But in the secondary sense of utility defined as emulation by which an invidious comparison is made—an invidious comparison being “a process of valuation of persons in respect of worth”¹⁷—and evidenced by ability to pay, then a means-to-end relation is established. Accordingly, the comparison must be made to something beyond the immediate disinterested situation; that is, to an interest which prevails, and by virtue of which such invidious comparison can be made. Such an interest is sustained by “conspicuous waste,” judged in terms of an arbitrary cost system.

If we may restrict the principle of utility to a means-to-end relationship, we can see how it differs from the principle of aesthetic value. The relation of means to end is not an integral, but is a loose, connection. The reason is not far to be sought. Means to end is the old causal relation, and as Hume long ago showed, the cause is an *x* followed by a *y*. It has only the phenomenal ground of succession and repetition. Neither on *a priori* nor on *a posteriori* grounds is there any reason why fire cannot make water freeze, even though observation has always been to the contrary. In terms of the more subtle, operational procedure, the principle remains unchanged, and for the reason that there is no inherent passage from cause to effect or from operation to observed result. The relation is discontinuous, and has reference to something ulterior. Thus its logic veers towards atomism. In “practical” situations the same principles obtain.

In the means-to-end relation there are alternative means to the “same” end.¹⁸ Thus since there are alternative means, they are distinguishable. According to the logic, then, the end possesses the immediate value, the means only instrumental value. We have called this situation the adjustmental. The end is ulterior to the means, and requires indirect action—effected through the use of instruments—in order to bring about the end, which is intellectually definable, and irrelevant to emotional components.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 34. Although Veblen states that in the term “invidious” there is no intention to extol or depreciate, the context belies the “intention.”

¹⁸ That is, the “same,” provided the end is defined in the grossly atomic fashion of the utilitarian.

Machine production is the most perfect embodiment of such a means-to-end relation, especially inasmuch as the machine must be intellectually understood. In a secondary sense, the machine comes to be valued as an object of intrinsic worth, or better, as an object of sentimental value, sometimes referred to as the sanctity of private property. In this classical conception the operator of the machine is thought of as a replaceable atom. The resentment to the classical point of view is becoming more audible, and augers the breakdown of the older mode of thinking, including the mode of thinking which separates means and end. Yet the older atomism tenaciously persists.

To describe the aesthetic process as means to an end is to caricature it. The process is not for the sake of something else; it is for its own sake. That is to say, its end is only its own process come to a conclusion. This is not to assert that there is no mediation anterior to expression, for art does not flourish in a vacuum and it does depend upon an antecedent background of experience and skills. Technical ability and knowledge of materials are necessary, though not sufficient, conditions of art. When the means becomes effective, the relation is similar to what for Aristotle is the relation between habit and virtuous action. The one is a pre-condition, but not a sufficient ground, of the other.

Practical purpose is dualistic and interested; it is the mark of a divided self—or, if one prefers, a divided object. Aesthetic purpose is monistic and disinterested; it is the process of sense-material becoming determinate; its determinacy is effected by the direct perceptual passage from the incomplete to the complete. Its transcendent reference is not spatial or temporal otherness, but development, perceptually realized. The relation is not means to end, but means-end. As such, the purposive is engendered directly in the continuity of sense-experience, and purpose is the whole continuity directly envisaged as the consummatory object. Hence, aesthetic value is intrinsic, and initially involves no invidious or ulterior comparison; for it is individualized. One might even say that purpose is meaningless, though not valueless, since individuality does not refer beyond itself, but is itself of immediate value. The purposive, however, is meaningful in the sense that it is contextual. The aesthetic process means with reference

to both its retrospective accumulation and its anticipatory fulfilment. Moreover, when means to end becomes means-end, then it may further develop aesthetically.¹⁹ When we see what is involved in a practical purpose which becomes aesthetic, we can see the integral relation of art to society, and at the same time avoid the insufferable anomaly to which Kant was led by his distinction between dependent and free beauty, together with a characterization of the innocuous flower as the highest kind of beauty.

We can crudely represent the difference between the utilitarian and the artist in terms of method and end. The utilitarian recognizes an end to be effected and he treads roughshod over the means. His method is subjective and private; subjective because the end is pleasure, and private because it is unsharable, involving goods consumed and destroyed. The artist's method is one which advances from the means to the impersonal end which it involves; he proceeds from the germinal expressive to the expressed, which is social and impersonal. As one discovers from Beethoven's notebook, some thematic material, in which melody is recessive and latent possibilities of development are dominant, is appropriate for the symphony; other, in which melody is dominant, is appropriate only for the song. The means is decisive, the end only the ineluctable development of the means. Such goods are not destroyed, and are actually enhanced by becoming public.

Means-end requires a logic different from the atomic. In fact even Dewey's conception of the end in view is a distortion of the means-end logic; for the end in view, though it purports to be a safeguard against impossible and fantastic ends, and thus has an ostensibly realistic ground, is nevertheless sundered in thought from that which is given immediately and expressively. The end in view constitutes an aspiration and is dominated by an ideal which is distinguishable from the critical means of its attainment. It is a short-run instead of a long-run end, but the end is nevertheless distinguishable, and separated in time, from the means. The end in view is only a more subtle form of the utilitarian doctrine. When means and end are integral, the logic must be one which is

¹⁹ E.g. the so-called tragic flow is originally a means-to-an-end relation and is effected by the tragic poet into a new means-end, whose unfolding constitutes tragic necessity.

arresting and which possesses excellence—what Aristotle calls the “mean.” Actually the mean is determined not by extremes, but sheerly through its own determinate excellence. Aristotle recognizes this insofar as virtue in a specific situation is determinate. He even illustrates his point from the fine arts:

“If it is thus, then, that every art [not merely the fine arts] does its work well—by looking to the intermediate and judging its works by this standard (so that we often say of good works of art that it is not possible either to take away or to add anything, implying that excess and defect destroy the goodness of works of art, while the mean preserves it; and good artists, as we say, look to this in their work), and if, further, virtue is more exact and better than any art, as nature also is, then virtue must have the quality of aiming at the intermediate.”²⁰

Moral virtue along with the rest of the arts is practical. It aims at some end. But the end possesses excellence. For Aristotle the end is action. “Happiness is an *activity* of the soul . . .” “Tragedy is the *imitation of an action* . . .” The principle of practical wisdom in the final analysis depends upon insight. This concerns not the particular that falls under a rule, but the individual. The rule and the particular coalesce to form the individual. Thus, tragedy is the “universal history of the particular.”

Now we see why art cannot be added to the utilitarian thing. Since means and end must be integral, design and function must go hand in hand. The industrial designer or the architect does not add art as ornamentation; his art is not to conceal, but to emphasize the latent design in a machine or a structure. He can create art only by working through the functional purpose of a thing and understanding it better than the engineer or the contractor. The functional purpose is part of his materials, which he must know as a painter knows the latencies of color and form, or as the musician knows tone, rhythm, melody and harmony, etc. His problem may be all the more complex, but his solution may be all the more profound. The nineteenth-century solution of the machine and industrial design was not a happy one. We are still reaping the harvests of man’s dislocation in his world, when “utility” gone wild alienated him from it. The skyscraper is a partial beginning of the twentieth-century resolution, but one of which the potential-

²⁰ *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1106b, 9-16. Dordt trans.

ities are still to be explored. We have come to recognize the need for making architecture harmonize with social life. Mere height does not suffice, for perceptual unity cannot be ignored. Spatial volumes must be broken to give the structure worthy form, and the sense-quality of the materials must be enhanced not through ornamentation or pretentious decoration, but through functional emphasis. Elephantine proportions must give way to forms whose harmony is not deception but embodied resolution of our culture. When this resolution fails to come to pass, we can expect nothing more than a utilitarian efficiency, efficient with respect to everything but personality. When functional purpose is realized in the object, then the description of the aesthetic value inherent in it is not in principle different from that of the so-called fine arts. Functional purpose is material for the artist. Its expression is the creation of art.

Didactic Purpose

Having distinguished the utilitarian from aesthetic purpose, we are now in a better position to distinguish between didactic and aesthetic purpose. Aesthetic purpose is the work of art brought to realization in the expressive medium. Didactic purpose is an end (having further consequences) brought to a thing *ab extra*. The end is not aesthetic but is a prescription demanding further action beyond the thing which has been given, and not resolved in it. The thing, consequently, acquires evidential status for something else, and is thus not intrinsically complete in itself. Moreover, as evidential, it is not integral to the end, and as in all evidential matters, it is subject to dispute and disproof. One does not disprove art. The discursive procedure of the didactic always requires—though it seldom receives—grounds beyond those of the thing.²¹

²¹ Our terms here tend to become confused, for if we identify the thing with the work of art, we beg the question. Consequently, by thing we here mean pseudo-art—i.e. a sensuous thing which is expressive, but not resolved in the sense-medium, and hence not expressed. The thing is abortive art, arbitrarily "completed" by an injunction for further practical action.

Though the principle of the distinction between aesthetic and didactic purpose is not difficult to set forth, empirically the line between them, as between art and propaganda, is often scarcely distinguishable. Since any subject-matter is legitimate material for art, that which impinges upon our personal interests tends to release processes of mind inapposite to the thing, and makes for an attitude of favor or disfavor on extraneous grounds. Thus, responses become biased, and intellectual judgments are substituted for perceptual unity. Since the line between pleading and expressing is not always clear, our empirical judgments are uninformed, and the ensuing arguments become progressively hotter. In pleading, the artist is talking to his public, a function which today ought to be reserved for his winter-lecture tour. In expressing, the artist permits the story to tell its own tale, growing towards its own final terminus. Some current literary practices seem to disfavor a conclusive ending, and oftentimes the story seems to stop, rather than to come to an end. At times it may be that the end is properly felt to be a continuing process the very futility of which is its own conclusiveness. We do not mean to assert that a work of art can be summed up in an Aesopian aphorism. On the contrary, we might almost say that the success of a work of art is in inverse proportion to the adequacy with which we can summarize it.

Greek tragedy is inextricably moral; forces of good and evil permeate the *Prometheus* or the *Antigone*. But the tragedies are not didactic. Each possesses its own compelling logic with its unique, inevitable outcome. The outcome of tragedy, though not a happy state of affairs, has a sense of finality and conclusiveness, which belongs to every aesthetic experience. Although moral elements are certainly included in tragedy as providing its very spirit and life, it is the poetic expression which gives it aesthetic character. Poetic expression is not ornament; it is the substance of tragedy. For in poetic expression distance is possible by reason of the fact that expression is the individualizing activity, and is consequently arresting. Choice of words in tragedy is not arbitrary, for it is in their uniqueness that they express. To alter them is to yield to the typical, which is disputable, and is to destroy the individual, which is indisputable. The fundamentally Greek

attitude which insisted upon an objective world with its forces of good and evil is reflected in the Greek conception of tragedy. The statistical and case-work methods of today make tragedy an infelicitous medium. In a machine age the individual is so thoroughly confused with the type that objectivity becomes inverted. Abstract generalization comes to stand for particulars, and the individual is only a unit within a large category. Nobility tends to give way to quantity.

Aristotle raises for us the problem of how moral elements, which are not ulterior purposes imposed upon tragedy from without, may nevertheless be included in it. Of the six elements of tragedy—plot, character, diction, thought, spectacle, and song—he explicitly identifies only one with moral purpose: character. "Character is that which reveals moral purpose, showing what kind of things a man chooses or avoids."²² But character is not the end of tragedy; it is an element of the whole; the end is plot.²³ Plot is, of course, not without a moral aspect, and Aristotle does assert that it must not offend the moral sense.²⁴ Now the question arises how plot can be both an element in and the end of tragedy, and I presume that as defined there is no answer. Only as plot is taken as the consummatory whole is it the end. In this case, the end is the plot as the actualization of the potential, and the other elements are potentially the end as they develop together in it.

In tragedy, as indeed in all art, end and means coalesce, and so far as we can make a rough distinction, it is only in the dynamics of art that means may be considered the individualizing and the end the individual. Thus, the end is the means realized, the purposive become aesthetic purpose. Moral or religious or sectarian purposes may be included within art as subject-matter; they cannot be the end of it. On neither empirical nor *a priori* grounds can we show that such purposes are not proper subject-matter for art. But if in their treatment they are not restricted to subject-matter, then the artist becomes the moralist who in-

²² *Poetics*, IV, 17, Butcher's trans. Quoted by permission of The Macmillan Company.

²³ *Ibid.*, VI, 10-11.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, XII, 2.

trudes himself upon his art. In his *Defense of Poetry*, Shelley gives the classical expression when he writes:

"Those in whom the poetical faculty, though great, is less intense, as Euripides, Lucan, Tasso, Spenser, have frequently effected a moral aim, and the effect of their poetry is diminished in exact proportion to the degree in which they compel us to advert to this purpose."²⁵

Today the moral issue is being raised on the economic front and in terms of so-called proletarian art, art which, some have said, is always for bourgeois consumption. The dialectical materialists have forced real issues, and have contributed some remarkably penetrating insights.²⁶ One particular virtue of the dialectical analysis is the tool which it affords for analyzing content in its social settings. For if, as we have been insisting, there is continuity between the physical and the social, then we need a technique for analyzing sense-materials in their social contexts. Thus, the emphasis upon the social character of art, with consequent repudiation of the arbitrary and private, which are essentially unintelligible, appears to be in the right direction. But if this is the correct emphasis, then the adjective proletarian has no better aesthetic foundation than bourgeois, American, Victorian, oriental, or any other adjective. This is especially true for the dialectical materialist, since his ultimate art belongs to the classless society in which proletarian could have only a passing, historical meaning.

When works of art are grouped together by means of an adjective, the adjective may refer to a certain kind of subject-matter which the works have in common or to a certain historical period in which the works are produced, neither of which is quite independent of the other. As such, the adjectives are harmless and may be helpful for cataloguing purposes, and possibly even for suggesting certain dominant attitudes. But this procedure usually leads imperceptibly to sundering subject-matter from the art-context.²⁷ Thus, when the subject-matter is characterized adjectivally, the adjective tends to connote something intrinsically derogatory

²⁵ Pp. 14-15. Ed. by A. S. Cook.

²⁶ Cf. Christopher Caudwell's admirable dialectical analysis of poetry in his *Illusion and Reality*.

²⁷ John Strachey, I think, is guilty of this.

or praiseworthy, depending on one's point of view, and a point of view external to the work of art. Since the judgments predicated about the works of art are external to them, they are not aesthetic, but sociological judgments; and the degrees to which the judgments are external to the work of art is the degree to which they are uninformed.

Only as the artist expresses—and does not plead—the social wedded to its sense-embodiment is he the true artist. Daumier appears to be one of these. Even when he expresses the feeling of the third-class traveller, his art is not propaganda. Daumier does not argue; he paints. Art which is heavily loaded with social content is the most difficult of all. It easily leads into the misguided path of propaganda. Its very intensity and nearness require great maturity of perception, for subject-matter tends to intrude upon expression; but the fact is not easily discernible until a new perspective permits more critical insight. In the new perspective we can better see whether a thing is art or simply mistaken for art. Little Eva and Uncle Tom are not compelling today. We cannot be certain that the Joads will still be compelling tomorrow.

The Suppressed Wish

If didactic purposes must be distinguished from aesthetic purpose because they are not intrinsic to the frame-work of art, the suppressed wish must be distinguished for similar reasons. Since it is not intrinsic to art, it is not relevant to it. Subjective stimuli, which, even though motivating the artist, are not detectable in the art-work itself, must be excluded. Personal conflicts which frustrate ordinary overt behavior and which by being suppressed become a "cause" of art-activity, are not aesthetic. Not the cause of the unhappy man's fantasy-making, but the finished product, which is the expression of a purpose, is of truly aesthetic import, whether this comes about consciously and deliberately or unconsciously and by chance. In the older language, we may state the

principle as one of the difference between the efficient and the formal cause, the sequence of events or source of motion and the purposive fulfilment.

Desires are not individuated merely because their sublimated form is an outlet for repressions. We value Shakespeare not because he wrote to alleviate repressions or because he was in financial distress; we value him because he gave concrete expression to unified purposes, which we can apprehend and enjoy. We need know nothing of the life of the artist in order to appreciate his work. The scholar who makes an intensive study of church registers, of manuscripts, and of evidence pertaining to the birth and life of the playwright may provide us with interesting historical data, but his researches fairly miss the mark of promoting aesthetic appreciation of a *Hamlet*, of a *Lear*, or of an *Othello*. Whether *Hamlet* was written by Shakespeare or, as some wit has suggested, by another man of the same name makes no difference. That we have his works suffices; if in some cases the test reveals that parts are of inferior workmanship, suffice it to show that these disclose a weakness of the play as an aesthetic entity. If we are worshippers at the shrine of Shakespeare, we should most assuredly attempt to vindicate his holiness by attributing his frailties to ill-advised hierophantic collaborators—and to be sure, historical evidences has often confirmed our faith—but the only aesthetically intelligible procedure is to criticize the play from internal evidence.

Even Unamuno's suggestion in his fanciful dialogue between Shakespeare and Hamlet that the author is created by his hero is extra-aesthetic. Unamuno portrays a Shakespeare, disconcerted by Hamlet's insolence, who admonishes him for failure to observe the proper respect due his creator. Hamlet retorts that the facts justify quite the contrary. For it is he who has created Shakespeare, and not Shakespeare who has created him. Our interest in the playwright is secondary to our interest in the product of his imagination. When the secondary becomes the primary, then we shift from the aesthetic to a biographical or historical attitude. When the creator reveals himself in his work, he is stepping outside his rôle as author, and at precisely that point the work fails, and we look to irrelevant historical fact, extraneous

moral purpose, or the like. Creation unquestionably involves powerful forces stimulating the imagination to production, but these forces are psychological. In art-appreciation we must look to the product itself, as effecting aesthetic communication.

Communication of aesthetic purpose is the production of a self-satisfying object. One does not reveal oneself aesthetically, except in the sense in which one grasps (or fails to grasp) the aesthetic object. So-called explanation of art as grounded in psychological complexes is most acceptable where art is least successful—the limiting case being pure pathology, which is eminently the field of psychoanalysis. Where art is successfully consummated in satisfied imagination, it is its own guarantee, and were experience always such, we should require no psychology. The ground of communication is the sense-medium, which as a set of physical data has the same kind of independent status as any other physical thing. We have noted, however, that physical things are only totalities of data, which must be got at severally and abstractly. When sense-medium is aesthetically grasped, its felt relations constitute a continuity, such that all aspects become appropriate to one another. When this appropriateness is effected, totality gives way to unity, which is purpose expressed. Thus, the physical structure is the ground of, the purposive effected into purpose is the verification of, communication.

Now we may clear up the question whether in appreciation we grasp the artist's true purpose. The question more pertinently put is simply: Has the artist appreciated his own work? The truthful answer is that we do not know, but that it would certainly be very strange if he did not. The work of art as a physical object has no sanctity, no beauty in and of itself, and can conceivably be simply a chance shuffling of materials. Value does not attach intrinsically to abstract, spatial and temporal relations, which are specified, not individualized. It attaches to that which is individual, to that whose intrinsic passage is effected through itself and not through something extraneous. The purposive answers this description; it is incomplete and developing. It is fundamentally a striving, satisfied only in a sense-medium which effects the felt appropriateness. The object is completely exploited, and nothing more can be asked of it. Purpose, then is the immediately felt

object, and appropriateness is verified when perceptual unity obtains. What is suppressed from this unity is irrelevant to it. We are indifferent to the artist's personal distress or elation which is not intrinsic to the object. All that we demand is that whoever would appreciate the object must perceive it in its entirety.

The artist communicates feeling by making certain injunctions through the sensuous thing, which must be grasped in its wholeness. Whether or not our perceptual feeling is the same as the artist's, we cannot definitely say. But to the extent to which the purposive permits analysis, art-judgments are informed. Thus, there is an apparent point of contact among all who would appreciate a work of art. Although critical appreciation would seem not to prohibit supplementary interpretations and nuances of one purpose, it does prohibit contradictory purposes; for then it could admit no one consistent purpose in it. If the work is ambiguous, so that contradictory purposes can be read into it, the artist has not seen clearly what he was doing, and in so far he falls short of being an artist. In this event, critical appreciation would reveal the thing to be pseudo-art, which is not susceptible of complete perceptual grasp, because contradictory purposes war with each other, and leave the imagination dissatisfied.

The artist's purpose as subjective intent is immaterial to aesthetic appreciation. Only the objective aesthetic intent is material, and this can be gained only in immediate, critical experience. If for the meaning of the *Sonata Appassionata*, Beethoven refers us to *The Tempest*, we are ill-advised in taking him at his word. The meaning of the *Appassionata* is what is intrinsic to it, and, so far as it is an art-object, nothing else. The purpose is the sense-content brought to full realization. Aesthetic imputation of feeling to this content is valid and necessary so long as it does not destroy the unity of perception. Imputation is pathetic fallacy from a physical, not from an aesthetic, point of view; for it completes the physical thing, and makes it an object of contemplation. When the contemplative dissolves again into physical elements, then aesthetic value as such perishes. But so long as feeling permits us to hold before us the sense-object in its integrity, purpose is expressed in it, and we may with reason say that we have grasped the artist's purpose.

Conclusion

We are in a position now to see the fuller character of aesthetic purpose. Fundamentally, it is the postulate of aesthetic value, which can be neither proved nor demonstrated, but only recognized. It is opposed to practical and didactic purposes and to the suppressed wish, for as such, these are indeterminate and extraneous to the sense-content immediately apprehended as object. Formally defined, aesthetic purpose is simply determinate feeling, which in turn is perception or satisfied imagination. Moreover, in that it is communicable, satisfied imagination is socially engendered. In its verificatory phase, purpose is substance, object, or individuality. But if aesthetic purpose is simply other than purposes which are extraneous to an immediately apprehended object, it is nevertheless, as the aesthetic judgment will show, analyzable in terms of purposive relations, the dynamics of which are fulfilled in purpose.

When the purposive is fully expressed, it is purpose. In the first instance, the purposive is the *sensum* coming to fulfilment in tang. But tang becomes determinate only in its fuller context, the specific categories of which must be worked out in the various arts, perhaps all of which involve among others, rhythmical form in conflict, balance and dominance. More specific categories are probably ascertainable within the various arts. The expressive or purposive becomes determinate in the aesthetic object; consequently it is dynamic and directional. Interest is thus produced in the object, and this is precisely what we mean by aesthetic disinterestedness. The perceptual process in which the interest is sustained is cumulative—that is, through memory the past is borne into the present, and through imagination the incomplete present anticipates what is to come. The consummatory process is that in which tang becomes determinate. Any attempt to develop determinacy beyond its final, consummatory stage destroys its meaning. Overworked tang becomes formless; meaningless repetition which fails to develop purposiveness detracts from the object. Imagination, then, is that process of forming a physical object in which expressiveness is exploited to the full, an object which sustains the fullest interest it can bear. Any attempt to super-induce interest dissolves

the object, and instead of sentiment in the object there is only sentimentality in vacuity. Any failure, however, to exploit the fullest expression of the object tends to reduce it to a physical status.²⁸ Whenever the physical is sundered from the expressive, the thing is at best suggestive and consequently tends to detract from fulfilled purpose, which is beauty.

From the dynamical point of view, then, purpose is the consummation of the purposive, and this consummation is effected in direct feeling, as the satisfied imagination. Its proper logic must be cast in terms of the relation obtaining between the purposive and the consummated purpose; its relation to anything else is external. Analysis of the principles of such a logic may be reserved for a discussion of the aesthetic judgment. By way of anticipation, however, we can see that purpose, save in an attenuated and not quite legitimate sense, cannot be abstracted from the whole which it is. Purpose conceptualized verbally may be suggestive for appreciation, but it is no more identifiable with appreciation than are Lamb's *Tales* with Shakespeare. Purpose is truly aesthetic only as expressed; that is, as the object attains individuality. Therefore, the basic aesthetic relation is that of the purposive as expressive to the purpose as expressed. In these terms the problem of individuality becomes manageable. This problem may be resolved by inquiring into the nature and validity of art-judgments, which refer to the developing experience, and of the aesthetic judgment, which refers to the experienced individuality. Since, however, some alleged kinds of beauty seem to controvert the theory of expressive beauty, which is implicit in the thesis of the satisfied imagination, we may to advantage proceed by first inquiring into these issues before turning to the problems of the art-judgments and the aesthetic judgment.

²⁸ Cf. T. M. Greene, *The Arts and the Art of Criticism*, Princeton, 1940, pp. 407ff.

CHAPTER V

On Kinds of Beauty

A. Material and Formal Beauty

The march of naturalism has passed over the field of aesthetics not without leaving its impress. However significant the result in crushing out pale and anaemic romanticism, it has nevertheless left in its wake a not too orderly empiricism. By and large, the empirical method reduces a complex thing to its simplest elements, and concentrates attention upon the purely sensuous materials, which are usually identified as qualities. Accordingly, such an empiricism asserts that any discriminate quality is *ipso facto* an instance of beauty. Empiricism makes an impressive case, and its contributions have been not inconsiderable. Since, however, its case is not entirely unambiguous, and since, moreover, it raises some issues for the theory of the satisfied imagination, it deserves attention. We may conveniently treat empiricism with respect to some problems that emerge in connection with the allegation that beauty is of different kinds and that no one formula will cover them all. Then, in order to round out our discussion, we may consider the related topic of beauty in nature and also the topic of the ugly.

The traditional division of beauty has been into three kinds, which are supposed to be distinct from one another and therefore incapable of being similarly analyzed. In the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Sully gives a summary account of the classification. There are, he asserts, at least three different modes of the attribute, beauty: "(1) sensuous beauty, (2) beauty of form, and (3) beauty of meaning or expression, nor do these appear to be reducible to any higher or more comprehensive principle. It requires a certain boldness to attempt to effect a *rapprochement* between the formal and the expressive factor."¹ On the basis of subject-matter

¹ 11th ed., "Aesthetics," p. 279.

this classification seems to have ostensible import, but precisely what its aesthetic significance is remains to be seen. To facilitate discussion we may inquire separately, as far as possible, first, into material beauty or beauty of sense and, secondly, into beauty of form.

Material Beauty

Beauty, we have seen, is essentially immediate, and this immediacy is inherently sensuous. Beauty of sense, however, is sensuous and only sensuous. Our present undertaking, then, is to see whether or not the meaning of these two statements is the same or different, for *prima facie* the statements are different. In the current mode, the sensuous is often identified with the given, such as the datum of science. The datum is the patch of color, the sound, the area of heat, or the like, which is assumed to be open to inspection. It is ordinarily thought to be given immediately. But the belief is certainly questionable; and there is good reason to assert that in science the datum functions not so much in its aspect of immediacy as in its aspect of mediacy.² For as the scientific enterprise becomes more and more refined, it comes increasingly to depend upon recording devices, and the scientist tends more and more to substitute for immediate sensations the records established by these devices. The datum, then, is not so much immediate as it is public and repeatable under standard conditions. Thus, it foregoes its immediately expressive aspect in favor of its more mediated, standard aspect. As such it possesses no intrinsic value, but instead attains a factual status. Certainly we must not confuse the datum of science with so-called immediate sense-quality, which is alleged to have aesthetic character.

Obviously, sense-beauty is not a datum as above conceived. Our contention has been that while the scientist starts from the

² Hartshorne has interestingly observed that as the intensity of a sensation, for example, heat is increased, what would have to be measured is not heat but pain. Cf. *The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation*, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1934, pp. 49 ff., together with his references to Pikler, Burnett and Dallenbach, and others.

common, perceptual world, his procedure requires him to clip experience of its sensuous expressiveness; and that while data are incipiently expressive, the scientific enterprise does not permit them to come to fulfilment. We have, however, the burden of showing that the sensuous stuff of experience is expressive. Patently, this is not a matter to be proved by logic; it can be recognized only by an appeal to experience. The expressive character is certainly in some instances not too obvious upon inspection, for what is it that Delft blue or magenta tries to express? One treads here dangerously near to a suspiciously anthropomorphic way of thinking. Is it not true, however, that man as a purposive, desiring creature, emerging in a world which sometimes furthers and sometimes thwarts his very being, should come to find in sensuous materials expressive character which tends to crystallize his moods? An area of cool green may very well enhance the feeling of an elemental harmony which binds us to nature. One may take an almost barbaric joy in the sight of spring colors, portending the very essence of nature's again coming to life. And even though no explicit purpose is to be gained, autumnal colors may fill us with a sense of the threnodic. No doubt the skeptic will rejoin that, far from rationalizing his perceptions in this amusing fashion, a man is content with what he sees, and what he sees is not the imaginative expression of what we impute to his seeing. We may suggest, however, that sense-presentations, which emerge in the interplay of man's vital processes with his world, are expressive, and it is only from the cold, intellectual point of view that they are thought not to be so. For all perceptions appear to have at least rudimentary expression.

The more clearly we appreciate sensory stuff, the more we feel impelled to recognize its expressive character. We describe tones as harsh, mellow, thin, full, and the like; or colors as warm, cold, vivid (*vivere*), restful, pure, and the like; and the lists of expressive adjectives can be extended indefinitely. When the painter is said to have used a "cold palette" the tone of the painting is set. The coldness is neither cutaneous nor visual, for since feeling is immediate the two are inseparable. In aesthetics we get back to the "common sense," which already contains the expressive. The grim starkness of a Breughel appears in his brownish-reds and

greyish-greens infiltrating into the brownish-white snow. To be appreciated, sensory stuff must be felt, and in the feeling is the becoming of tang.

The adjective is the humble bearer of expressiveness, for where it is wanting we may speak only of *sensa*—mere entities to which at best we can point. If a tone is not harsh or mellow or silvery, or a color not warm or vivid, restful, or the like, could it be aesthetic at all? The adjective may not be asserted explicitly, but if we do not feel it, there remains only the non-aesthetic *sensum*, devoid of intrinsic character. *Sensa* are inexpressive and not to be mulled over. Only the sensory stuff in which we can feel something of a mood, however indefinite, inchoate, or fleeting, has aesthetic being. When the Frenchwoman in reply to the question as to what she thought to be the most beautiful word in English, said “cellar-door,” we can appreciate in the sounds, taken out of context, the liquid quality so dear to the French. Had the respondent been a German, the reply may well have been the more guttural “gorgeous goat.” The beginning of expression is correctly focused on the adjectival. Impressions are not nouns but adjectives, whose meanings are incomplete.

Consequently, and without doing violence to the facts, we may justly propose that material beauty is expressive matter. It falls short of being the art-process precisely because the verbal is merely suggested without coming to fulfillment. Material beauty is intrinsic to art, but through abstraction it comes to be set up as a quasi-beauty in its own right. Since the imaginative demands of the percipient are less exacting than in beauty of expression, the realization is partial and the arbitrary preference more pronounced. The great incidence of the sensuously ugly bears witness to this fact. Many people do not like orange, or abhor red, or find pink sickly saccharine. Violet and lavender and orchid are thought to be effeminate. Material beauty borders the realm of the suggestive and gives free play to the instinctive, immediate responses. Since it is not brought to fulfillment, and is therefore not determinate, uncritical preference is rampant. Because sense-material is not engendered in the full art-process, it permits greatly diverging judgments. Sensuous stuff can be adequately judged only

in the context of art. That the same color is appropriate in one context but not in another is a platitude. A major chord may sonorously resound in assisting a mood, or it may entirely destroy one. The indeterminacy of sensuous stuff is a challenge to the art-impulse, and we have sufficient testimony that the true artist can use the wildest or the most subdued materials, as, for example, in Van Gogh and Rembrandt.

The artist usually avoids the "obviously pretty" stuff, and instead of painting sunsets or moonlights, which nature can do much better, he may paint a significant still of insignificant objects or a vibrant form of hideous tenements. Usually by its very nature, the obvious or the striking sense-material calls for simple treatment, thereby placing rather formidable restrictions upon the artist. The less obvious requires more adept treatment, precisely in order to bring out the full effect of its tang. Thus, we see why material or sense-beauty is short-lived. It is first of all the more obvious and instinctive kind of beauty, whose original appearance impresses the senses as yet undulled; secondly, it is neither wholly determinate nor capable of much development. Only as material beauty compels the imagination to bring out its fuller expressiveness, thus leading to expression, does it merit the status of beauty proper.

Formal Beauty

Even a most cursory examination of aesthetic literature reveals startling ambiguities of the term, form, traceable in part to the attempt to use it without adequate empirical analysis, as referring to all the arts, and in part to its reference both to an aspect of art and to art entire. I have no desire to add to the misunderstanding, but in the light of the theory of the satisfied imagination it is pertinent to suggest the conception of aesthetic form implicit in it. The polar conceptions are on the one hand that which identifies it with geometrical form and on the other that which identifies it with beauty as such. We may proceed by considering each in turn.

The philosopher's preoccupation with abstract conceptual analysis sometimes leads him to make a concept, independent of matter, the equivalent of beauty. His natural propensities impel him toward geometrical forms, those abstractions which can be understood by thought alone. The straight line, the perfect circle, the triangle become archetypes for beauty pure and undefiled. With a Pythagorean bias he may suggest a questionable type of experimentation. Unwittingly motivated by the idols of the theater, he little understands the character of the arts, among which is the art of the theatre itself.

The laws of harmony, with simple mathematical ratios of 1:2, 2:3, 3:5, etc., signal a great Pythagorean achievement. But laws of harmony, it must be remembered, belong to physics rather than to aesthetics. Interesting as the mathematical patterns and profound as the underlying scientific analysis may be, nevertheless the art of music thrives not on mathematical ratios but on the quality of experience which the ear can make of it. And even though the simple mathematical ratios may provide underpinning, it is the tempered scale, involving complex ratios, to which the occidental world turns. The absence of strict mathematical forms is quite as important as its presence. The rules for dissecting the arts, and the prescriptions for forms of harmony, measurement of proportions, and the like, turn to the favorable instances and omit the unfavorable. Thus the mathematically minded may analyze Palestrina or Haydn or Mozart, and forget about Brahms or Berlioz; he may analyze Greek or Gothic or Romanesque and omit the rococo and contemporary architecture. T. S. Eliot or Edna St. Vincent Millay is passed over in favor of Shakespeare's sonnets or Pope's couplets. The more rigid form of the ballet is taken to the exclusion of the more fluid dance-forms of Mary Wigman. In general, the forms being analyzed from the mathematical point of view—and even then certainly not adequately—hasty generalization affects not too felicitously the pronouncements made on art. To consider more pointedly the problems involved we may first of all refer to the subject upon which the most detailed work has been done, the golden section.

Much psychological research has centered about the golden

section, roughly a proportion of 5:8::8:13. Psychologists have ascertained that of the various rectangles presented to subjects, more choose the golden section than any other figure, and that of those who do not choose the golden section the tendency is toward figures most nearly approximating it.³ Not without significance is the fact that the subjects were asked merely to choose the most pleasing figure; in and of themselves the forms are so simple and uninteresting as not to warrant being called beautiful. If asked whether the golden section is a beautiful proportion, we are impelled to counter, "a beautiful proportion of what?" Its very inexpressiveness makes it a dubious object of aesthetic interest. But assuming that it does possess aesthetic interest, we might try to find its nearest analogue in art, where presumably it could operate in the aesthetic experience. The context is most likely to be found in classical art, where simplicity of proportion has its ideal of placidity, repose, and graceful movement. Here is a possible kinship to Greek art with its pacific, self-contained rhythm, expressing the Greek attitude of ideal, finite proportions. The attempt to find the golden section in extant art has, however, been attended by no great success; for measurements have been so arbitrary as to make them worthless.⁴ Even though most people may find the section pleasing, their judgment of necessity is founded only in prejudice and has little or no aesthetic import. Although the section may suggest something of an expressive quality, the fact that it is not actually embodied beauty should make us chary of the claims made for it.

The same is true of other lines and forms. The serpentine curve, for example, may suggest a dynamic quality of spiritual longing or even of discontent. The very fact that it has no precise beginning or end accentuates this character, and in this regard has a loose analogy to the gothic line.⁵ The vagrant quality of the serpentine curve must of course be discriminated from the more vertical gothic line. But again, such discrimination can adequately

³ Langfeld, *The Aesthetic Attitude*, pp. 224 ff.

⁴ Cf. Langfeld, *Ibid.*, p. 231, especially footnote.

⁵ In regard to the relationship between line and expression one may to advantage turn up Wilhelm Worringer's suggestive treatment, *Form in Gothic*, Putnam, London, 1927.

be made only when the fulfilment of these lines is incorporated in works of art. It seems then that their expressiveness comes largely from the embodied experience, from which abstraction is made. Being an abstraction, the formal is not so much in and of itself expressive as it is suggestive, in the carry-over from concrete experience to the abstraction of that experience in the more symbolic and intellectualized form of line and figure.

Formal beauty is open to the same objections as is so-called material beauty. Both are suggestive, but incomplete, art-forms. Both fail to evolve into consummatory experience. On the one side, material is formless, and on the other, form is empty. Only as matter and form coalesce in determinate unity is beauty realized. In part, this is the old problem of the relation of so-called primary to secondary qualities. Professor Hartshorne suggests the aesthetic solution. He writes:

"On the one hand, we seem to have sheer structure; on the other, sheer structureless simple qualities. Yet the age-old aesthetic fact is that in vivid experience this contrast is relativized, for here structure itself is felt as qualitative and qualities as life-expressive, and therefore implicative of the dimensions of contrast and complexity inseparable from life. The full solution is found, if at all, only in the recognition that feelings are socially structured intrinsically, and that in feeling the distinction between quality and relationship is a matter of emphasis only."⁶

In other terms, matter is arresting and expressive; it is beautiful only as the arresting comes to fulfilment or as the expressive becomes expressed. Form is the completion of purpose as individuality. Thus, geometrical form is far removed from the aesthetic precisely because it is only symbolic and hence indeterminate. Its indeterminacy is ear-marked by the fact that it can be symbolized in mathematical terms. On the expressive side we need in contrast to geometrical form, some such idea as plastic form.⁷

⁶ Charles Hartshorne, *The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation*, Chicago (quoted by permission of) The University of Chicago Press, 1934, p. 200.

⁷ This distinction is implicit in Clive Bell's "significant form," which is certainly not geometrical form.

Though geometrical form may serve as a rough scaffolding for plastic form, no very keen perception is needed to see that art does not abide by the rigorous structure of compass or ruler lines. Dürer has spoken of the "word of difference" by which a thing becomes fair or foul, and these differences which an artist "specially intended" are observable in all art. The rough, geometrical scaffolding is observable in practically all painting, sometimes in the general circular effect of the central figures and perhaps more often in the triangular effect, as in many of the Madonna paintings. No doubt the geometrical assists perception. But it is in all cases safe to say that geometrical form is only an approximation to plastic form. El Greco, for example, often uses the orthodox triangle to sketch out his central figures. One may even discover that the figures are elongated to preserve the general contour. Compared with the Greek ideal, they are out of all proportion; but certainly no great acquaintance with El Greco is needed to perceive that proportion is the very essence of his art—not the proportion of the individual figures, which is patently contradicted by his characteristic elongations, but that proportion which contributes to the unity of aesthetic purpose. In its pregnant sense, however, form is truly aesthetic only as it is the outgrowth and completion of expressiveness.

Our insistence is that since both material and formal beauty are expressive, they are aesthetic, but incompletely so. They are then only aspects of beauty. As such, they may be complementary aspects of the aesthetic process, or in some instances their contrasting effect with the more inclusive process may even lead through conflict to the intensification of expression. The formal is never easy to analyze; for types are seldom rigorously adhered to, and more often than not, the more strict the form the less likely are we to find living art. Even repetitions in the aesthetic process, as we have before had occasion to remark, are not blank repetitions; they are developments. In view of the qualifications that necessarily attach to form as an aspect of art, we may happily drop the term as used in this sense.

With greater reason form may be used to refer to art which is fully expressed. This is not an esoteric usage; it is grounded in

the nature of expression. In this sense, form is the completion of material beauty. Here we approach, and apparently quite properly, the Aristotelian conception of matter and form or potency and actuality. The formal is the actualization of the material; that is beauty itself. Here the expressive becomes the expressed; it becomes aesthetic individuality, standing in its own right. That this is the classical meaning of the term is asserted by Professor Nahm. He writes, "The whole tenor of their work and the illustrations they offer indicate clearly that both Plato and Kant have used *form* and *unity* as identical terms."⁸ And after showing that their thought actually runs counter to the false abstractions of matter and form, he asserts "In both Plato's and Kant's aesthetic, 'form' has been used as though it were a term which could be divorced from matter, the very term which gives it significance." And he adds, "Granted that form and matter may be separated logically, it is quite impossible to accept a separation of the two in objects of the empirical world, combinations as these are of formal and material aspects."⁹ If in its expanded meaning, form is identical with beauty, then it is perhaps better to recognize at the outset that it is properly characterized as fulfilment. Especially is this so when we discern that aesthetic individuality is the expressive, fulfilling process which comes to a close in expressed fulfilment.

Beauty of matter and of form are marked off as distinct types of beauty only in the attenuated sense that they are incomplete aspects of beauty. Abstracted from their context, they have only a relatively self-contained status. This conclusion is apparently not at odds with that of other writers. Sully, whom we have noted to state that the kinds of beauty are irreducible one to the other, says in the same article:

"The recent inquiry into our ways of contemplating form is, in spite of exaggeration, valuable as showing that *our distinctions of form and expression are not absolute*. Just as there is a rudiment of ideal significance in colour, so form, even in its more abstract and elementary aspects, is not wholly expressionless, but may be endowed with something of life by the imagination."¹⁰

⁸ *Art: A Bryn Mawr Symposium*, Bryn Mawr Notes and Monographs: IX, p. 292. Italics in original.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 297.

¹⁰ *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, "Aesthetics," 11th ed., p. 284. Italics supplied.

Carritt takes the more extreme position that all beauty is not only expressive, but that there can be no sundering of the formal from the expressive. He asserts:

"The aesthetic consciousness demands that we should hold together two complementary beliefs: that all beauty is expressive, for just so far as 'nonsense verses' are beautiful they express feeling; and that beauty is not the aggregate of two incoherent elements, form and meaning, or, as is sometimes suggested, of two methods of expression, one literal or prosaic, the other suggestive and emotional, but organically one."¹¹

And again,

"A sunset certainly expresses emotion, and expresses it by means of a luminous coloured pattern; but which should be called formal and which the expressive elements I am unable to determine."¹²

Finally, Santayana, who maintained the irreducibility of the kinds of beauty quite as rigidly as Sully, concludes:

"In surveying so broad a field we stand in need of some classification and subdivision; and we have chosen the familiar one of matter, form, and expression, as least likely to lead us into needless artificiality. But artificiality there must always be in the discursive description of anything given in consciousness. Psychology attempts what is perhaps impossible, namely, the anatomy of life. Mind is fluid; the lights and shadows that flicker through it have no real boundaries, and no possibility of permanence."¹³

If we must make a distinction, would it not be better to say that the material and formal are not completely realized beauty, and that although expressive they are not fully expressed?

A word is in order concerning the so-called beauty of intellectual systems, so cherished by all who engage in intellectual enterprises. That there is something akin to an aesthetic thrill in the elegant solution of an intellectual problem can scarcely be questioned. But that such a thrill is evidence of beauty which has come

¹¹ E. F. Carritt, *The Theory of Beauty*, London (quoted by permission of) The Macmillan Company, 1914, pp. 269-270.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 271.

¹³ *Sense of Beauty*, p. 266.

to realization is questionable. Questions arise because of the nature of the subject-matter, which is represented by arbitrary symbols. That x , y or z should represent unknowns; that a , b , or c , constants; that equality or difference signs should be represented as they are—these are mathematical accidents, with no intrinsic necessity, and might well be replaced by other symbols. The refusal to believe that the symbols are arbitrary is much like the Bostonian's refusal to believe that a mid-Westerner speaks English. One is, of course, foolhardy to argue that any system of symbols is as good as any other. The history of mathematical notation decisively disabuses us of this misapprehension. But the history of notation shows also that the more mature intellectual systems become, the more they depart from pictographs and folk language. If systems of notations themselves do not offer much comfort to aesthetics, even though elegance or simplicity is a factor, perhaps one may find such comfort in the meanings of the symbols.

This is not the place for a lengthy analysis of the semantics of mathematics and science, and I am aware that the issues are ripe. Nevertheless the rigorous techniques of modern logic clearly manifest the divergencies of the language of art from that of logic and of science. Employing the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, together with that of the material mode of speech, some theorists¹⁴ observe that whereas analytic judgments refer to definition and implication, synthetic judgments refer to empirical observation. The material mode is said to have no scientific content and is therefore thrown out as being nonsense. To throw out the material mode is to rob us of all genuine art-judgments. The distinctions which these theorists make may be useful for certain types of analysis, but I cannot agree that they are ultimate, and thus that the language of science is entirely shorn of expressiveness, and therefore of aesthetic value.¹⁵ Yet the expressiveness of the language of science is so greatly impoverished that its minimal residuum leaves no very attractive prospects for the artist. If for a moment, however, we take the distinctions as ab-

¹⁴ Cf., for example Carnap, *Philosophy and Logical Syntax*, London, Paul, Trench, and Truber, 1935, and the *Unity of Science*, London, Paul, Trench, and Truber, 1934.

¹⁵ Cf. the writer's essay, "Quality, Physicalism, and the Material Mode," *The Philosophical Review*, Jan. 1941.

solute, we can see why the language of logic and of science is opposed to that of art.

Upon this assumption, analytic judgments have no referents, for since they are non-empirical, there are no entities to which they must refer. They are said to refer to other symbols, given by definition, and their usage is determined by principles of syntax. Their drive is determined by prefigured assumptions, and they consequently retain merely a hypothetical status. Synthetic judgments are purportedly factual; they refer, however, not to aesthetic individuals but to particulars or instances, as we have already shown. Being indeterminate, they are not objects of aesthetic contemplation. Thus in both types of judgment aesthetic expression is excluded. Such expression can occur only in the so-called material mode of speech. When Shakespeare speaks of "the last syllable of recorded time," he is neither defining it nor pointing at it. Only a bold mind can assert that it is (in the context of *Macbeth*) meaningless.

Inasmuch as I am not prepared to accept the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments as ultimate—though the distinction is certainly not entirely groundless—the conclusion to be drawn, it seems to be, is that so-called beauty of intellectual systems is a hybrid and, like the material and the formal, an incomplete kind of beauty. Since its expressiveness is stunted, it cannot properly flower into beauty. The purity of its thrill—which no scientist would put forth as a *bona fide* reason for accepting his theory—is gained at the expense of repressing the more profound aesthetic feeling. The esoteric character of the scientist's technique puts a chasm between him and the artist. The present closing of the chasm could only dislocate both science and art; the unity of the two could thrive only in a culture very different from that in which we live today.

B. Beauty in Nature

Since art is in an obvious sense artifact, made by human beings to satisfy human need, and since nature is not manifestly

the product of a mind, at first blush art-appreciation and nature-appreciation appear to require different interpretations. That beauty may appear in nature is hardly open to doubt, but that beauty in nature differs in no important way from beauty in art is a moot question, to the consideration of which we may profitably turn.

We need no great acquaintance with works of art to attain a high degree of confidence that a work of art bears the mark of a conscious intent of a highly sensitive mind. Except in certain cases of fraud, the artist's aesthetic imprint persists in his work; this imprint constitutes the recalcitrant factors, through which we as appreciators re-create the art-object. The clue to the re-creation of art is in the artist's signature, not at the bottom of the painting nor on the title-page of the composition, but in the brush stroke or in the idiom of the musical phrase.

To assert that nature is similarly constituted by conscious purpose is, since the evidence is wanting, to invite dogmatism. The issue, however, is not whether nature is expressive or inexpressive, for the latter, as we have seen, makes aesthetic perception impossible; it is whether or not expressiveness belongs to it in and of itself, and independently of appreciating minds. In nature-appreciation, there are those who assert that purposiveness is in nature apart from us, and that it is there to be appreciated, even though we are not sensitive to it.

That nature is purposive in itself may be either the silent conviction of the nature-lover, or it may be an articulate credo asserting boldly that nature is objectively beautiful. This latter may be asserted in diverse theological forms, ranging anywhere from pantheism to theism to Homeric theology; or it may take a more peculiarly aesthetic turn, such as the alleged reality of the poet's communion with nature. In these forms the argument soon gets out of hand, and this is certainly not the place for extended discussion of the theology of beauty. But since Kant's demolition of the proofs of God's existence, we cannot but perceive the weight of his criticism on the theological argument which takes an aesthetic turn, not essentially different from the cosmological proof.

The argument for a supersensible agent as the creator of

natural beauty is, in truth, no argument at all. The critic and historian of art, Professor Mather, has a simple, convincing answer to whoever would explain natural beauty in terms of a Supreme Artificer. He writes:

"In a case of a devout person, one may say that the esthetic transaction which includes nature is tripartite, God being the Supreme Artificer who has created natural appearances for our delectation. But such a statement would be subject to restrictions and reservations which practically annul it. A devout person would hardly presume to say that the activities through which he appreciates the beauty of nature are identical with or even closely analogous to the Divine activities in creation. In short, such enjoyment is not a creating anew."¹⁸

From an aesthetic point of view, the issue is a false one. What is called for is not argument concerning the existence of an architect of nature, but analysis of experience. Even if such an architect does exist, we cannot conclude that our aesthetic sensibilities are therefore heightened. When the devout attitude prevails, we are more likely to seek justification for the extra-aesthetic than to appreciate for itself that which appears in immediate consciousness. Since there is a break in continuity between the maker and the thing made, experience becomes divided, and the aesthetic process is distorted out of all shape. Even if nature should consist in a Leibnitzian world of harmoniously related monads, which contains value in and of itself, we come to appreciate it only as the art-process is realized in our own experience. Whether the object possesses this value independently of its functioning in our experience, is aesthetically immaterial. If we are correct in assuming that beauty as the fulfilment of expressiveness involves a temporal process, then there is no aesthetic ground for asserting the beauty of the object, save as it emerges from the process.

In its aspect of expressiveness, perception of nature is in principle not different from that of artifacts. The perceptual is intrinsically expressive, and since man is inextricably interwoven in the so-called natural world, he is bound to find it expressive. To dismiss nature's expressiveness by calling it pathetic fallacy,

¹⁸ Frank Jewett Mather, Jr., *Concerning Beauty*, Princeton, (quoted by permission of) Princeton University Press, 1936, p. 61.

is to miss the point. The pathetic fallacy refers to the discrepancy between what a thing feels to be to a percipient and what it actually is in itself. But what it is in itself has aesthetic meaning only in perception; consequently, the only discrepancy can be that of conflicting expressive qualities. Such conflicts destroy beauty and constitute its opposite; that is, ugliness.

Natural beauty, like beauty of matter and of form, usually falls short of complete expression. First of all, the perceptual field is likely to be larger and more confused than that of art. For in one sense art may be thought of as nature purified. Secondly, and because nature does not appear to be consciously designed, it rarely proceeds through expressiveness to climactic expression. It possesses only to a minor degree the crystallized and intensely purified character of art. Since it contains more of the suggestive and less of the dramatic, it perhaps requires greater imaginative collaboration of the percipient than does art-appreciation. Such a conclusion gains weight from the history of art, in which we can see the arduous struggle from which emerge the forms of nature which the artist has given it.

If nature is incipiently art, but has fallen short, then we should expect to observe fundamental similarities between the two. We may suggest these with respect to three considerations: (a) that art may be spurious, (b) that art has an intimate affiliation with nature, and (c) that nature is "framed" in much the same fashion as art.

(a) Today we can no longer be in doubt that frauds are consciously perpetrated upon art-lovers. Pigments are literally thrown upon canvases and words bandied about with no other intent than that of duping one into believing that they constitute poetry. There is no end to forcing upon our attention shams, which the author himself recognizes to be only so much pap, having merely sale value. When a museum can hang a prize painting turned sideways, instead of right side up, and when the connoisseurs proclaim it a great work, the significance of such misjudgments is patent. First,

it is vividly brought home that the difference between art and nature may be no more than that between things formed by man and things formed by non-human processes. Secondly, the presumption that *objets d'art* have intrinsic value must be justified. We might attempt to use the sleuth's strong-arm method of extorting a confession from the fabricator; yet this could not but prove futile. Though the probability is extremely small, still the splotch work done as a fraud might unintentionally be a masterpiece. The ingenious statistician has calculated that it would take a million monkeys jumping on a million typewriters a million years to pound our Shakespeare's plays; there is perhaps the same probability that any particular splotch-work may turn out to be art—always a possibility, however small.

There is, in truth, only one genuine method of detecting aesthetically significant objects: that of immediate experience as satisfying the imagination. If we are to guard ourselves against insincerity, we must judge the worth of the thing in our own direct perception. Otherwise, we fall back upon secondary criteria of doubtful validity. The only genuine criterion is that of experience, by virtue of which we answer the question: Does this thing express aesthetic value? When we thus reject secondary criteria for judging art, the distinction between art and nature tends to dissolve.

(b) Art is intimately affiliated with nature. Just as art borrows from nature, so our perceptions of nature are modified by art. Poetry is made concrete by allusions to nature; nature is made poetic in being expressed for mind. There is no point in questioning the greater intensity of perceptions of nature. For example, pigments can never begin to approach the luminosity of the sun, but since art is not imitation, there is no reason why it should attempt faithfully to reproduce nature. The painter develops his own technique, by which he is able to express his intent. Further, art cannot possibly exploit the multitude of concurring impressions which we get from nature. Painting is predominantly visual; music, auditory; but no art has successfully exploited, for example, thermal, olfactory, or gustatory sensations. Nature and art are none the less closely wedded. The artist constantly refers to nature for materials and for renewed inspiration, and nature in turn becomes more significant through the handiwork of a

Breughel, a Wordsworth, a Debussy. In fine, the worth of both art and nature is enhanced by their mutual references.

(c) Still, must we not recognize that art is always in some kind of frame, that its bounds are always more or less clearly defined, whereas nature has no frame and no bounds? The charge that nature has no frame may seem to establish the fact that it falls within an entirely different category of beauty. Our burden is to show that when nature-appreciation is aesthetic, it is not fundamentally different in principle from art.

In the first place, the contention that art is in a "frame" is not at all obvious. Greek tragedy is none too intelligible without its preceding argument. The Greek citizen, more familiar with his mythology than we are with the Bible, must have felt a continuity in the tragedies, which we can get only by diligent study from extraneous sources. Surely no one can doubt that the myths are part and parcel of the tragedies; they give them an historical perspective and orientation, without which the dramas would be woefully denuded. Even though the dramatist includes much of the relevant myth, the drama's full significance requires us to see it against its historical background. The same applies to any genre—to medieval art, to oriental art, to Elizabethan or Victorian—not in the sense of mere chronological history, but as pivotal to the re-creation of specious moments.

Or again, a master like Rodin consciously obliterates the frame (the pedestal) when he makes his work grow from partially unhewn stone. In this case the suggestion is that art is continuous with, and not discrete from, the rough world of nature. Tschai-kowsky's *Pathétique* ending with a long, sustained note in the 'cello gives the impression of reaching out to infinity, despite the abrupt, disconcerting applause of over-enthusiastic audiences. Instances could be multiplied indefinitely, but these should suffice to show that it is not at all clear that art always has a frame which strictly bounds it.

If on the one hand art is not definitely bounded, on the other nature tends to be framed. Our selection and rearrangement make of it a virtual artifact, tantamount to creation. Though largely dependent upon reproduction, even photography is now commonly recognized as an art. Whereas the studio permits controlled effects

in lights and shades and posture, the landscape photographer can still exercise control in placing his tripod, in judicious use of filters, and the like. Our own selection and reconstruction of nature may be for the most part immediate and only half-conscious, but still it involves rudimentary creation. S. Alexander writes: natural beauty "is itself creation, creation in the less exacting form of selection. . . . We find nature beautiful not because she is beautiful herself but because we select and combine, as the artist does more plainly when he works with pigments."¹⁷ The immediacy and unreflectiveness of our selection of natural beauties tend, in truth, to make us consider the beauty of nature objective and quite independent of mind. Our satisfaction unpremeditated and our judgments univocal, we think that we have not participated in the creative process. But evidence in the psychology of perception leads us to believe that we are creators, however humble, in selecting and arranging objects in our appreciation of nature.

If we have no frame for nature, at least our perceptions are focused upon the relevant aesthetic surfaces. Our peripheral vision may be blurred; but the same is true of our peripheral vision of the framed canvas on the gallery wall. The museum director knows that paintings must be hung upon a neutral background and that they must be so spaced as to prevent inhibitory effects. Apparently we are again justified in tearing down the artificial barrier between art and nature. The frame of art has been unduly, and without reason, emphasized, and the creative work of mind in nature underestimated. There seems to be a continuity between nature-appreciation and art-appreciation, and where there is a difference it is one of degree rather than kind. Objectively, all that is required is a sense-presentation; whether it is fabricated by man or whether it is the appearance of a natural thing does not alter the fact that it can be the bearer of aesthetic meaning. Initially we have no legitimate ground for asserting that either art or nature is purposively engendered. Although there may be more of a presumption for art, in the final analysis the sole verification rests in immediate experience. And in nature as in art the only legitimate frame is that feeling in which an internally harmonious object is sustained. Indeed, it is feeling which

¹⁷ Samuel Alexander, *Beauty and Other Forms of Value*, p. 30. Quoted by permission of The Macmillan Company.

marks off for perception such an object, and which is the only genuinely aesthetic frame of art.

The controversy concerning the superiority of either nature or art over the other appears to be a thankless and fruitless inquiry. We may invoke special criteria for our purposes, but then we are reduced to special pleading. We may generalize only in a rough way. With Mather we may agree that in terms of purity art is superior. Or we may agree with Prall and L. A. Reid that in terms of intensity, vividness and comprehensiveness, nature is superior, though unquestionably we should have to add that it is for the most part less coherent than art. Nature-appreciation includes more diversified sensory materials, for nature is not partial to the visual and the auditory, but includes all the other senses. With its array of color, sound, odor, temperature, motion, vital functioning, and not infrequently taste and touch—the almost universal claim of her appeal is not surprising. But even these generalizations will have to make room for exceptions. In the final analysis, we should have to compare individual experiences. Though we might generalize with the “by and large,” the pursuit is of doubtful worth.

Our conclusions are rather modest. What we have tried to show is simply that nature- and art-appreciation are in principle not different. That nature should be expressive is inevitable, when we consider that man can live and move and have his being only in it. That nature should fall short of full expression is also inevitable. For in it man is also stopped and thwarted. In both art and nature, appreciation is initiated not in the assumption of a designer, but in expressiveness. When this is consummated in expression, the imagination becomes satisfied in what we may without distortion call the expression of a purpose. Perhaps nature is less likely than art to achieve the fullest realization in the satisfied imagination, but where it does, it is as truly and genuinely aesthetic as art. Beauty of nature requires us to be artists, and in some instances more creative ones than we are as art-appreciators. In either case, appreciation may be more or less inchoate and

unreflective or it may be highly articulate and critical; but in either case, natural or artificial pigmentation may yield aesthetic satisfaction.

C. A Postscript on the Ugly

Stranger: But upon this view, is the beautiful a more real and the not-beautiful a less real existence?

Theaetetus: Not at all.

In some sense the ugly is a variety of beauty; for tragedy, gargoyles, gruesome poetry, stark painting, and dissonant music serve as examples of positive aesthetic worth. Here the ugly falls within the category of the beautiful in much the same way as the sublime or the comic. When, however, ugliness is taken universally as a species of beauty, there is no room for the occurrence of ugliness as a negative value. As alternatives to this point of view, some have interpreted the ugly in terms of the moral, by which it comes to be called evil; and others regard the unbeautiful or aesthetically indifferent as the opposite of the beautiful. In virtue of the diversity of opinion, the status of the ugly becomes an embarrassing problem. Is it merely a variety of beauty? Is it a moral rather than an aesthetic category? Is it without aesthetic significance? Or does it have intelligible aesthetic significance as a negative value which is the contrary of beauty? Answers to these questions are imperative both for understanding the ugly and for sharpening our concept of beauty.

The idea of the unbeautiful requires little attention. As used by Professor Stace,¹⁸ the term designates something which is not of aesthetic concern. For the theory of knowledge it raises the problem of whether there is perception which has no aesthetic worth, positive or negative, but by reason of its reference to that which is not expressive, it falls outside the field under consideration. Whether or not there is a kind of pure expressionless perception is a matter of fact we cannot further argue with profit. We

¹⁸ Cf. Walter T. Stace, *The Meaning of Beauty*, London, G. Richards and H. Toulmin, 1929, pp. 69 ff.

assume that the aesthetic situation involves expressiveness.

The ugly as a variety of beauty again raises no problem different in principle from the aesthetic situation as we have understood it. This conception of the ugly refers not to a different kind of situation but to subject-matter not easily put out of gear with things of so-called practical concern. In finding subject-matter repulsive, we no longer enter into it, but react against it adjustmentally. Here we have need for the psychologist rather than the aesthetician. When Hamlet devises the play within the play, he perceives that only by a superhuman effort could Claudius conceal his guilt. Losing what Bullough calls psychical distance, and no longer able to retain his composure, Claudius reacts to the play as a thing repugnant and vicious. The lie-detector ordinarily belongs to the field of crime, not to that of aesthetics. As a variety of beauty, the ugly merely requires of us more fortitude and disinterestedness in the contemplation of things pitiful and fearful, of things emotionally powerful. The problem is psychological, that of willingness to enter into things which from another point of view are painful or disturbing. But by reason of the energies and tensions being caught and resolved in the sensuous thing, what would otherwise be painful yields aesthetic satisfaction.

The correctness of calling ugly what is due to psychological indisposition is questionable, for the initial attitude being non-aesthetic, the resulting judgments are not aesthetic. Perhaps this is more easily dismissed by what Bosanquet calls difficult beauty.¹⁹ Here emphasis is properly assigned to the thing as a work of art, not to the feeble and insensitive mind. If we want to call it ugly, we may better qualify it as facile ugliness. Then we see clearly the limitation as ours and not the artist's. The ease of recognizing non-aesthetic repulsiveness blinds us to the more difficult task of realizing positive aesthetic merit. When in his altar-piece, designed for a colony of syphilitics, Mathias Gruenwald depicts Christ as suffering from the dreaded disease, we find it much simpler to censure the work and to rest smugly in moral elation than to comprehend the aesthetic reality.

Failure to make the distinction between aesthetic and practical criteria can lead only to bigoted censorship. I do not mean to say

¹⁹ *Three Lectures on Aesthetics*, London, The Macmillan Company, 1931, pp 87 ff.

there are no practical issues involved, nor even to minimize them (though this is primarily a matter of science and prudence), but that nothing but confusion and irresponsibility can result from failure to make the distinction. Art-expression which does not encompass the social may be all the more limited, but it is nonetheless art. The deformed and the sensual make for difficult art, but the difficulty is self-imposed. When subject-matter is abstracted from art, its aesthetic merit can no longer be judged. This facility for abstracting belongs only to a cultural age preoccupied with set norms, which are chiefly encrusted mores. By applying these norms, one presumably ascertains whether a thing is good or bad. Judgments of art, however, are not determined by set norms; whether art is good or bad is discovered only as the art-process issues into determinate individuality, which we call beauty. Since art is not the prosaic, it cannot be expressed by the prosaic mind. Subject-matter being an illegitimate abstraction from art, the judgments made on its basis are not aesthetic.

On the opposite side are equally non-aesthetic judgments, when form is taken apart from content. There are those who presume to grasp the form of art but find it aesthetically dissatisfying. A Bach fugue or a Brahms sonata is too intellectual, or Szostakowicz is too atonal. The demand for the melodic which the form does not possess, inspires them, since it does not come within the scope of their limited imaginations, to wave aside the formal. We have good reason to believe that Bach and Brahms and Szostakowicz knew what they were doing and often succeeded flawlessly. If the listener cannot sustain the meaning of the fugue, if he apprehends it merely as a geometrical form, he is not judging it as music. If instead of making sense, it comes to be heard as a sequence of unpleasant sounds, he improperly calls it ugly. The limitation is his, and he is criticizing it on extra-aesthetic grounds. Judgment on the basis of form alone, as on the basis of content alone, is the illegitimate abstraction which puts it outside the pale of the aesthetic. The ugly is in this case only facile activity, on the one hand dictated by non-aesthetic attitudes, and on the other bereft of the sensuous appreciation in which alone expression thrives.

We do find, however, border-line cases between facile ugliness and aesthetic ugliness. When critics disagree whether the

extension of massive stone columns into spindle-like colonettes is an appropriate use of material in gothic, we meet an aesthetic issue difficult to resolve. The simple answer is to assert that one of the schools is not imaginative enough; but in raising the question, which one? we are at a loss for an answer. Or again, in the drama is the problem of resolving coincidence and the unfolding of ideal character. Criticizing Novalis' aphorism that "character is destiny," George Eliot writes in *The Mill on the Floss*:

"But [character is] not the whole of our destiny. Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, was speculative and irresolute, and we have a great tragedy in consequence. But if his father had lived to a good old age, and his uncle died an early death, we can conceive Hamlet's having married Ophelia, and got through life with a reputation of sanity, notwithstanding many soliloquys, and some moody sarcasms towards the fair daughter of Polonius, to say nothing of the frankest incivility to his father-in-law."

Dictated by coincidence, drama becomes artificial and absurd; dictated by character, it becomes actionless and plotless. The simple answer is that there must be a balance between the two. But the simple answer does not constitute a true resolution of the problem.

We seem to have hit upon something relative in the aesthetic situation, something which requires further analysis. We have said that art is initiated in the instinctive phase of experience and that beauty is the full development of the instinctive into the determinate and social. Relativity has its locus in the instinctive, in that which is taken as immediately expressive. It seems patently contrary to experience to say that the same physical thing has the same expressiveness for all people or even for the same person at different times. If, then, stone does not appear proper material for colonettes and tracery work to one, but does to another, the contrary judgments are, for the time, decisive. Likewise for coincidence, which breaks the continuity for one but not for another.

Because we cannot say which has the dull imagination and which the lively, we are compelled to accept both judgments. Although we must accept both judgments as correct reports of a happening, we recognize, however, that the judgments refer to different happenings. Since for the one the material is not, and

for the other is, the bearer of fulfilled expression, the one is compelled to assert its ugliness. But as it is possible for the judgments to be resolved in later experience, we may call it hypothetical ugliness, hypothetical not in the sense of misrepresenting actual experience, but only in the sense that later experience may lead to a better-informed judgment. And if this instance of the ugly is hypothetical, the corresponding judgment of the beauty is likewise hypothetical. In both instances its hypothetical character is recognized only in retrospect. Without some such assumption, I do not see how, except by appeal to authoritarianism and dogma, we can account for the common occurrence of reporting factual ugliness in actual experience.

If it is necessary to qualify certain experiences of the ugly as being hypothetical, the question arises whether there is anything categorically or invincibly ugly. Although Bosanquet disfavors the suggestion, Mrs. Gilbert seems to have effectively refuted those who would assert the non-existence of invincible ugliness.²⁰ She finds the roots of the ugly in unfulfilled pretense and incoherence. We may turn to the bearing of these suggestions upon our own discussion.

If we take seriously the assertion that expressiveness is a necessary condition of the aesthetic, we must look to it as the source of the ugly as well as of the beautiful. The non-expressive is aesthetically neutral. The expressive is immanent, but teleological, demanding resolution. The artist's intent is precisely this resolution effected in the sensuous thing. When intent is supplied from without, the aesthetic situation lapses. The ugly falls between the two. If there is nothing expressive, no aesthetic demands are made on us; if the expressive is resolved, it is beauty, not ugliness. The ugly appears to be the expressive which, instead of being realized in the object, leads out of it. Beginning in expressiveness, the ugly thrives on suggestion, which leaves behind and fails to incorporate the original expressiveness. Since resolu-

²⁰ Cf. Bosanquet, *Ibid.*, pp. 97 ff., and Katharine Gilbert, *Studies in Recent Aesthetic*, Chapel Hill, North Carolina Press, 1927, pp. 162 ff.

tion is not attained through expressiveness, the ugly is a mark of the failure of aesthetic fulfilment. The ugly purports to be aesthetic, and initially develops that way, but then something inappropriate to its beginnings intervenes. The artist's intent obtrudes upon the thing, and since the individualizing process fails, individuality is not attained.

As a result of defective structure, the superstructure collapses. Intent being sundered from the thing, we have claptrap. So-called poetry for general consumption, five-and-ten-cent store reproductions of emotional adhesions, popular sentimental songs (a clue to which we get by reading aloud what are euphemistically called the lyrics), ornate *objets d'art*, omnipresently remind us of public gullibility. These obvious attempts to wring emotions from us, without justification or provocation, constitute what we may call invincible or categorical ugliness. For the most part, such instances are clear cut, and even the fabricator—one cannot say artist—is not deceived. Ugliness accrues to the thing in virtue of its pompous suggestiveness not expressed in the sense-structure. This dualism precludes individuality, and makes expression still-born.

If the pretentious makes for insincere claptrap, there is another type of unrealized expression, perhaps not so definitely ugly as it is "almost beautiful." Beginning in the expressive, loose suggestion then carries the artist on to something else which he tries to incorporate in the same physical thing. In a work of great magnitude, for example, as in Beethoven's *Ninth*, this is an ever-present danger. The conception may be too great even for a Beethoven or a Michael Angelo. Where the achievement reaches sublime heights, however, we cherish the ambition even though it may be somewhat short of complete realization. Marring effects though there may be, we recognize the magnitude of the positive attainment, and though the almost beautiful is not the beautiful, we do not feel that we can call it ugly. In the case of the lesser artist we may not be so generous. His work, halt and stuttering and not on the whole satisfactory, is predominantly destructive to the aesthetic impulse. Perhaps he is working in the wrong medium, or perhaps he is more ambitious than competent. Whatever the reason for his failure, conflicting elements mutually react to destroy one another. Irrelevant and useless flourishes and embel-

ishments become mechanical impediments, inhibiting instead of facilitating expression. In architecture, functional structure may be forsaken for ornamentation. Or a modern orchestration of a Bach Chorale with bells and tympani may be shocking. Apprehending these defects, we judge the thing ugly, since it is only partially expressive. When the imagination grounded in keen perception remains dissatisfied, there is categorical ugliness.

This discussion is not without significance for current art-practice. Artists' refusal to prostitute their work by making trite content the bearer of suggested meaning is their protest against and escape from categorical ugliness. The reaction against unfounded sentiment is a necessary evolution in art, whether it goes by the name of formalism, modernism, or what-not. The trend is towards the autonomy of art with the consequent desire for stripping it of irrelevant associations. Art may thus become esoteric, for the specially tutored; but at least it avoids the pitfall of a grubby utilitarianism. In forswearing random associative content, highly formalized art necessarily reaches a smaller public; but the criticism reflects more upon the public than upon the artist. When, however, we mistake a tendency in art for an absolute, aesthetic theory suffers. Formalization is precisely that which makes content determinate. Form is the realization of expressiveness, and where this calls for unconventional treatment only ugliness can result from any other treatment. Categorical ugliness, as Bosanquet suggests, may be resolved by taking a thing in a larger context; when we do this we alter the original expressive character, and consequently substitute a new thing for the original. Yet the original as such remains an instance of the ugly—expressive, but presumptuous, unfulfilled, misguided, and incoherent.

Where the so-called pathetic fallacy occurs, we have a clear-cut case of the ugly. The fallacy is not that of attributing expressiveness to a physical thing. It is that of finding discrepancy between the thing and its expressiveness. Bad or mixed metaphors do just this. The pathetic fallacy is a discovery that comes originally from experience of the ugly and is later read into beauty. It is no wonder that one like Ruskin, who is inveighing against pretense and deceit, is one to discover the pathetic fallacy; but to apply it universally can only destroy everything aesthetic in favor

of the prosaic. The distinction we need is that between good and bad art. Where this is wanting, there is no discrimination and any sloppy sentiment may go as currency for art.

Aesthetic ugliness as a negative value is the opposite of good art. There are those who contend that bad art is not art. This is true only in the attenuated sense that some things which begin as art fail of consummation. Originally, to judge these upon other than aesthetic grounds is to do them injustice, and is not quite legitimate. For only through the aesthetic approach, in the course of which we find them wanting, are we in a position to judge them inartistic. To judge them morally or intellectually is to leave their aesthetic merits, negative or positive, untouched. Only *afterwards*, and by way of apology for their not being art, do we correctly interpret them in a wider context. Since the original point of view is aesthetic—and in terms of this alone we properly understand the ugly—our judgments are correctly described as aesthetic. Even though artistic failure leads to intellectualizing or moralizing or what-not, and consequently to intellectual or moral judgments, and the like, we ought not to be misled into thinking that the ugly is therefore non-aesthetic. Since for the most part those who assert that the ugly is not aesthetic also assert that anything is potentially an object of aesthetic worth, they are in a curiously paradoxical position. In virtue of the fact that the well-intentioned artist subscribes to aesthetic criteria, but fails to adhere to them, it is only by aesthetic criteria that his work can be measured as falling short of art.

It is not purism but special pleading to pretend that everything is either good art or not art at all. The distinction obviously needed is between good art and bad, between the process which culminates in satisfied imagination, and that which though failing to yield satisfaction can be judged only in terms of the imagination that should have been satisfied but is not. The aesthetic judgment is required, and in its most pregnant sense the judgment can be made only by him who has the needed insight. This is a task not for the hack critic but for the artist. Categorical ugliness is that which stands unresolved as a block to expression. The beautiful may triumph over the ugly, but where the ugly exists, we had better recognize it in its own terms for what it is.

CHAPTER VI

Aesthetic Judgment: The "Logic" of Art

Logic is no substitute for empirical analysis. It is merely a rigid form of and an added check upon insights had in a haphazard, cursory way. Initially, inquiry proceeds not from the purely formal to the material. Rather, the material suggests the formal; then since the latter applies to an indefinite number of instances, it enjoys a transcendent estate. This notion of the development of logic seems to be confirmed by its comparatively late emergence in man's intellectual life. Aristotle's logic grows out of a rich background of philosophical thought and speculation, in the course of which nature comes to be conceived in terms of substances and attributes. The logic of relations stems largely from Hume's analysis of things into a series of impressions, which, of course, in turn had a long, respectable tradition. When and if man comes to have new insights not intelligible in terms of existing logics, he will no doubt develop new ones, more appropriate to his purposes.

In aesthetics, as in other material disciplines, an inquirer's logic follows upon his insights, and in this case, his logic is a commentary upon his understanding of art. Or if he applies a logic borrowed from other disciplines, there likewise is evidence of the quality of his understanding of art. We may hope to provide similar evidence by making explicit the logic of art which is implicit in the theory of the satisfied imagination. Accordingly, we shall attempt (a) to determine whether or not beauty is definable and analyzable, (b) to ascertain univocally the meaning of the aesthetic judgment, and (c) to interpret in what sense critical judgments may be passed on art.

Definition and Analysis of Beauty

(a) Despite the fact that there is no universal agreement on the meaning of beauty, it is usually assumed that beauty is definable in the sense that it is not confused with other things and can be distinguished from them. There are, of course, some who at least assert that they do not know what beauty is, and there are those who refuse to accept anything finite as real. Nevertheless, among those who think that beauty is definable, there persists an irritating misconception, to which we have before referred: that even though beauty cannot be analyzed into parts, it can be pointed to. If we have been correct in distinguishing between spatio-temporal particularity and aesthetic individuality, there is a genuine sense in which beauty cannot even be pointed to. For only particularity admits of such designation; not individuality. Although individuals may be revealed, they cannot significantly be pointed to. If we assume that beauty is revealed (even if only in being created), nevertheless, a serious problem arises as to whether it is analyzable.

Not uncommonly is it observed that beauty is felt, not argued. No doubt argument has never convinced anyone of the existence of beauty. The difficulty of asserting what beauty is is testified to by the predominance of negative judgments concerning it. We may with reason reconsider whether beauty is definable. To be sure, we offered a definition of it as the expression of a purpose in a sense-medium. The question is whether we framed a definition proper or merely a verbal definition.

That a verbal definition of beauty can be framed is neither in question nor of much significance. If one assumes—and the assumption appears to be not unwarranted—that aesthetics is a legitimate subject of inquiry, which has for its aim the study of the beautiful and the ugly, then one necessarily presupposes that it can be articulated for study. In this sense a verbal definition can be framed as referring to what one means by beauty. According to an early work of G. E. Moore's, however, a thing is definable in a much more important way: "We may mean that a certain object, which all of us know, is composed in a certain man-

ner: . . . [that it has parts], all of them arranged in definite relations to one another.¹ In raising the questions whether beauty is analyzable and if so in what sense, we ask on the one hand what is the ground of the aesthetic judgment, and on the other what kind of logic evolves from the judgment.

Those who, like Moore, assert that beauty is an indefinable invariably assume that it is a simple quality, or at least some kind of whole which cannot be analyzed into parts. Though it may be pointed to and recognized, it cannot be resolved into elements related to one another. Definition apparently refers here to the analysis of a thing into elements: beauty cannot be analyzed into elements; therefore, it is indefinable. Moore has written "You can give a definition of a horse, because a horse has many different properties and qualities, all of which you can enumerate. But when you have enumerated them all, when you have reduced a horse to its simplest terms, then you can no longer define those terms."² Whether or not beauty is complex, probably no daring soul can bring himself to say that it is a whole with enumerable elements, and precisely because enumeration is divisive and destroys beauty. The doctrine that "everything is what it is and not another thing" is clear enough when we understand what the "thing" is; but when the thing is for thought indeterminate, the doctrine is shorn of intelligible meaning. This criticism suggests that we must clearly bear in mind two kinds of analysis not valid in aesthetics: that which takes the part for the whole, and that in which quality is sundered from structure.

The first does not require discussion other than to point out that analysis into parts is valid only for an additive whole, where the relations are basically external, of the "and-type." I assume that it is neither profitable nor necessary to argue further that beauty is not of this sort. The second type of analysis is more difficult to criticize and has been seriously entertained in various ways by various writers. Not uncommonly is beauty said to be a tertiary quality which supervenes upon an object. The meaning of this statement is ambiguous, but a few words concerning it may

¹ G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica*, p. 8. Quoted by permission of The Macmillan Company and The University Press, Cambridge, England.

² *Ibid.*, p. 7.

be instructive.³ On the one hand, beauty may be sheerly this tertiary quality, external to everything else, and consequently ineffable; or it may be a quality *of* an object, and not independent of the so-called primary and secondary qualities, which, roughly, constitute the physical thing. Finally, the relation of "supervening" is always a source of ambiguity and discomfort. Because of the difficulties involved in these formulations, and because of what appears to us to be a basic distinction between art and beauty, we have in our previous analyses been led to recast the problem in wholly different terms.

In stating that beauty is the culmination of a continuous process, not a thing with parts, we must assert at least four basic principles. First, art is a process which holds intrinsic interest for the participant, and secondly, the intrinsic interest is constituted by being both retrospective and anticipatory. Thirdly, the process grows from the indeterminate to the determinate; that is, from intention to fulfilment. Finally, the process is dynamically mediated through judgment. Thus, experience comes into being through the experiential. Since the real subject of judgment is the resultant experience, and since the process short of consummation is always more or less indeterminate, the logic of art can be articulated only consequent upon immediate, resolved appreciation, which in the generic sense is beauty. That is to say, the dialectic of art issuing into beauty is not a method of deductively proving a conclusion, but rather a method of predication upon the basis of insights had after the process is resolved. Thus, the art-process, as artists continually testify, does not thrive on intellect. And since the process engaged in is not consciously directed to an end, the artist often knows not whereof he speaks.⁴ The paradox of

³ Samuel Alexander, for example, is obviously insisting upon a relational theory, in which beauty consists of a peculiar relationship obtaining between subject and object. The theory of the late D. W. Prall is much more puzzling. It appears that he takes more seriously the notion of the tertiary quality, and at the same time asserts or implies that (1) analysis of the relation of expressiveness to so-called primary and secondary qualities is possible, and (2) beauty is constituted by a subject-object relation, even though (3) relations are infinite and therefore unknowable. Cf. D. W. Prall, *Aesthetic Judgment*, New York, Crowell, 1929, pp. 222 ff., 58ff., 8. Parallels can be found in his *Aesthetic Analysis*.

⁴ One recalls Plato's conception of art as "divine madness," and Shakespeare's identification of the imagination of the lover, and madman, and the poet. Also cf. Prescott, *The Poetic Mind*, p. 231, and A. E. Housman, *The Name and Nature of Poetry*, pp. 46 ff.

the logic of art is that beauty can be defined only with reference to the art-process, but the process becomes intelligible only in its resolution, which is beauty. To bring these statements to clear light, we may show the inapplicability to art of various types of logic—Aristotelian, operational, and idealistic.

As Aristotelian logic is usually interpreted, it derives its impetus from classes and classification, and represents a mode of predication the basic concepts of which are inclusion and exclusion.⁵ Foundational to the process of discursive thought is the important distinction which Aristotle makes between primary and secondary substance. A primary substance is an individual thing, such as Socrates, or Alcibiades, or Bucephalus; and a secondary substance is a kind or class of things, such as man, or animal, or horse. The way in which a primary substance is apprehended—through perception or intuition—shows it to be markedly different in nature from a secondary substance. The latter, because it refers to an indefinite number of particulars, is not perceived but conceived. A particular is an instance of a class, and its nature is defined when the class is defined. To define the class, of which the particular is an instance, is to fix the terms of the class by stating its genus and differentia. Definition thus refers to particulars, and not to individuals, whose nature is got at through perception. Individuals are primary substances and are not, strictly speaking, definable. It is secondary substances, under which particulars are subsumed, which this formal logic takes for its subject-matter. Since secondary substances are class concepts, and are themselves defined in terms of class concepts, they are non-temporal abstractions which serve to explain static properties rather than temporal processes.

An individual comes into being through a process, and we come to understand the individual in all its qualitative richness only as

⁵ In this and the subsequent paragraphs on logic I have profited by discussion with and suggestions from Professor D. T. Howard. Professor Howard does not, however, agree with the traditional interpretation of Aristotelian logic.

we can pursue the process from its small beginnings to its large fulfilment. Aristotle himself was apparently aware of the difference between classes, under which particulars can be subsumed, and the individual, which comes into being. Individuals must be accounted for in terms different from those by which we account for particulars and secondary substances. Aristotle used the terms "potency" and "actuality" to account for the processes by which the individual comes into being. These terms are not strictly definable in the mode of genus and differentia. A process is not a class within which particulars fall. Nor is it a particular, for we cannot point to it, precisely because it never *is*, but is always *becoming*. Only by setting up a thing as an actuality is it amenable to Aristotelian logic. Thus, although beautiful things may be contained in a larger class scheme, as primary substances they are not rigorously definable. Hence, even when Aristotle speaks of the universality of art, and the consistency which must be maintained in tragedy, the whole tenor of his thought is different from that of his logic. A work of art is not an instance of a type but is an individual. To this extent formal logic does not aid our comprehension and analysis of art.

If Aristotelian logic is not applicable to art and of no avail in art-analysis, operational logic performs no better service. The operational logic of Bridgman is a logic of manipulative intelligence, designed for science and technology. It is, moreover, a logic of discontinuities; for it is only a more precise attempt to formulate a positivistic, almost atomic, analysis of scientific procedure. If one performs such and such operations on such and such things (further defined operationally), the results will be so and so. Operationalism looks persistently to facts (which include operations), and envisages basal discontinuities between operations and final results. There is no accounting *why* hydrogen and oxygen, gases, operated on in a certain fashion yield water, a liquid. Nor why sodium and chlorine, one a solid and the other a gas and both poisonous, yield the non-poisonous table salt. But through operations, we discover that such is the case. This procedure is manipulative, engendering discontinuities, with no conceivable explanation of connections, and consequently is concerned with external

relations of whole to whole. This logic is not appropriate to the art-process, which requires a postulate of continuity and therefore a doctrine of internality of relations.

If we are correct in citing operational logic as involving relation of whole to whole, fundamentally discontinuous, and atomic and divisive, it is obviously not a logic which can provide a ground for aesthetic analysis. The understanding of unity is crucial to the concept of beauty. But unity cannot be defined operationally; it can be defined only as the resolution of a process engendered immanently. Although we may ascertain *conditions* under which aesthetic activity flourishes, these are external to art, and either pre- or post-aesthetic. However much external conditions may help to develop aesthetic sensibilities—and these are matters primarily of psychological concern—a point of view designed for the understanding of external manipulation does not accord with the point of view necessary for understanding the art-process. Since art is based in intrinsic appreciation, and since this is precisely what operationalism cannot account for, its techniques hold no great promise for aesthetic analysis. And in its insistence upon whole-to-whole relations, it cannot explain the unity which evolves from the art-process. The idealist, on the contrary, vigorously insists upon unity above all, and his thought invites our attention.

However significant and important are the writings of the idealists with respect to logic, whether they have produced in the strict sense anything that may properly be called logic is questionable. What the idealist includes under the rubric is in part a criticism of Aristotelian logic, in fact, a criticism of all finite assertions which lay claims to ultimate truth or falsity, together with an expression of a metaphysical doctrine, perhaps best summarized in the Hegelian dictum that the real is the rational. The rational is then said to be the only individual sufficient unto itself. It is that which is in and for itself and which has no ground other than itself. Logic is at best the morphology of knowledge. Since, however, idealistic logic cannot be separated from reality, it cannot of itself provide strict implications. In truth, a part is never quite real, and hence "parts" cannot be interrelated into the whole. F. H. Bradley

confirms our contention when in *Appearance and Reality* he develops the paradoxes involved in discursive reasoning. Idealistic logic in the end can accept no beauty but the one absolute, which alone is truly individual. The absolute unity, however, is so far-reaching that it cannot account for finite experiences.

According to many critics, the thesis of monism is the most vulnerable aspect of idealism. For in his insistence upon the unity of all things, the idealist is not in a position to recognize any discontinuities in nature, and must assert the interrelatedness of all things whatsoever. Whether or not the stand is ultimately tenable, historically we can see the arbitrariness of his position. It is especially arbitrary in the domain of science, where on the one hand alternative and contrary mathematical systems must, on its own showing, fall within and be predicated of reality, and where on the other there is no place for an operational logic, in which patent, empirical discontinuities can be provided for. If, of course, it could be ascertained that all processes in nature are continuous, then an operational logic could not be played off against the idealistic.

Idealism makes its best case in the field of values. Our contention, however, is merely that since there is no strict logic of part-to-part relations, idealism provides no logic of art. In analyzing things, idealism invariably requires the insufferably weak admission that analysis goes hand in hand with synthesis. But since it does not show how synthesis is effected, its admission is one of failure. Parts are not real parts; they must be qualified. Then either analysis is not really achieved or synthesis is a merely verbal solution, which obscures the real issues.

We have not yet found a logic of art. Though there seems to be little doubt that beauty occurs and is definable or discriminable in the sense of being directly experienced, still we have not ascertained the means by which it can be analyzed. Aristotelian, operational, and idealistic logics—each is inadequate, even though each has bearing upon aesthetic matters. If, however, we first analyze the aesthetic judgment, we shall be in a better position to recur to the problem as one of the sense in which critical judgments mediate the aesthetic judgment.

The Aesthetic Judgment

(b) The aesthetic judgment is, implicitly or explicitly, the starting-point of aesthetic analysis. The judgment is merely an assertion that x is beautiful or ugly, as the case may be. Hence, the judgment presupposes that beauty and its opposite are something, and it is the formal statement of this presupposition. No aesthetic theory of whatever stripe, so far as I am aware, questions that beauty in the generic sense, of which the aesthetic judgment is the verbal statement, constitutes the subject-matter of aesthetics. However much theories disagree as to the nature of the subject-matter and however much their divergence as to the meaning of art and the goal of the art-enterprise, they all insist that the apprehension of beauty is the prerequisite for theorizing about it. For Santayana, as for most theorists, it is even better to feel beauty than to understand how we come to feel it. Inquiry may aid us in the discursive procedure of setting forth the conditions under which beauty appears, the principles which it involves, and its significance in the social context, but without immediate appreciation, theory can be only misguided dogma.

Beauty, then, does not depend upon the aesthetic judgment, nor is it constituted by it. Rather, it is the referent, which makes the judgment meaningful. There is wide diversity of opinion concerning the nature of the referent, and this diversity reflects the basic issues of aesthetics. We have developed the thesis that the referent of the aesthetic judgment is the expression of a purpose in a sensuous medium, and our preceding analyses have been an explication of this thesis. If they are in principle correct, then whenever such expression occurs we may legitimately pronounce the aesthetic judgment that the thing is beautiful. The judgment is the memorandum that a particular experience is thought to be aesthetic. And the judgment is true or false, depending upon whether or not the experience in question was aesthetic or not; but the experience had, is itself not dependent on the assertion or its verification. Thus, we are wholly in agreement with Prall's declaration that: "Aesthetic judgment is distinguished from aesthetic experience as such by the simple fact that it follows and

records such experience after the experience has been had and with reference to what was experienced."⁸ Direct experience is the ground upon which alone we are justified in asserting the judgment.

The rôle of the aesthetic judgment, however, is important. Although it is primarily a declaration of experience had, conflicting judgments tend to make us reconsider the object. Since the experience was aesthetic or not, or possibly included aspects of the aesthetic, the judgment is accordingly true or false or ambiguous. When disputation leads to a reconsideration based upon new insight, the judgment performs an important office. Naturally, the referent is now strictly speaking a new one, but the judgment is more informed and made more wittingly. So long as it refers us back to the object to confirm or refute our previous judgments, it is not useless. In our reconsideration we can better ascertain whether we have really grasped the object as an aesthetic unity, or whether we made the judgment by virtue of faulty perception and blind spots in our aesthetic vision. In the final analysis, our considered judgment is compelling, and where this conflicts with that of another, it is not always possible to determine which is better grounded. We observe that the judgment refers not to a physical object apart from experience, but to the experienced object. Thus, since the referents differ, what appear to be conflicting judgments may both be validated. If conflicting judgments lead us back to the object, they have adequately performed their function. For in reconsidering the object, we are not trying merely to repeat a past experience but to gain a new or better insight. The new insight may be articulated through what we may call mediating or critical judgments. We may turn to consider these judgments, which help to inform us of the character of the referent, what it is, and whether it is truly analyzable.

⁸D. W. Prall, *Aesthetic Judgment*, New York (quoted by permission of) Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1929, p. 5.

Mediating Judgments

(c) We are now obliged to assess the claims that beauty is mediated through judgment. Mediating judgments, which are constitutive of beauty, are not to be confused with the aesthetic judgment, which follows upon beauty. Of necessity, this view controverts the notion that beauty is a simple quality, merely given, but ineffable and unanalyzable. If beauty is just such a simple quality, it is not even related to preferences, but is simply the presence of a quality. Even the conditions under which such a quality appears are not in this view proper subject-matter for aesthetics. The conditions are strictly speaking either irrelevant or a subterfuge for asserting something that does not belong to the theory. The first alternative repudiates any intelligible passage from the conditions of beauty to its quality; for aesthetic criticism cannot recognize the conditions of beauty, which according to the theory are not aesthetic. The second contains the subterfuge that beauty is a quality *of* an object. Consequently, since the object is relevant to the situation, beauty is not simply a quality, but an object which has a quality.

Another type of theory more plausibly asserts that beauty is mediated; namely so-called relational theories, in which beauty is defined as being a peculiar kind of relation obtaining between a mind and an object. S. Alexander has admirably developed this point of view. His pivotal thesis asserts that although beauty is constituted in a relation between mind and object, it is both disinterested and objective. While it is not quite clear whether it is objective because disinterested or *vice versa*, the emphasis appears to fall on the ground of disinterestedness. "The mind for which an object is beautiful is not any mind but one which apprehends or appreciates impersonally or disinterestedly . . . Beauty is not merely something which gives pleasure but which pleases in a certain way, and in a way which can be shared by other minds."⁷ And in a later work he says: "We may put a difficult situation thus, that the work of art *pleases* the individual or satisfies him, but has *value* only in so far as it satisfies a standard mind. The

⁷ *Space, Time, and Deity*, London (quoted by permission of) The Macmillan Company, 1927, p. 294.

value of beauty lies in its satisfying objectively."⁸ Beauty as a value is then in some sense objective and disinterested.

Now we discover that its objectivity rests in its mediating judgments, which distinguish it from percepts. "For the beautiful object is unlike percepts in this respect, that while a cognized percept is the basis of a judgment, the beautiful percept is the result of judgment."⁹ Thus, to use his example, when I see a picture of an animal and see it as beautiful my experience implies the judgment, "I see this painted form alive." Beauty involves expressiveness and "It was the paradox of beauty that expressiveness belonged to the object itself and yet could be there only because mind which does not enter into the object was yet present and possessed it. Just because such judgments [as] 'I see this alive' . . . are implied in the beautiful work, it is possible for others to take note of my attitude . . . to approve both the beauty, and me in my pronouncement that it is beautiful."¹⁰ Accordingly, beauty is mediated by an expressive quality, which may be registered by a mediating judgment.

Alexander's contentions gain weight by reason of his conception of the mind. Without explicitly criticizing this, I think we can resolve a certain ambiguity in his theory, and at least clarify the issue. The expressive quality mediates subject and object, and, he argues, since this can be expressed by judgment, beauty is therefore objective. Now whether or not beauty is mediated—and there are good reasons to assert that it is—it seems gross confusion to say that an object is beautiful *because* it is mediated. More specifically, there is neither a causal nor an implicative relation between the judgment "I see this form alive" and "I see this painting as beautiful." If this were a valid logic, then one would be compelled to assert that because stage scenery appears to recede in space—even for the "standard mind," whatever that means precisely—it is therefore beautiful. And, in truth, all the classic illusions of psychology, mediated as they are by judgment, must be asserted to be aesthetic. Should the causal or implicative

⁸ *Beauty and Other Forms of Value*, p. 175. Italics in original. Quoted by permission of The Macmillan Company.

⁹ *Space, Time, and Deity*, p. 294.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 295.

relation be denied, then the judgment that beauty is objective and disinterested becomes groundless. For then there is no movement by which the mediating judgments effect the aesthetic judgment.

Apparently, Alexander has not sufficiently distinguished between two kinds of analysis, and his failure to do so leads to a major difficulty throughout his whole system. First, he is trying rigorously to work out a relational point of view. Then he supplements this with a doctrine of emergence. But since the emergent is essentially discontinuous with the relational, the latter can in no genuine sense explain the former. So in his aesthetic, the relational can account only for the *conditions* under which beauty appears. The tertiary quality then "supervenes" upon the relational, and as expressive is the ground of judgment. The judgment so asserted is, however, not the aesthetic judgment but a critical or mediating judgment. Moreover, since there is no strict logic by which the mediating judgment compels the assertion of the aesthetic judgment, there is no logical passage from the expressive to expression. In other words, either the expressive is beauty itself, in which case there is no need for mediation; or the expressive is not beauty and then passage from it to beauty is not effected. In his conception of the "standard mind" Alexander attempts to circumvent the problem. The standard mind, however, is either the tautology which asserts that any mind which appreciates beauty is a standard mind or else the myth that no actual mind can appreciate it. Objectivity (or is it merely disinterestedness?) is thus attained only by an appeal to a subjective mind, even if it is called a standard mind.

If, however, I understand Alexander correctly, he is making a bold attempt to resolve a genuinely aesthetic problem. Underlying his insistence that beauty is mediated, is the profound conviction that it emerges with "reflective consciousness," and thus appreciation is not wholly arbitrary, or simply that which pleases. In this sense, Alexander is a lineal descendant of Kant. Because of his failure to make a distinction between the expressive and expression, he seems unable to ground his claims for mediation. Once this distinction is made, the basal problem is seen to be not

one of the emergence of the expressive, but one of the relation of the expressive to expression, in which the logic of art is properly based, and issues into beauty in the generic sense. An operational logic does not resolve the problem, for beauty is not a sum-total of expressive qualities externally related. Nor does an idealistic logic which considers an expressive quality a part resolve it, for then immanent movement from the expressive to expression is precluded. The idealist, however, has made a distinction, which aptly supplies a point of departure for further discussion; namely, his use of the term, judgment, as opposed to the logical proposition.

Metaphorical Judgments

If we seriously entertain the notion that beauty is a process come to realization, then we recognize the futility of trying to analyze it by means of the logical proposition, which as a unit of meaning referring to an atomic fact, on the one hand fails to be a proper instrument by which we can understand continuity, and on the other makes us sunder thought from things. When we try to split beauty up into atoms, it disappears in vacuity; and when we try to analyze it into units of thought, we leave the thing behind and concern ourselves with thoughts, and not with the thing. A noteworthy fact in art-analysis is the critic's preponderant use of metaphorical terms. Upon close investigation, however, this fact is not at all surprising. Because of the intent of the critic, literal terms are seldom or perhaps never appropriate to express his ideas. Upon the assumption that the artist has uniquely expressed an aesthetic purpose, and upon the further assumption that this purpose can be expressed only in his own terms, then any other terms necessarily misrepresent his purpose. Literal propositions cannot express the artist's intent, nor are they appropriate for art-analysis. If the artist could communicate his art by means of literal propositions, his work of art would be superfluous. The outlook for analysis is not promising, but if we can correctly construe the conception of judgment as opposed to propositions, we may discover in this a welcome tool for analysis.

Whereas propositions refer to analytic "facts," atomized and torn from their context, the judgment refers to the qualitative continuity of experience. The former are abstract and indeterminate, for even particulars may be universalized as x and y variables. The judgment purports to lead to the concrete and determinate; it issues into perception as a thing of intrinsic worth. Propositions assert literal meaning, judgments metaphorical meaning. The distinction is between quantitative assertions and qualitative evaluations. Propositions are the tools of a science which has grown to a high degree of refinement in expressing quantitative differences between measured things. The function of metaphorical judgment is to characterize the immanent aspect of growing determinacy. Hence, the very essence of metaphor is to represent the objective process in which evaluation has its ground, and through which the qualitative comes to its inherent resolution.

The vitality of the judgment as a metaphor consists in its immediate reference to the *perceptual*, and thus to its mediate reference to determinate perception. Since the perceptual is expressive and makes upon us further demands, it is nothing other than the art-process as one of growing determinacy. The metaphorical judgment does not fully express perception. Otherwise, it would itself be the work of art, and as intrinsically satisfying, nothing further could be asked for. As mediating judgment, however, it articulates the cumulative continuity of experience.¹¹ Hence, while the metaphorical judgment must suggest the dynamic phase of experience, leading on to further realization, it is itself subrogated in the further realization of the art-process. Consequently, the judgment is never final. Its function is to be resolved in immediate experience, in which it no longer retains an isolated identity.¹² The mode of apprehending art is not conceptual but perceptual or intuitive. It is an attempt to realize perception. To

¹¹ Cf. Whitehead: "A judgment is a feeling in the 'process' of the judging subject, and it is correct or incorrect respecting *that* subject. It enters, as a value into the satisfaction of that subject; and it can only be criticized by the judgments of actual entities in the future." *Process and Reality*, New York (quoted by permission of) The Macmillan Company, 1936, p. 291.

¹² Cf. Elijah Jordan on the principle of ambiguity, *The Aesthetic Object*, pp. 95 ff. For Jordan the ambiguous character of the metaphor traces to its twofold reference, to the realm of existence and to the realm of value. Yet, if I understand him aright, the object constitutes the individual to which alone the metaphor is applicable.

paraphrase Bergson, we may say that art is that discipline which dispenses with concepts.

The current emphasis upon literal propositions in aesthetic theory and art-criticism simply reflects our present-day preoccupation with the scientific enterprise. Literal propositions, which are abstract, are appropriate to most scientific procedure. Moreover, since analysis into units is all-important, a vivisectional technique can be applied, and order can be defined in terms of operations upon the units. The procedure does not require judgment.¹³ It is mathematical propositions and mathematical symbols which become the prototype of literal scientific propositions. Because, however, such propositions are non-aesthetic and divisive, the application of mathematical analysis to art promises no great hope for enlightenment. Mathematical terms are applied denotatively, as *elements* within a class. To operate similarly on art is to dissolve it into disintegrated parts.¹⁴ If, however, mathematical analysis is applied not to the constituency of the whole, but to the relationships of one beautiful thing to another, then the basic problem of analysis of beauty remains untouched.

Metaphorical judgment can perform an office that literal propositions cannot, precisely because the problem is not one of analysis of the whole into elements but one of realizing aspects of the whole. The aspects are not static elements; they are dynamic moments. Gerundives, not nouns or pronouns, are characteristic of aesthetic analysis; for the aspects must be both adjective and verb in one. The only substantive is the completed action. The substantive is the end, in advance of which the gerundive is the characterizing activity. Expression is the completion of the continuous development of the gerundive. When the medium has been fully

¹³ Cf. Dewey, *Art as Experience*, New York, Minton Balch, 1934, pp. 307 ff.

¹⁴ George D. Birkhoff works out an interesting thesis in his *Aesthetic Measure*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1933. Although he refers to his awareness of the complexity of the empirical problems and recognizes his over-simplifications due to concentration upon the "formal" as opposed to the "connotative," yet the whole tenor of his thesis bears witness to his tearing the aesthetic whole to pieces. His point of view is atomistic and sensationalistic, conjoined with the inevitable associationalism. (p. 6.) He speaks of the "*summation of the feelings of tension which accompany the various automatic adjustments.*" (p. 5. My italics.) And in line with the expected pattern of thought he measures aesthetic objects according to *types*, and must further assume an "idealized 'normal observer,'" (p. 11.) Finally, as his last chapter confirms, the meaning of aesthetic form is geometrical or mathematical form.

exploited, no further action can be demanded, and the whole of necessity satisfies objectively. Aesthetic analysis is poles away from mathematical analysis. When the mathematician resolves into a dyadic relation the vapid "A loves B," he can understand only two terms and a relation. The banal subject for analysis might well be written in chalk on an alley fence by a school-boy. The puerile statement "Dante loves Beatrice" can be nothing but caricature, to which could be added only the trite, "And they lived happily ever after." But surely Dante has emphasized that the very elemental nature of love is a journey which breaks all finite bounds. To translate his love for Beatrice into "Dante loves Beatrice" is sheerest mockery. If the intent is to mock, then it is properly analyzed into Dante, a term, is related asymmetrically to Beatrice, a term, and the relation is dyadic. Love is a two-termed relation holding between the elements *a* and *b* of the class *C*. Once this system has been set up, then through laws of syntax one may operate upon the propositions and derive tautologies.

If our description of the art-process is correct, the altogether pertinent question may be raised: How is technique to be construed, and what is its connection with art? Technique is ordinarily thought of as being a means to an end. The technician assumes that means can be studied and so perfected as to bring about an end more efficiently. In art, technique raises a peculiar problem, for means is not independent of the end. In most enterprises the virtue of concentrating upon technique results from the division of labor in which an operation can be performed blindly and without direct knowledge of its relation to other operations. Hence, the machine can effectively supplant human labor. In art, however, this is not the case, and the underlying assumption is that the good technician develops keen vision. When this meritorious assumption is lost sight of, the art-process is confused with physical ability. Creation is then confused with mechanism, and aesthetic insight into individuality is no longer distinguishable from pathological behavior.¹⁵ Since, however, art does not develop in a vac-

¹⁵ We may be compelled to agree with Baker Brownell in his reasons for decrying the art of museum and of the orchestra hall, where emphasis on the spectator's attitude kills the participator's attitude; but I fear his *Art is Action* does not sufficiently distinguish between art-creation and physical activity.

uum, and since it is assumed that tutoring can be effective, then one who disdains technique separates himself from the only milieu in which virile art develops, and can have recourse only to sentimental romanticism.

The solution of the problem is perplexing. Unless there is technical ability in manipulating things, there is no instrumentality by which art can come into being. Where there is mere technical ability, the objective achieved is not art but technology. The gap which yawns between technology and art must somehow be closed. Obviously, it cannot be filled by technology itself, for there is a sense in which art cannot be taught, precisely because it differs from patterned technique. Aristotle's suggestion concerning the teaching of moral virtue is worthy of consideration, and his suggestion gains weight by reason of the similarity of his conception of virtue to that of art in the theory of the satisfied imagination. Aristotle recognizes that habit is not virtue, but that through habitual actions one comes to understand what virtue is. The connection between the two is obscure; yet the fact seems to have support.

So in art. Mechanical ability is not art. But through mechanical ability one is often "somehow" able to transcend the mechanical and arrive at the artistic. The "somehow" is always disconcerting, and never quite intelligible. And to say that the aesthetic is an emergent from the physical may be factually correct, but still not very enlightening. No doubt a major part of the difficulty resides in a misconception of the nature of habit. Purely mechanical habits of the stimulus-response type are, even as psychologists today are increasingly emphasizing, only abstractions from concrete behavior. In our gross observations, we ignore the unique character of each response. Governed by a prejudice to look only for the pattern of similarity, we overlook the intrinsic meaning of the specific response. The good art-teacher is in many ways a good psychologist. He keeps responses more fluid, and once they tend to become set, he suggests new patterns of behavior to counteract the old. Because he has better discrimination and vision than his student, he can recognize the spark of spontaneity and creativity, as well as lethargy and indolence, and can use means to stimulate the one and reform the other. His

task is to achieve order, but only that order which thrives in the gerundive becoming substantive.

Critical judgments of "Do this," or "Don't do that" have worth only so far as they lead to better vision. Being constructive, the positive judgment is more difficult to form, for it is the work of the creative artist himself, and is formed on the basis not of set art-rules but on the basis of aesthetic vision. The negative judgment, which is largely destructive, is more simply formed. It refers to defeated expression, and though a person may see that expression has not been realized—and can support his judgment through caricature—he cannot so easily supplement it with the positive judgment. Caricaturing employs a means-to-end method, and is a comparatively simple form of criticism. Founded largely in external relations, it may use an operational logic. Nevertheless, it gives evidence of the aesthetic impulse: in caricaturing a work of art, the critic may be unable to show what the artist should have done, yet he is aesthetically aware of the artist's failure. The ugly is always easier to criticize than the beautiful, for the inappropriate is shocking to the sensibilities, and can be more easily identified. Because continuity is broken, the external can be pointed out. Not so the immanent, which must be felt in its context, not pointed out. Some not very convincing theories consider the external—that is, the mechanical intruding upon the immanent—to be the mark of comedy. These theories are not convincing, because, we assume, comedy is aesthetic, and therefore must be distinguished from the ugly. Even though there is a close connection between the two, the comic is nevertheless construed in an immanent process, and is thus an aesthetic way of man's coming to terms with a highly civilized and mature world.

Metaphorical judgments mediate the aesthetic process; literal propositions refer to analytic facts. A proposition may, however, serve an aesthetic end, especially in respect to the detection of the ugly or inappropriate. When a singer's note is flat, judicious use of the pitch pipe may save the situation. The proposition can be asserted in strictly scientific terms. One may even compare photographic vibrations of the two sounds. This kind of proposition, however important, is elementary. One assumes that the artist

can discriminate elementary data through the ear. For higher criticism only the ear can judge, since interpretation may call for subtle shifting of pitch, tempo, or volume. Critical propositions may appropriately apply to elementary technique, but they can be truly evaluated only in the context of the judgment.

Two criticisms, from which the judgment is free, are open to the proposition. First, any situation admits of an infinite number of propositions, the sum-total of which cannot yield the aesthetic judgment, nor can any set of them yield the judgment. Secondly, unless the critic concentrates attention upon the consummatory experience, questions of technique are misdirected inquiries *ad nauseam*. Judicious discussion of technique always fall *within* the aesthetic context. Great art testifies that problems of technique become non-academic only as they are focused upon actual art. The approach to art through technique is inevitably sterile, unless propositions of technique can be transcended. Accordingly, the proposition is not a strictly valid judgment. The alternative approach is to mediate the aesthetic judgment through the metaphorical.

The virtue of the metaphorical judgment consists in its expressiveness. It is not so much true or false as it is enlightening or unenlightening. The nerve of expressiveness consists in its feeling-tone, precisely because feeling is not a passive suffering but a drive. The figurative form of the judgment is precisely that which makes possible reference to unfolding meaning. I suppose it does not make good sense to speak of the literal meaning of metaphorical expressions, for which reason, it seems, formal logic excludes metaphors. Nor is it strange that metaphors and idioms are least translatable. They must be rendered by similes. The reason is not far to be sought. Metaphorical reference is to the experiential (not to be confused with the observational), and such reference is always inadequate; for the experiential must be ordered as experience. The simile, in which reference is avowedly incomplete, becomes determinate only in further experience.

The meaning of metaphor is to be found in moving experience. It is no accident that the artist has much in common with the propagandist. As the academic world amply testifies, one is not

stirred to action by a literal proposition. One is stirred to action through emotionally moving ideas. Unlike art, the effectiveness of propaganda is accomplished by disjointing the past and present from the future. The metaphors of the propagandist must not be too engaging, for then attention is turned to the evolving present, in a way which makes us highly critical of it. Propaganda thrives on the trite metaphor, sufficiently impoverished to attract not too much attention itself, but sufficiently vivid to suggest a course of action towards a melodramatic end.

Art must not cut past and present from future—and in this sense compels a restraint, which is precisely that which the propagandist must destroy in order to make his propaganda effective. Art thrives only in an engaging process whose intrinsic worth evolves into fulfilment. The artist crystallizes expression in the art-work. When art gives rise to practical action—and through the vision one achieves in art, action certainly can become more enlightened—there is an attendant shift from the aesthetic attitude to some other attitude. In the sense that the artist is a superior critic of experience, our practical attitudes inescapably become molded in conformity with the values which art realizes. Without some conception of intrinsic values, the extrinsic have no moorings, and caprice and misdirected power and arbitrary authority take the place of intelligently directed conduct. The metaphor helps to give insight into the intrinsic value of art, but it can never be entirely satisfactory, for its true meaning is the referent of the aesthetic judgment: the aesthetic experience itself.

Since the aesthetic judgment does not mediate, but only records experience, its rôle is strictly curtailed. The metaphor as mediating judgment is no substitute for the aesthetic, but it performs its special office of mediating the evolving art-process. It does not analyze the whole into parts, for then it would destroy experience. Nor can it express the whole of experience, for then experience would not be mediated, nor in any valid sense analyzable. The dogma that analysis and synthesis go hand in hand is probably correct, but usually meaningless. In our view, analysis means not parts but partiality. Partiality is not self-sufficing; in its own cumulative drive, it contains tensions the inherent organization of

which is consummatory. Synthesis is growing determinacy. Complete synthesis is complete determinacy. Analysis is the recognition of partiality as engendering a purposive drive. This view of analysis and synthesis does not permit us to use the words of Dewey when he writes: "Judgment has to evoke a clearer consciousness of *constituent parts* and to discover how consistently *these parts are related to form a whole*."¹⁶ A more positive conception of mediating judgment would seem to take into account what has been above suggested as the function of metaphor.

Because metaphors are arresting and yet permit passage into further resolution, they mediate aesthetically. Thus they play the rôle of the perceptual—a *perceiving* which is being formed and which retains intrinsic worth in becoming determinate in the resultant experience. Metaphor directs us not to sensation but to perception, whose essence is synthesis. Once the perceptual whole is sundered into parts, only prayer—not always an effective agent—can bring it together again. Because it comes into being through process, beauty is thoroughly mediated, and consequently is thoroughly based on judgment. That is to say that perceiving is itself a process of criticism which is a quest for that which satisfies objectively. If we like, we may say that the process is subjective because it is not determinate, and the end is objective because it is determinate. The one is synthetic activity; the other is the realized objective. Because beauty is a complete realization, it can be expressed neither by propositions nor by the mediating judgment. Propositions are trivial and blind. The mediating judgment is partial and refers to perceiving; it is not true or false, but is an aid to perception.¹⁷ Mediating judgments can be evaluated only in the larger context of beauty, which, as we have seen, is unity or aesthetic individuality. They rest ultimately on the silent testimony of experience. This experience is recorded but not constituted by the aesthetic judgment.

¹⁶ *Art as Experience*, p. 310. Italics supplied. Perhaps a too literal interpretation of this sentence does not do justice to his thought, which he himself apparently feels compelled to modify in the succeeding sentences.

¹⁷ In *The Arts and the Art of Criticism*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, Ch. 23, Professor Theodore M. Greene attempts to show parallels between propositions in science and judgments in art. The latter cannot be understood save in a metaphorical sense, and I think are not true or false, any more than perception is true or false. Perception refers to a synthesis which either obtains or not. Truth or falsity then would have to be applied to its extrinsic relations, not strictly aesthetic.

Summary

Our discussion of the rôle of the proposition and of the judgment in mediating aesthetic value can now be summarized. When matters of technique are considered apart from the specific art-context, they can be set forth by means of propositions, and these are testable in the same way as are propositions in science. Both sense-material and abstract form may become objects of inquiry in technical problems. The propositions of technique refer to the physical structure of a thing, and the attempt to determine this is a scientific undertaking. The physical thing, we have held, is not irrelevant to the aesthetic object. Since, however, it is sundered from the aesthetic context, it lends itself to scientific analysis. This procedure, however, ruthlessly destroys the motivating drive of aesthetic fulfilment, and the physical thing is apart from and other than the aesthetic object. It is analyzed morphologically, and though an infinite number of propositions are predicable of it, no one or combination of them implies or otherwise issues into the aesthetic judgment. Since the thing has been shorn of expressiveness, and since unity can be realized only through expressiveness, which becomes determinate, the thing is doomed to still-birth.

The facts to which this analysis points are simple, but extremely important. On the one hand beauty is not proved, and on the other art is continually re-interpreted. The two go hand in hand, for if beauty could be proved, art would not admit of new interpretations. Since there is no logic of propositions by which the aesthetic judgment can be deduced, we must recognize that the proposition cannot mediate the aesthetic object. Moreover, propositions reflect an anti-aesthetic attitude and the data to which they refer cannot bring experience to realization. Technique is thus no guarantee of art, even though the converse is true that there is no art without technique. Hence, the metaphorical judgment presupposes but is not reducible to propositions.

The efficacy of the metaphorical judgment to mediate the aesthetic judgment resides in its purposive drive. Since beauty is the whole, the mediate must be partial and yet contain the movement

through which the whole comes to be. The metaphorical judgment has for its aim neither truth nor falsity, but expressiveness, looking towards the realization of experience. Though it is not true or false, the metaphor is grounded and directed or ungrounded and misdirected. It is grounded in the purposive movement of art and directed towards the beautiful. Hence, criticism must flow from the immediate appreciation, in the absence of which the critic may, to be sure, talk, but his talk is the kind of effervescence which one may read every day in the newspaper column. On the basis of his own immediate appreciation, the critic may then lead others into the work of art. This he can do only through suggestion by which the appreciator can himself re-create the work of art. The metaphorical judgment is inadequate and misdirected to the extent to which it leads away from art, instead of into it. Too often the highly emotional critic is one who indulges his own emotions without shedding light upon the work of art. Disdaining the medium in which feeling is grounded, he leaves us with a sense of his elation but with no sense of the art-process. Sound criticism asserts propositions in the context of the metaphorical judgment. When the critic succeeds in this enterprise, his criticism is grounded and directed towards the re-creation of the aesthetic object.

The term commonly used to bring together the proposition and the metaphor is style. Style is the expressive, which is physically embodied. It is the individualizing activity in which the physical becomes germane to art. It is the work, for it and it alone discloses intrinsic worth, which is individuality. In this achievement the artist has criticized, interpreted, and come to terms with his world. His art is grounded in the physical; and instead of renouncing the world, he makes it part of his very being. His insights are revealed and communicable because he has not renounced, but has brought the world to terms through the art-process; and by re-creating the art-process, we can share his insight. His criticism is the more significant because it is positive insight; its end is wholly mediated, and each moment of the continuity of the art-process is judgment which is founded in the keen sensibilities of maturing experience. This criticism is neither

prosaic nor romantic; it is imaginative. The authority of the imagination is compelling, for only through it is fulfilment achieved. Moreover, imagination effects a reconciliation between the physical and the expressive, a union which constitutes style.

Although techniques may be relatively easily abstracted and compared, it is different with style. When styles are compared, the historical interest is usually uppermost. There is, however, one legitimate, aesthetic reason for comparing styles: to make by way of contrast for clear aesthetic seeing. This interest is not governed by an attempt to criticize one as good and the other as bad, but only to vivify through heightened sensibilities what a work of art is. It may be that in comparing a copy with an original, one is found good and the other poor—and whether it is the original or the copy which is good is a task not for the historian but for the critic. The comparison shows that poor art is deficient in style; that is, in the individualizing process. The techniques may be similar, but the one is misapplied; the other not. When we look for similarities, there is always the danger of overlooking individuality; and coupled with this practice of looking for similarities is usually the inordinate desire to employ the so-called classics as yard-sticks. Whatever may be the virtues of the procedure pedagogically—and they cannot be great—the misdirected judgments of the past bear witness to its vices.

One more conclusion is pertinent to the discussion; namely, that there are no degrees of beauty. Whenever and however the aesthetic object comes into being, it is maximally aesthetic, and any further additions or qualifications can only detract from it. This conclusion implies, of course, that one aesthetic object cannot participate in another. A song from an opera, a stanza of a poem, a detail from a painting either is not a complete aesthetic whole, or the larger whole from which it is taken is a compound rather than an integrated whole. The opera is likely to be a mixed art, which is not thoroughly expressive, and rather loosely connected by recitatives. The stanza or the detail of the painting is likely to be expressive, but in its isolation not fully expressed. When the art-idea is such as to permit of greater development, in its original form it falls short of beauty.

If there are not degrees of beauty, there are nevertheless degrees of expressiveness, which may be only more or less completely expressed in a thing. Appreciation which is immediate and primarily instinctive requires little work for the imagination and hence little creative ability. So-called beauty of sense and beauty of form, and to a lesser degree, beauty of nature, are examples of the more instinctive and less reflective sort. They offer limited opportunities for analysis, and because of their intrinsic poverty, their worth is often confused with pleasure. Little wonder is it that hedonistic aesthetics emphasize primarily beauty of sense and of form. Since beauty of sense and of form are aesthetically indeterminate, pleasure is set up as a quality which is alleged to be the object of experience. Moreover, the object is not developed in a context, and preference very largely supersedes judgment. And since the thing is not determinate, conflicting and irresolvable judgments are made of it.

When the simple song is completely expressive, it is completely expressed. Aesthetically, it demands no great maturity, and again may fall largely on the side of the instinctive. It is noteworthy that the simple song is comparatively short and does not lend itself to the kind of development which we find, for example, in the later sonata-forms, where greater complexity requires a less melodic theme. Although in the generic sense there are no degrees of beauty—and in this sense, therefore, beauties are not comparable—there may be a difference in breadth and depth of meaning, which make for profundity and greatness of art. The simple beauties offer little room for the critic, and constitute no great problem either for criticism or for appreciation. The popular song of the day needs no dissertations or extended analyses. Appreciation of it demands but little receptivity. Not so with great art, in which the preparations for receptivity and judgment tax our susceptibilities to the full. Here the function of the critic is to help us to perceive. The principles involved are those of art-criticism. With our background of aesthetic analysis we may now explicitly observe what they are.

CHAPTER VII

Art-Criticism

To set forth principles of art-criticism is a task for one who combines the qualities of consummate artist, imaginative critic, and mature philosopher. One can embark upon such an undertaking only with a feeling of dogmatism—not to say, of trepidation. Since, however, the theory of the satisfied imagination implicitly involves a theory of criticism, I feel that this inquiry would be incomplete without some explicit statement of the nature of criticism. Moreover, aesthetic theory finds validation to the extent that its principles of criticism concretely relate to our actual appreciations; for theory takes on added significance when it is a guide to art.

If our preceding discussion is in principle correct, then beauty is both definable and analyzable as the culmination of the art-process. Its definition is not merely verbal; it is functional. The definition of beauty as the expression of a purpose in a sensuous medium refers us to the art-process which organizes sense-material into an object. When purpose is expressed, it is consequently the object, and nothing else; and aesthetic purpose thus cannot be severed from the object. In this latter sense, beauty is not definable, and we may say with MacLeish:

A poem should not mean
But be.

We do not suffer from the misdirected belief that purpose is given in advance of creation, or that creation is a mechanical feat of carrying out a predesigned purpose, or that the act of creation is otiose. On the contrary, purpose is neither realized nor known, save through the process of creation, and in this sense the poet knows not whereof he speaks until he has spoken. Realization of purpose is the wholeness that is beauty itself.

We have found that although beauty is not analyzable into elements or parts, the art-process, which issues into beauty, is thoroughly mediated. It is constituted by that urgency which organizes past and present activity into immanent drive demanding fulfilment. Process is experientially grounded, and is articulated in the metaphorical judgment. Such judgment is expressive and dynamic; it summarizes and anticipates; it is resolved only in immediate experience. If analysis is viewed as that activity which divides things into discrete parts, then beauty is *ipso facto* unanalyzable. But if it is viewed as the educative process of bringing past into the pregnant present, which also contains the promise of fulfilment, then beauty is tellingly analyzable.

Art-criticism proper mirrors growing determinacy, the organizing of tensions into a self-sufficient whole; or, in the case of the ugly, the disorganizing of tensions into irreconcilable oppositions. The former is criticism of beauty; the latter, of invincible ugliness. Because of their refusal to discern the art-process by which beauty comes into being, many writers have insisted that beauty cannot be analyzed from the experiential point of view. For them, analysis must be external to the thing itself; it is the relation of art to something beyond—whether that be something psychological, sociological, theological, or what-not. For example, Caudwell writes:

"If anyone wishes to remain entirely in the province of aesthetics, then he should remain either a creator or an appreciator of art works. Only in this limited field is aesthetics 'pure.' But as soon as one passes from the enjoyment or creation of art works to the criticism of art, then it is plain that one passes outside art, that one begins to look at it from 'outside'."¹

We need not question the possibility of a sociological or of other forms of analyses; we need only point out that there is aesthetic criticism which is more than "cold contemplation." If art-activity is cold, the temperature must decrease appreciably as one observes it from the outside.

The alternative looks as if it were the old shibboleth, art for art's sake. Yet the reflective person will be troubled with the answer that art is for the sake of something beyond—whether it

¹ Christopher Caudwell, *Illusion and Reality*, London (quoted by permission of) The Macmillan Company, p. xiv.

be society, God, or the bill-collector. Part of the difficulty may no doubt be traced to an unwarrantedly narrow interpretation of art, which is tied up with an historical genre. If art for art's sake must refer to a specific genre, then we had better give it up. If not, it may still make sense. In the first place, the meaning attributed to art by the theory of the satisfied imagination includes much more than the so-called fine arts. However closely the fine arts meet the requirements, there is always a question whether they wholly realize aesthetic purpose. Thus, those who urge that art is organization of experience enlist our sympathy. For perhaps the real meaning of art is, as Aristotle and Dewey and Whitehead and Bergson among others, have insisted, experience itself. The difficulty is not so much in art for art's sake, but in the attempt to sunder a peculiar type of value from the life and blood of virile experience. Once we perceive that experience is constituted by a host of coalescing values, perhaps incipiently initiated in our first waking moments, then art is not effete delectation, but activity occasioned by the need for coming to terms with our world. If there is any excuse for going back to the so-called classics in art, surely it is because of the diversified values which we share with them and which come to expression in them. Yet there is good reason for asserting—what seems to be a fact—that a minor poet of today is as important as a major poet of yesterday. Depth and permanence may not characterize his poetry, and though his day may be fleeting and "historically unimportant" he reflects a vision of our emerging world, with which we are more intimately in touch.

Finally, if art is for art's sake, it is not therefore individualistic, private, or incommunicable. On the contrary, the burden of our analysis has been to show that it is inherently social, public, and communicable. This alone can provide the nerve of a logic of art, which is thoroughly mediated. As the idealists have suggested, there is a genuine sense in which we may say not that the artist creates, but that the world creates through him. Although art may have different nuances of meaning, nevertheless since the artist excludes arbitrary and irrelevant details and focuses upon those aspects of experience which are of more than transitory interest, identity of meaning may be approximated. This is not

because art expresses the typical, but because through its process it expresses the individual. Only the grossest confusion arises where we do not distinguish the individual from the individualistic. Because, moreover, the individual is in context, and has both pre- and post-aesthetic aspects, we are provided with a clue for interpreting standards of criticism.

We have distinguished three phases of the aesthetic experience, each of which constitutes a more or less distinct moment. Through the phases we can better understand the relevancy of various types of criticism. First, there is the gross, relatively immediate approach to appreciation, which we have called the instinctive. These beginnings enlist our aesthetic impulses. The artist announces the theme which he is to develop, the course of which brings a greater realization of its latencies. This further development of the experience we called the more intellectual or mediated aspects of experience, with the analysis of which we were chiefly occupied in the preceding chapter. Finally, the intellectual or mediated is resolved in the consummatory experience, which is the end of art, for it has now issued into beauty in the generic sense. Our aim is to show that the basic divergencies of different types of criticism are due to the fact that each implicitly isolates and refers primarily to some one of these phases of aesthetic situation. We may avoid this internecine war and consider in order what we may call: (a) genetic criticism, (b) aesthetic criticism, and (c) higher criticism.

Genetic Criticism

(a) Genetic criticism may be defined as that form of criticism which attempts to show the relation between the pre-aesthetic and the art-work. It sometimes tries then to explain the latter in terms of the former. As we have suggested, genetic criticism emphasizes the instinctive aspect of art as its special subject-matter. By the instinctive, we mean not a patterned reaction to a stimulus, but the immediate, gross "feel" of a thing which is

engaging and which calls for further realization. The genetic critic observes that the art-process flourishes in a milieu, and he calls attention to this milieu in the attempt to focus upon the conditions which make for passage into the art-process. Since the art-process is conditioned by psychological and cultural factors, he converges attention upon their relations to art. Moreover, because he is little inclined to analyze the art-process itself—and even tends to insist that art cannot be criticized and that it is sheerly an emotional indulgence—he concentrates upon the origins of art, and hence rarely advances farther into art than its more “instinctive” phases. In his preoccupation with their dependence upon psychological, historical, and sociological or anthropological conditions, the genetic critic thus marks out his field of inquiry.

Genetic criticism, however, raises some puzzling methodological problems. First, we call attention to the indispensable dogma that all art-criticism tacitly assumes a more or less complete knowledge of the work of art. Otherwise, there simply is no criticism *of art*. Yet it is not always beyond doubt that genetic criticism abides without reservation by this dogma. Its problems are so set as to detract from art, and to reduce it to a psychological or social scientific discipline. Secondly, genetic criticism tends to occupy itself with pre-aesthetic rather than with aesthetic problems. Though it deals in good faith with conditions which lead up to the art-process, it has difficulty in showing the passage of these conditions into the art-work itself. This difficulty is usually coupled with the first, when the genetic critic refuses to take art seriously, and often has no sense for the individualizing process which constitutes the thing as a unique object of value. We are thus forced to insist that his criticism is legitimate only as it recognizes the advance of the pre-aesthetic into the aesthetic. Only thus can the psychologist, historian, sociologist and anthropologist contribute insight into aesthetic matters; for the line between aesthetic and non-aesthetic criticism is determined by whether we are forced into or away from art for its appraisal.

Psychological investigations have not as yet had signal success in aesthetic matters. Since, however, the individual's capacity to discriminate aesthetically has had a long development both in the

evolutionary scheme and in the social context, and thus provides a relatively virgin field for inquiry, we cannot say what future investigations may bring. It is, nevertheless, no mere coincidence that most of the laboratory work in psychological aesthetics has been performed on the more simple, instinctive aspects of beauty—line, color, tone, rhythm, and the like. These are most akin to non-aesthetic discriminations. As for studies in meaning and expression, the prize goes to the psychoanalyst. On this level the immediate aspects tend to be referred to subject-matter, and Hamlet is analyzed in terms of the Oedipus complex. We need not add our ridicule to those who have already spent themselves in debunking psychoanalytic criticism. We may, however, underscore the basal principles of individuality, which is foundational to all art, and of which the psychoanalyst has still offered no satisfactory account.

Genetic criticism no doubt has been most fully exploited and most painstakingly implemented by the historians of art. Though we cannot even hope to summarize the diversified approaches which they have followed, we may suggest some of the broader principles which are relevant to our discussion. That historical researches are governed by points of view, all more or less biased by the historian's interests, may be taken as axiomatic, though the point of view often loses its drive and vigor among the lesser camp followers who make a pretense of a more catholic, all-inclusive synthesis, but who actually achieve nothing more than egregious syncretism.² Yet the fact should not be obscured that historical criticism does have a bias in the light of which a leading thread is woven in and out of works of art. Predominantly, this bias is one which emphasizes and exhibits the development of

² History often suffers from unsupportable pretense. The naïve conception is that history is a mere chronicling of events. If, however, we accept the dogma that criticism presupposes intrinsic appreciation of art, the critic must first go to art and then work back to its origins. Thus, history actually begins with the contemporary and reads historical events backward. In other words, the direction of the critic's presentation is the reverse of his direction of understanding. No doubt his history would be more genuinely objective to the extent he understood the point of view of the predilections and biases from which he started. Then he could rid himself of his unctuous attitude and enter whole-heartedly in his adventure. His results would be attested by the realistic and directed outcome of his adventure, to which by virtue of his self-imposed restrictions he has willingly submitted. Objectivity consists not in pale fact, but in colorful enterprise, whose success is verified in fact.

technique in a given period or century of art-history. But technique, we have tried to show, is an abstraction and an intellectualistic discipline, separate from what is given more immediately and directly in experience. So the use of color or line, for example, is made a special object of concern, usually apart from its fuller embodiment in art. Because of his ability to abstract technique from art, the historian more than the artist is responsible for creating a genre. Whether a work of art is Apollonian or Faustian or what-not is a fiction created by the systematic mind. The fiction, however, is a bloodless category, intellectualistic rather than aesthetic, unless the critic shows how it actually enriches the texture of experience.

In order to correct the one-sided emphasis upon technique, historical criticism, may turn towards the representational in art—as if a synthesis were effected by asserting two extremes. This, of course, merely adds to the confusion, for now subject-matter tends to be severed from the only means by which it attains aesthetic standing. Researches in iconography may provide fertile soil for scholarly advancement, but they have still to demonstrate their claims to aesthetic standing. Only when subject-matter is shown to be the matter which becomes formed in art does iconography justify its aesthetic claims.

Finally, history may share in the enterprise which sociology and anthropology take as their field; namely, the cultural milieu in which art develops. In this case the object of concern is the cultural climate of the epoch in which the artist lives and works. Then art, especially in the sociological view, becomes a phase of cultural development, which includes as well, religion, politics, economics, science, and philosophy. The background which forms the cultural milieu of the artist, in which he must work, affords an orientation to art, but again at the instinctive level. These influences gain significance only as they functionally develop in art. Psychology, history, sociology and anthropology—all, *mutatis mutandis*, are beset with the same basic problem, so far as their contributions are intrinsic to an understanding of art.

Since they do not constitute art-criticism proper, but try to show how art is related to and emerges from the non-aesthetic, they inevitably concentrate upon what we have called the more

instinctive aspect of art, and try to bridge the chasm between the pre-aesthetic and the initial phases of art. The title often announces these phases of art, which become more distinctly aesthetic in, for example, the theme in music, the description in the novel, the prologue of the drama, or in some cases, in the disembodied techniques of the various arts. The starting-point in painting and architecture is often more arbitrary, for it proceeds usually from a general impression to a nicer discrimination of details, leading back to a discerning apprehension of the whole. But the original, general impressions are many-faceted and seem to be oriented largely according to those interests in which the appreciator has keenest sensibilities. Most appreciators seem inclined to look at painting primarily from the point of view of representational content—a rather unfortunate approach, for the simple reason that more often than not it makes them assume non-aesthetic attitudes. One's approach is no doubt from the facet most congenial to one's own sensitivities, whether it is line, or color, or tactual qualities, or what-not. The important thing is that if the approach is aesthetic, no matter where it commences it inevitably drives on to the other facets through the intrinsic logic of the work. Professor Mather has this to say:

"Right criticism is always of the total meaning of the work of art. The roads to total meaning are many. Where the critic begins to go in is a matter of convenience; eventually he must tread all the main routes to the center. He must write in the order of his own growing understanding. If, like the most talented critic, the late Roger Fry, he is especially sensitive to the form of the work of art, there he will probably begin, but his critical task is incomplete until he wins through form to meaning. Mr. Fry usually did, but somewhat grudgingly."³

In emphasizing the matter which is instinctively grasped, genetic criticism is incompletely aesthetic. Only as the inherent demands of the instinctive advance us into the art-process in which tang becomes determinate are we steeped in the very matrix of the aesthetic context, to which aesthetic criticism proper is relevant. This we see to be the intellectual aspect of the experience, the aesthetically mediated.

³ Frank Jewett Mather, Jr., *Concerning Beauty*, Princeton (quoted by permission of) Princeton University Press, pp. 227-228.

Aesthetic Criticism

(b) Once the instinctive has set up forces which advance the art-process, we are confronted with the mediating aspects of a growing experience. It is with respect to these mediating aspects of art that we feel the need of criticism which tells us what to look for in art, and how appreciation can be heightened. Two comparatively distinct approaches to the problem may be suggested as they emphasize (i) analytic description or (ii) sympathetic appreciation. Though they are not mutually exclusive, their aims and methods differ sufficiently to admit of being treated more or less separately.

(i) Analytic criticism is that which, beginning with the art-object as beautiful or ugly, proceeds by mediating propositions to describe the thing in factual terms. Factual statements are ideally correct or incorrect, and as such command assent or dissent. But although they have a strict factual grounding, their aesthetic merit may be nil. Unless they relate to the aesthetic purpose, they are trivial—sheerly unenlightened comments on the structure of the physical thing. Propositions may assert of art so-called primary and secondary qualities; they may even classify things according to set forms—sonnet, elegy, tragedy, sonata, fugue, rondo, and the like. Moreover, they may analyze further the minutiae of the various classifications. But so far as they are sundered from aesthetic purpose they are aesthetically sterile.

Enlightened criticism proceeds upon the assumption that a work of art expresses purpose, and unless the critic actually apprehends the purpose, he is unable to make revealing pronouncements on art. Factual statements he may make, but no factual statement implies the aesthetic judgment. The factual must find its place within the context and be subordinate to aesthetic purpose. Since purpose can be given only in actual experience, in its absence no critic is qualified to judge the relevance of actual data. Otherwise, criticism is incoherent to the point of vanishing, and inquiry becomes not aesthetic but scientific. In this event, technique is removed from the aesthetic context.

That purpose cannot be conceptualized and set up as the norm for evaluating factual statements has, of course, been pre-

judged in our previous analysis. Aesthetic purpose is not a concept; it is, as expressed, nothing short of the complete object. To characterize it conceptually is to distort its experiential character. As a suggestive tag, conceptualization may have some office. When it is substituted for immediate apprehension, however, it does irreparable damage. Speaking of Beethoven's *Fifth Symphony*, Schaufliker says that the four movements can roughly be divided into the outer struggle, comfort or reassurance, the internal struggle, and victory, respectively. "In some such broad way," he continues, "it is usually possible to define the argument of a musical composition; but with no more particularity than if one were to determine beforehand about some proposed fresco merely its size, shape, and principal colour scheme."⁴ Even though definable, concepts are indeterminate. In art, they may at best suggest or prepare the mind for individualizing activity. So far as concepts are taken literally, they defeat rather than further aesthetic appreciation.

The limitations of analytic criticism are patent. Factual statements cannot by any strict, formal logic issue into the aesthetic judgment. As mediating propositions, they fall within the aesthetic context, in which case they have no independent validity, and must always be qualified as a keener grasp of art manifests their limitations. In this sense, their validity is subordinated to and determined by experience, not it by them. Hence, they really beg the question. When they are made explicit and removed from the aesthetic whole, they destroy it. When they are inherent in the fabric of experience, they are always subject to modification. The virtues of analytic criticism are thus seriously restricted. The chief rôle of analysis is to correct emotional effervescences which bubble away from the medium in which alone art lives. When, however, the analytic critic is motivated by a driving insight into art, then his hard, factual analysis is not so easy to dismiss. Then he may raise some pointed questions about art. Does the artist arbitrarily, capriciously, and unintelligently ignore established canons; or does he take license only in order to further expres-

⁴Robert Haven Schaufliker, *Beethoven: The Man Who Freed Music*, p. 213. Though I am not suggesting that Schaufliker would agree with our general line of reasoning, certainly he recognizes the inadequacies of conceptualization.

sion? Are there conflicts which hinder and halt expression, such as unharmonious expressive elements, unresolved discords, loose ends, superfluous and distracting flourishes, or defects of structure, such that we are unable to apprehend the object in immediate sense-experience? So long as questions of this sort are framed within the context of the expression of purpose, they may be fruitfully multiplied. When this is the case, we observe that art-criticism thrives only in warm and intimate experience, which is the ground of sympathetic appreciation.

(ii) Sympathetic appreciation proceeds on the assumption that art is not a formal discipline, and consequently that its method is not one of propositions and of facts but of interests and of feelings. The appeal then must be to interests, and by gaining our confidence, the critic tries to reveal the emotional temper of a work of art. His procedure need not be uncritical; but he always makes analysis secondary to appreciation. His aim is to induce contagious enthusiasm, by which he tries to tap interests and to evoke appreciation for works of art. To further this aim he may find that a mere gesture of the hand or a subtle intonation of the voice often proves far more effective than noisy exhortation that the work ought to be appreciated.

This undertaking makes of the critic a teacher, in the highest sense of the word. He is a spiritual midwife, assisting in the birth of the art-object. Himself recognizing the intrinsic worth of art, he encourages and develops the latent sensibilities of others, that they may appreciate the work. His problem is to sensitize the physical thing into an expressive object for them. His purpose is to arouse their impulse to grasp the object in its wholeness. The task of this critic is one of bringing the perception of others to fulfilment through the free exercise of their sensory equipment, perception which is controlled only by the restrictions which the artist has imposed. Whoever accomplishes this task is a critic who is himself an artist, but in this case, one who is willing to subordinate his efforts to the re-creation of a purpose deemed worthy of expression. This is not impressionistic

criticism, which effects a new work stimulated by the original; it is objective criticism, which has for its aim the re-creation of the work the artist intended. Hence, it thrives not on subjective passion, but upon objective feeling which has become determinate.

The procedure of the sympathetic critic will vary according to the particular problem set before him. It must be adapted to the various inlets through which appreciation comes, and in this he is limited only by his own resourcefulness. He will exploit the various instinctive approaches to which he finds some ready response. When an original sensitiveness to color, or to line, for example, is manifest, he will pursue the lead. He may even resort to an historical approach, and place a work in a perspective of art-history or arrange works according to the artist's own development. This approach inevitably entails comparing and contrasting works of art with one another. With the understanding that belongs to his own genius, the critic presents works of art in order, from those simple and easy to grasp to those more complicated and difficult to grasp. So far as the procedure has to do with mere names, mere presentations, or mere chronological order, it is futile, culturally and aesthetically. These comparisons are odious. But if through comparison, the critic induces keener appreciation of the artist's intent, the procedure may well be accorded a place of dignity. Comparisons and contrasts that help us to see clearly the nature of the art-object are aesthetically legitimate, and may prove useful in art-education.

Where sympathetic appreciation is likely to go awry is in making for emotional contagion which leaves the art-object untouched. The critic may evoke emotional response, but it may be no more than a vote of confidence in him. It may contain nothing of the immediate apprehension of the object, but only of the critic's reflected, impressionistic emotion. And though the aesthetic judgment may be called forth, it has as its referent not the artist's intent but a misplaced confidence in the critic. The judgment then—perhaps wholly sincere on the part of the self-deceived appreciator—is aesthetic in name only. This practice can be adjudged only as objectionable romanticism.

Both analytic criticism and sympathetic appreciation are relevant to the art-process, so long as analytic criticism operates

within the frame-work of the aesthetic experience, and sympathetic appreciation keeps its eye directed toward sensuous embodiment of purpose. Aesthetic criticism rests upon the principles of the metaphorical judgment. We have seen in the preceding chapter that the metaphor articulates the expressive movement of the developing process. Through gerundives it focuses upon the moving perceptual process, which becomes fulfilled in consummatory experience. Criticism is pregnantly judging. It is the power of discerning, and since discerning is qualitative, its vehicle is the metaphor, the force of which ineluctably turns us to the experiential. Naturally, there are no pre-established rules for judging, precisely because it thrives only in the medium of creative spontaneity.

The genius which is implicit in the art-process dislodges fixed, old ways, and engages imaginative efforts for realizing the logos of the immanent. The critic assists the process through metaphorical, discerning judgments. His judgments are not final; they are slow-motions of the process, which must be increased to tempo if they are to issue into beauty. Analytic criticism, and *ipso facto* technique, must be subordinated to sympathetic appreciation, which, however sympathetic, is nevertheless wholly critical. For in meditation there is at each moment that discernment by which alone the whole becomes determinate unity or individuality. The process is one which involves spontaneous activity, and may with reason be called the principle of genius. Its individualizing activity yields the fruits of art in the resulting beauty. This and this alone is the content proper of the aesthetic judgment. With respect to these determinate wholes there is, however, a further set of principles of criticism, long recognized and needing only to be put in perspective.

Higher Criticism

(c) The artist and the appreciator have achieved in the consummated experience that resolution which proves the success of

the work of art. The further evaluation of this resolution is determined by its place within the dynamics of the cultural context. In part the problem is practical in the sense in which we need at times some comparative scale for measuring the value of works of art. Whoever repudiates this problem has never been confronted with the responsibility for, say, a concert or an exhibition. It is also in part practical in the sense that one feels the need of becoming more fully aware of his own culture, and perhaps even in comparing the ideals of his own culture with those of another. It is, of course, puerile to try to rate works of art in a scheme from highest to lowest, nor is this in any precise way required of us. Moreover, beauty in the generic sense is absolute and without degrees. As Dürer has written:

"Good and better in respect of beauty are not easy to discern; for it would be quite possible to make two different figures, one stout, the other thin, which should differ one from the other in every proportion, and yet we scarce might be able to judge which of the two excelled in beauty. What beauty is I know not, though it dependeth upon many things."⁵

But though we may agree that there are not degrees of beauty, nevertheless, there are degrees of expressiveness, and rough comparisons of the relative merits of works of art may be made. These judgments are partly relative to our own cultural settings; our appraisals inevitably shift in the light of our changing culture, and in the light of our insights, which may become either more mature or more senile. They depend partly upon those rare critics who are able to bring to life again the dormant virtues of neglected art. Despite the dependence of judgment upon cultural shifts and upon the quality of individual insights, the matter is not one of sheer caprice. There is still the pressing testimony of the works of art themselves. Unfortunately, the works are often set up as "classics" and are recognized by lip-service, however remote they are from our actual appreciations. But in all genuine appreciation we are compelled to advert to the thing itself.

The need for some standards is inevitable. Some works of art we call great. They have a profundity, a scope, an intensity that calls forth more than admiration. This is not to say they are

⁵ Quoted by T. Sturge Moore, *Albert Durer*, p. 319.

more beautiful than less pretentious forms of art but only to say that the purposes of artists differ. To develop a simple lullaby into a symphony would be to create a monstrosity. And since we still have room in our culture for lullabies, it does not make sense to say that the artist should have written a symphony. Of course, if the artist prostitutes his talents, that is a different matter. But assuming that he is driven on by the scope of his own imagination in the light of his culture, we have little justification for taking high moral ground in our criticisms. It is not necessary to develop at length what we mean by great art. All that is called for is a statement of the general principles or criteria of great art. Great art has profundity, by which we mean that there are layers of aesthetic meaning, not independent of one another, but so interlaced that we may be fully aware of some of them and only dimly and opaquely aware of others. Great art has scope, by which we mean that it encompasses a magnitude of vision not found in more simple and direct works of art. Finally, great art has intensity, by which we mean that its dramatic character reaches a pitch and climax unattainable in everyday expressions.⁶ These principles have been developed so often and are of such common knowledge as to meet no further elaboration here. A. N. Whitehead has crisply summarized what great art is in the following words:

"Great art is the arrangement of the environment so as to provide for the soul vivid, but transient, values. Human beings require something which absorbs them for a time, something out of the routine which they can stare at. But you cannot subdivide life, except in the abstract analysis of thought. Accordingly, the great art is more than a transient refreshment. It is something which adds to the permanent richness of the soul's self-attainment. . . . It transforms the soul into the permanent realization of values extending beyond its former self."⁷

Great art has a degree of expressiveness the power and vitality of which filter into a man's subsequent activities. Only one more

⁶ For a brief but clear exposition of these principles see Stephen C. Pepper, *Aesthetic Quality*, ch. IX. Calvin S. Brown, Jr. has written on an interesting phase of this subject in an article entitled, "Triumphant Repetition in Music," *Kenyon Review*, Winter, 1941, pp. 52-62.

⁷ *Science and the Modern World*, New York (quoted by permission of) The Macmillan Company, 1939, pp. 290-291.

point need be mentioned here; namely, the criteria of greatness are principles of art, not abstractions from art-objects. In other words, in employing them one is not segmenting art but only putting it in its cultural setting. Consequently, in employing them, the critic is not breaking works up into parts, but seeing them in their individuality.

One further class of art may be mentioned, especially indigenous to a culture intent upon experimenting with new art forms—what we may call, for want of a better term, “interesting art.” “Interesting art” is a kind of luxury in civilization. It may be exotic; it may have an indefinite number of forms. Essentially it is art whose purpose seems strange to a virile culture. Scarcely touching any deep-seated interests, it is a phenomenon more to be reckoned with than appreciated. In its experimental aspect it may possess germs of something which may later issue into significant art. But as the peculiar domain of an esoteric sect, despite the fact that it satisfies art-principles, it seems to be more a social fact than a manifestation of art.⁸ Because we seem to be so little attuned to it, interesting art is in our culture but not of it. Apparently, the only intelligent attitude towards it is one of tolerance. Since it formally satisfies the strictures of art-principles, we have no alternative but to permit its free development. For the underlying hope is that through free experimenting, art-forms which are native to our culture will emerge from it.

Our account of principles of criticism has had as its purpose to understand and interpret in a broad context the specific principles which critics appear explicitly or implicitly to use. Any other way of treating the problem would seem to be not only ungenerous but a misdirected attack upon those qualified to speak in their special provinces. What is called for is primarily a determination of the proper limitations of criticism on the basis of their own avowed approaches. In this manner we ameliorate those

⁸ I hesitate to mention specific works, but an example of the kind of thing I have in mind may be represented by Joyce's *Finnegans Wake*.

vested interests which try to speak with authority on matters beyond their vision. Whatever the approach, however, all intelligent criticism has common meeting-ground in the art-process. For here is the essential fact, in the absence of which there is nothing aesthetic for analysis.

The genetic critic, whether as psychologist, anthropologist, or historian, is looking to origins of the art-process from his own special point of view. Upon the assumption that he has no awareness of the intrinsic character of the process, such a critic proceeds blindly in a realm of misguided fact-finding. The assumption is preposterous. There are, nevertheless, degrees of understanding as to what the art-process is, and accordingly genetic accounts are more or less helpful as they lead us farther into or farther away from the art-object. Because of the ulterior purpose of the genetic critic—intellectual comprehension—the tendency to use art to further an intellectualistic rather than an aesthetic goal is always present. Since sympathetic appreciation is governed by the desire for aesthetic fulfilment, this kind of criticism most nearly achieves the objectives of the satisfied imagination. Sympathetic appreciation finds the roots of art in that which is immediately expressive, and its guides experience through the necessity inherent in the art-process to its final terminus in beauty. Thus, it emphasizes critical, aesthetic mediation, through which purpose comes to be expressed. Its vehicle is the metaphorical judgment. Higher criticism has for its aim the understanding of beauty—the consummated art-process—in a cultural scheme. Since the various types of criticism all commonly converge on the art-process, they differ, when intelligently pursued, in emphasis, general orientation, and special interest. Eventually, all of them evince interest in the cultural complex, within which alone art thrives.

Questions as to how the cultural complex is to be understood land us in a cauldron of controversy. Future history may provide the answers. With our background of analysis, some general

suggestions may be appropriate. The category of culture is the category of social values, and art as one of the leading participants in the social enterprise deserves to have its claims pressed. When, however, culture is considered as the postulate of social values, the urgent problem is to see ideally what unity is implied in it and how the ideal is to be implemented in practice. Where a culture is not highly integrated, a rough practice may seem to dictate the setting up of values ranging from the indispensable and essential to the desirable and worthy to the undesirable and unworthy. Plato has vividly portrayed some such scale, and for Plato, as for many others, a set of economic values is all-important.

The indispensable condition of a state is a social organization in which the primitive needs of its citizens are provided for. Otherwise, man cannot raise himself above the level of the brute. Thus it is assumed that only when we have satisfied the minimal requirements of economic goods can we legitimately raise the question of political rights. Aesthetic value would accordingly seem to fall within that class of goods which is desirable after the biological and political man has been served. When the economic and political situations have been set aright, then it is believed that art may truly come into its own. For when the major social dislocations are resolved, art can satisfy the inner man, and point to values which enhance his spiritual life. According to this view, aesthetic value cannot rightfully be indulged in, in a world sordid in its economic and political manifestations. So long as misery and suffering prevail, there seems to be little justification for aesthetic enjoyment, and the theory that art is an escape is certain to be proposed. Theoretically, this view appears to have justification; yet one suspects an over-simplification, which pretty thoroughly distorts the nature of the case.

Time and again the paradox has been pointed out that our civilization is one with a superabundance of goods in which people starve for want of them. We also have theory and vision of social organization in which man is accorded dignity in his political rights and social relationships, but scant means have been found for putting into practice those rights which would seem to belong to him. In the face of these difficulties, what justi-

fication is there for venturing into an area of art—especially designed for consumption by the élite—when we have not resolved the elementary problems of social organization? The idea that we ought to be able to enjoy the finer things, that we ought not to be so materialistically minded, seems nothing less than depraved romanticism coming from those who have no knowledge of hunger, unemployment, political persecution, and the like. But in a society graced with the cultural possibilities which we possess, art may perform a central rôle.

Art may itself help to establish the ideals of a worthy society. The art-process is thoroughly one of the creative imagination, and of such stuff is the just society formed. Since the artist is most sensitive to his cultural milieu, he can be a helpful participant in it and a molder of it. Society may well prize his imagination. Especially in great art he is steeped in his culture. Yet in seeing beyond his culture, he may well give direction to it, without prostituting his work and without falling into the distortions of vulgar propaganda.⁹ By introducing us into the creative process, he presents the only sound basis for cultural advance. That the process is not divorced from the social order is testified to by the late Justice Cardozo when he said, "I have grown to see that the [judicial] process in its highest reaches is not discovery, but creation . . ." And further:

"My duty as judge may be to objectify in law, not my own aspirations and convictions and philosophies, but the aspirations and convictions and philosophies of the men and women of my time. Hardly shall I do this well if my own sympathies and beliefs and passionate devotions are with a time that is past."¹⁰

Cardozo has here voiced the spirit of art. Those who are oversensitive to the propagandic effects of art fail to see that its tech-

⁹ Cf. Louis MacNeice, *Modern Poetry: A Personal Essay*, Oxford University Press, 1938, preface, and also p. 201. Stephen Spender in *The Destructive Element*, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1936, declares not merely that great art has a "political or moral subject" (cf. pp. 15, 19), but that because art insists upon human values, it is a "criticism of life." In a vivid statement, he proclaims that the reason artists should adopt a revolutionary program is in order that their interests may become social, and not anti-social. By being a criticism of the slums; good architecture, for example, helps "to shape a new society." (Cf. p. 229.)

¹⁰ Benjamin Cardozo, *The Nature of the Judicial Process*, New Haven (quoted by permission of) Yale University Press, 1931, pp. 166, 173.

nique is in essence democratic, for its essence is communication, and communication which is contained in the public nature of art. Whatever further effects art has—and if it has no further effects, it cannot be great art—are all to the good. In invigorating and refreshing us, in giving us a sense of power in nature, in its insights into reality, art deserves an added place of dignity. In this sense alone can we truly speak of realism and realistic grounding of things.

A realistic view sees art in its indispensable cultural context. More than ever before, we need a thoroughgoing analysis of culture in the light of which human activities can be seen to be humane. Comprehension of what is involved in art helps in this undertaking, for art is a liberating activity which gives direction to human power. The keener our appreciation of it, the better grounded are our actions in the practical world. In the broadest sense, it effects a vision of which we can ill afford to be ignorant. If action is not to be blind, if it is to make sense, then we must have a clear grasp of immanent meaning, of which art is a notable expression. Art is more than the fine arts. It is the creative process wherever and whenever it may occur. It is the genius of man in a world which becomes native to him.

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